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This dissertation revises the historical narrative of critical pedagogy in 
college writing classrooms.  It argues that the key principles of critical pedagogy, 
first articulated by Paulo Freire in Pedagogy of the Oppressed, were practiced 
by a number of pedagogues as early as the eighteenth century.  It examines the 
teaching practices of these men and shows that they anticipated the methods of 
critical pedagogy.  This dissertation spotlights the need to reinterpret the history 
of critical pedagogy and to select a wider lens through which to understand the 
current pedagogical scene. 
Chapter I defines critical pedagogy as method and explains the Freirean 
project.  Chapter II locates parallels between critical pedagogy and the process 
and expressive pedagogies of the late 1960s and early ‘70s.  Specifically, it 
argues that the works of Peter Elbow and Donald Murray embody the principles 
of critical pedagogy.  Their emphasis on the epistemological power of language, 
for example, prefigures the theoretical foundation upon which Freire constructs 
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his critical methodology.  Chapter III argues that the pedagogical advancements 
of I. A. Richards in the early twentieth century anticipated the teaching methods 
of critical pedagogy, especially insofar as they established student-centered 
writing classrooms.  Richards’s attempts to place student interpretations at the 
center of the course situate his pedagogy more comfortably among 
contemporary approaches to writing instruction like critical pedagogy than it 
does among the formalist approaches to which he is generally linked.  Chapter 
IV argues that Isaac Watts and Philip Doddridge, two eighteenth-century 
educators, employ teaching methods that parallel contemporary critical 
pedagogy.  Foremost, Watts and Doddridge create participatory learning 
environments that center on practical subjects.  They are among the first 
educators to teach in the English vernacular and to supplement the traditional 
classical curriculum with new learning.  Chapter V examines the historical 
contexts in which these preludes to critical pedagogy emerge and shows that 
Murray, Elbow, Richards, Watts, and Doddridge taught at times when 
educational access was expanding.  It argues that their pedagogies developed 
in an effort to address classroom diversity and to discover strategies for bringing 
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INTRODUCTION: PROMOTING AND PRACTICING DEMOCRACY 
 
THROUGH CRITICAL PEDAGOGY 
 
 This dissertation aims to contribute to the present identity and future 
direction of rhetoric and composition studies by providing a history of critical 
pedagogy in college English courses, particularly those focusing on the teaching 
of writing. A number of scholars, including Thomas Miller, Sharon Crowley, and 
James Berlin, have recognized or advocated critical pedagogy as a part of 
composition’s history, but none have focused, as I do, on a history of its 
manifestation in the writing classroom.   
 Since the English translation of Pedagogy of the Oppressed in 1970, 
Paulo Freire has been celebrated as the pioneer of critical pedagogy, an honor 
that is well deserved.  His influential work, centering on the epistemological and 
transformative power of language, gave writing pedagogues a coherent theory of 
education for critical consciousness and social change. However, while Freire 
was the first to articulate the principles for what is today called critical pedagogy, 
he was not the first to find value in a critical methodology.  The methods that are 
now associated with Freirean critical pedagogy were practiced by a number of 
pedagogues as early as the eighteenth century.  I argue that the teaching 
____________ 
This dissertation follows the style of MLA Style Manual. 
   2
   
 
 
methods of these men are preludes to critical pedagogy.  By introducing and 
reinterpreting the classroom practices of pedagogues heretofore beyond the 
bounds of critical pedagogy, I also revise the historical narrative of composition 
and provide a wider lens through which to understand the current pedagogical 
scene. 
 My historical examination of critical pedagogy centers on the three 
dominant characteristics that define Freire’s critical methodology in Pedagogy of 
the Oppressed: a focus on the generative power of language and its ability to 
create and transform reality; decentered and democratic classrooms where 
students and teachers actively engage course material through praxis and 
problemization; and the use of relevant discussion topics in which students have 
expertise, interest, and/or experience.  What I do not emphasize in my study is 
course content.  Because I understand Freirean critical pedagogy as primarily 
method, I am more interested in how teachers teach than what they teach—
although any such distinction between method and content amounts to a false 
dichotomy. “The medium is the message,” as Marshall McLuhan argues (9). 
 
Political Misperceptions 
 Despite the inseparability of method and content, I must rely upon the 
distinction in order to contrast the popular conception of critical pedagogy with 
Freire’s own conception of his project.  The dominant view of education in the 
United States—perhaps the world—is that education is a matter of content, a 
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matter of remembering information supplied by teachers.  This view, according 
to Neil Postman and Charles Weingartner, requires not that students engage in 
substantive thought but, instead, “believe in authorities, or at least pretend to 
such belief when they take their tests” (19).  When this view of education and 
teacherly authority encounter critical pedagogy, the political current of the latter 
often draws false charges of ideological indoctrination.  What is most interesting 
about this criticism is how it unwittingly turns on itself: the accusation that critical 
pedagogy indoctrinates students is only valid under the teacher-centered, 
content-driven educational model.  In other words, it is justified only when critical 
pedagogy is assumed to employ the banking methods of traditional education.  
Herein lies the difficulty in maintaining such criticism: a pedagogy that adheres 
to the banking model is not, by definition, a critical pedagogy.  Freire’s approach 
centers not on content but on method, not on authority but on democracy, and 
not on memory but on process.   Given these features, critical pedagogy cannot 
legitimately be condemned as indoctrination; it lacks the requisite constitution. 
Instead, critical pedagogy attempts to demythologize received wisdom and to 
critically engage the meaning and context of experience through reflection and 
action.  The process eschews indoctrination because it encourages learners to 
embrace their existential authority and to participate in the construction of 
knowledge. 
  Even within academic circles, the view that critical pedagogy is primarily 
methodology is not universally accepted.  To detect this discrepancy, one need 
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look no further than the controversy over the writing curriculum at the University 
of Texas in 1990.  Linda Brodkey, then director of lower-division English policy at 
Texas, initiated a revision to the standard syllabus of English 306, the first-year 
writing course, which enrolls nearly half of all incoming freshman.  With the input 
of faculty and graduate student teachers, Brodkey redesigned the syllabus with 
an emphasis on “Writing about Difference.”  Course inquiry centered on judicial 
argument, the structures of which students would examine within the context of 
antidiscrimination law.  To the extent that the course directed students to “revise 
and assess arguments in terms of the cases they make rather than the positions 
they take,” Brodkey perceived within the revised syllabus a critical methodology 
(166).  Nevertheless, given its overt political theme, the course was attacked in 
the local media for endorsing a “new McCarthyism,” (“Good Riddance”), 
criticized by a conservative faculty group for advancing a “single hegemonic 
view” (“Statement”), and condemned at the highest echelon of the university for 
“promoting ‘politically correct’ ideologies” (Cunningham 8).  Under the pressure 
of insurmountable criticism, the dean of the college of liberal arts postponed the 
new curriculum.  Interestingly, Brodkey says that no one outside of the 
curriculum committee—not university administrators, members of the media, or 
other critics—had seen or asked to see the syllabus prior to the postponement of 
the course (181).  
 That critics of “Writing about Difference” would denounce the course as 
an ideological program without having read the proposed syllabus suggests that 
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they see education not as the process of active inquiry but as didacticism, the 
instructional process whereby teachers tell students what to think.  Brodkey has 
a different view.  Reflecting on the controversy four years later, she explains the 
intended purpose of the revised syllabus: 
I hoped that this course would convince some students to use 
writing critically; to identify, analyze, and produce arguments; and 
in so doing, to learn that the purpose of academic argument is not 
to discredit an adversary (as is often in debates) but to arrive at, or 
construct, informed opinions about the profoundly complex and 
vexing social issues implied by difference. (239-40) 
Clearly, Brodkey did not conceive “Writing about Difference” as a vehicle for 
political thought control.  She saw it, instead, as a way to engage students in 
rhetorical inquiry and critical reasoning.  Students would participate by reading, 
thinking, and writing about difference within “the context of antidiscrimination law 
and court rulings on discrimination lawsuits” (Brodkey 240).  Through close 
readings of such documents, she intended students to reflect on the material, 
not simply to react to topic or to share personal opinion. 
 Brodkey acknowledges that course syllabi cannot establish pedagogy; 
however, she notes that the proposed syllabus for English 306 “explicitly valued 
the intellectual work of making and qualifying claims in the light of evidence 
rather than the positions or opinions asserted” (240).  Accordingly, it would be 
inconsistent for instructors to approach the course in a doctrinaire manner. 
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Because the syllabus represents argument as inquiry, as the process of 
exploring and forming interpretations of concepts and circumstances, it asks 
students to examine the evidence in court opinions and to evaluate whether its 
use is justified.  It does not ask them to conform to a single interpretation of the 
material.  The process, Brodkey claims,  
requires teachers and students alike to explore the assumptions, 
or what [Kinneavy] calls ‘dogma’, on which each of us bases our 
own beliefs about difference, in this case, and to explore the 
junctures at which our assertions about social reality may or may 
not be based on good reasons.  (239) 
Given the emphasis on critical thought and individual interpretation in the 
syllabus, a pedagogy that would advocate a single view of difference over the 
informed arguments of students would not only devalue the course topic but also 
the notion of rhetoric as inquiry.  In other words, while the course syllabus for 
English 306 may not determine pedagogy, it strongly suggests one.  Specifically, 
it suggests a pedagogy based on Freirean principles: it encourages students to 
use language to engage (and perhaps transform) social reality through the 
active interpretation of relevant subject matter. 
 Even though the basic principles of critical pedagogy support Brodkey’s 
claim that political content can be discussed without the imposition of political 
opinion, Maxine Hairston denied such possibility in the aftermath of the Texas 
controversy.  In her 1992 article “Diversity, Ideology, and Teaching Writing,” 
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Hairston argues that Brodkey’s proposed course in “racism and sexism” would 
have severely limited “freedom of expression” for students in the course (189).  
She believes that when politics enter the classroom, students can no longer 
express their ideas or challenge the opinions of their teachers without fear of 
retribution, which comes in the form of bad grades.  This view extends from her 
belief that pedagogies concerned with politics, issues of power, or social justice 
are necessarily dogmatic and antithetical to free inquiry (187-88).  Accordingly, 
her criticism against pedagogues like Brodkey denies the very possibility of 
critical pedagogy.  
 Hairston’s article was not without controversy itself, receiving several 
responses in College Composition and Communication, some of which were 
penned by scholars whom Hairston explicitly named in her article.  In nearly 
every case, the responders attack the associative bond that Hairston tried to 
establish between political content and dogmatism.  Robert Wood addresses 
this relationship from the perspective of Freirean critical pedagogy: 
Over the past few years, I have worked closely with a number of 
composition scholars and teachers who are unquestionably 
committed to social issues and change—teachers Hairston would 
call “radical leftists.”  But never have I heard even one of these 
instructors so much as suggests that as teachers we should 
coerce our students into adopting our political views or that we 
should use the classroom to proselytize.  Doing this would conflict 
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with the most fundamental premise of liberatory pedagogy, which 
is to empower students.  (250) 
Wood clearly sees no direct link between politics in the classroom and 
indoctrination.  Has admits that many of his colleagues are radical, yet he has 
never observed what Hairston has.  If such activity were as common and 
widespread as she maintains, then surely a “veteran instructor” like Wood would 
have observed some attempts at indoctrination (Wood 249).  But as he and 
several other responders note, it is possible for teachers to discuss politics and 
other relevant topics without imposing their views upon students. 
 The conflation of political content with the politicization of the classroom is 
even more widespread outside of academia.  Whereas institutional controversies 
over course content—such as that at the University of Texas—rarely escalate to 
national attention, an ongoing assault against higher education persists in the 
media today.  The most vocal critic has been David Horowitz, author of several 
inflammatory books on higher education and the architect of the Academic Bill of 
Rights.  In The Professors, he argues that the traditional disinterested pursuit of 
knowledge—once the hallmark of academics—has been replaced with relevant 
subjects matter and political agendas.  He blames the transformation on 1960s’ 
anti-war activists who he says avoided the draft by staying in school to earn 
doctorates.  According to Horowitz, when these radicals received tenure-track 
appointments, they took their political activism with them.  “As tenured radicals,” 
Horowitz says, “they were determined to do away with the concept of the ivory 
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tower and [ . . . ] set about re-shaping the university curriculum to support their 
political interests” (ix-x).  To emphasize the radical nature of these professors 
and their ideologies, Horowitz lists a few of the interdisciplinary fields that have 
appeared over the years (e.g. peace studies, post-colonial studies, social justice 
studies) and argue that they attack various aspects of America, including its 
military and national identity (xi). 
 While Horowitz does not explicitly name critical pedagogy in his assault 
on higher education, it is nevertheless clearly within his crosshairs.  Most of his 
criticism, for example centers on the movement to make education relevant to 
current events and to the lives of students, a mainstay of critical pedagogy.  He 
maintains that the movement, which often introduces politics into the classroom, 
constitutes political advocacy.  He does not recognize, however, that the mere 
mention of a political topic in the classroom no more constitutes advocacy for a 
position than a discussion of Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s “The Yellow Wallpaper” 
promotes the confinement of new mothers.  To maintain such a position is to 
ignore a hundred or more years of pedagogical scholarship in the United States, 
scholarship that has advanced educational theory and developed alternatives to 
traditional classroom methods.  John Dewey, I. A. Richards, Paulo Freire, and 
bell hooks, for example, have promoted democratic learning environments that 
encourage students to participate in the creation of knowledge.  To assume, as 
Horowitz does, that teachers who bring relevant topics into the classroom ignore 
pedagogical scholarship is unreasonable, especially when educational theorists 
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who advocate the use of the relevant topics often do so to promote democratic 
and participatory learning.  Case in point: Freire argues that the content of 
education must start with students.  It must be organized around their existential, 
concrete, and present situations.  If the content is not relevant, then students are 
not equipped to participate in their education (Pedagogy 95-96).  For critical 
pedagogues, a commitment to democratic education is, at once, a commitment 
to relevant topics.  For Horowitz, however, no such connection exists: he 
believes that teachers bring relevant material into the classroom to advance 
radical political agendas; he never acknowledges that teachers might draw on 
such material—as part of a valid pedagogical method—to engage students in 
critical discussions of issues. 
 Despite his opposition to relevant topics, Horowitz professes the same 
educational values as critical pedagogy.  In his introduction to The Professors, 
he argues that the professorial task is “to teach students how to think, not to tell 
them what to think” (xxvi).  He supports this view on the grounds that “all human 
knowledge is uncertain and only imperfectly grasped” (xxvi).  This uncertainty, 
he says, is what makes issues controversial.  There are no “correct” answers, 
only interpretations of evidence.  Accordingly, Horowitz argues that teachers 
must temper their lessons with alternative interpretations of course material.  
Critical pedagogy shares these values.  Starting with the premise that all 
knowledge is situational, it seeks to engage students in the creation and 
transformation of reality.  In other words, like Horowitz, critical pedagogy 
   11
   
 
 
maintains that all human knowledge is unfinished (“uncertain”) and that the 
primary educational objective is to engage students in a critique of received 
wisdom (“to think for themselves”).  However, while critical pedagogy strives to 
reach the same educational goal that Horowitz champions, the process through 
which it pursues that goal is different from that which Horowitz recommends. 
 Critical pedagogy maintains that authentic education must be dialogic: it 
must include the views of teachers and students.  Through dialogue with others, 
Freire says, we become critically aware of the situations in which various views 
of the world manifest (Pedagogy 96).  When teachers and students share their 
diverse interpretations of reality, alternatives emerge against which participants 
are compelled to reconcile and evaluate their knowledge and perceptions of 
world.  If the process is not democratic, then students do not learn to negotiate 
knowledge and to think for themselves; instead, they are conditioned to 
uncritically accept interpretations of reality that are imposed by authorities.  
Horowitz also wants students to think for themselves, but he expects professors 
to provide the various intellectual perspectives from which students will form 
conclusions.  “[T]eachers,” he says, “are expected to make their students aware 
of controversies surrounding the evidence, including the significant challenges to 
their own interpretations” (xxvi).  In other words, Horowitz believes that students 
learn to think for themselves by collecting opposing viewpoints.  This approach 
provides students with ready-made arguments on both sides of an issue, 
allowing them to decide for themselves which is more convincing; however, 
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deciding which side of an issue makes better arguments—or which position is 
more consistent with a particular worldview—is hardly considered thinking for 
oneself.  It does not engage students in a critique of knowledge but asks them to 
choose between established positions.  
 Horowitz’s approach is far less independent than Freire’s, which 
encourages students to consider the extent to which their concrete situations 
inform their understanding of issues and their interpretations of arguments, a 
process that expands opportunities to think beyond conventional boundaries and 
ideological categories.  Accordingly, despite its focus on relevant topics, critical 
pedagogy is more consistent with Horowitz’s educational values than Horowitz’s 
own approach.  The latter inhibits independent and creative thinking by providing 
students with packaged arguments.  That more than one position is addressed is 
less significant than from where the critiques and arguments come.  Because 
teachers remain the exclusive source of knowledge under his approach, 
Horowitz unwittingly promotes a pedagogy that reflects not the “democratic 
systems of education” that he wants to protect but their “totalitarian counterparts” 
(xliv).  In the end, his approach has teachers speaking for and acting upon 
students, a practice that meets Freire’s criteria for indoctrination (94). 
 My criticism against Horowitz and others who conflate political content 
with political activism (including those who attacked Brodkey’s revision to the 
first-year writing syllabus at the University of Texas) should not be read as a 
rejection of the claim that indoctrination occurs in college classrooms.  It would 
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be naïve to assume that it never does.  However, it is equally naïve to assume 
that political discussions are always doctrinaire.  Critical pedagogues frequently 
introduce social and political topics, but they do so without the imposition of 
political opinion.  Any attempt to do so would violate the principles of critical 
pedagogy.  The Freirean educational model, therefore, cannot be defined as 
commitment to a particular political agenda. Nevertheless, to say that critical 
pedagogy does not impose a partisan agenda is not to deny that it asserts an 
ideology.  It does.  In this respect, it is no different than any other educational 
approach: “Each pedagogy,” Berlin observes, “is imbricated in ideology, in a set 
of tacit assumptions about what is real, what is good, what is possible, and how 
power ought to be distributed” (“Rhetoric and Ideology” 492). Critical pedagogy 
reflects an ideology grounded in freedom and democracy.  It promotes these 
values by performing them, by leveling traditional educational hierarchies and 
empowering students to seek alternative possibilities in the world.  It does not 
merely profess them.  Any attempt to achieve freedom and democracy via the 
banking model of education is paradoxical, for such attempts actually deny 
students the right to practice these values. Because the liberatory potential of 
critical pedagogy manifests in practice, critical pedagogy must be conceived 
primarily as methodology, not content. 
 Perhaps some of the misperceptions about pedagogies that bring politics 
and other relevant topics into the classroom are driven by pedagogical 
scholarship that privileges social vision over classroom practice.  Critical 
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pedagogy has its fair share of such scholarship.  The educational works of 
Henry Giroux and Peter McLaren, for example, emphasize the role of education 
in disrupting existing power structures and transforming dominant social and 
political realities within communities and cultures; they emphasize this role at the 
expense of classroom methods by which critical educational theories might be 
enacted. Giroux and McLaren maintain that teachers should define themselves 
not as classroom technicians but as transformative intellectuals “who are able 
and willing reflect upon the ideological principles that inform their practice, who 
connect pedagogical theory and practice to wider social issues, and who work 
together to share ideas, exercise power over the conditions of their labor, and 
embody in their teaching a vision of a better and more human life” (xxiii). While 
Giroux and McLaren do not ignore the topic of pedagogical practice, they 
generally address it in an abstract manner.  As a result, their discussions of 
methodology do less to alter actual classroom practices than they do to redefine 
the social and political meanings of those practices as transformative events. 
 Such privileging of theory over practice can give the impression that 
critical pedagogy is first and foremost a body of knowledge.  This perception can 
lead teachers who are drawn to the liberatory goals of critical pedagogy—or 
even to the image of the radical transformative educator—to view themselves as 
bearers of critical knowledge. Chris Gallagher, reflecting on his earliest college 
teaching experience, admits that he once viewed his role as a critical pedagogue 
in much the same way: “When my first semester at the college turned out so 
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disastrously, then, my conclusion was that I simply didn’t ‘have’ enough ‘critical 
knowledge’ to ‘give’ to others” (74).  Gallagher initially believed that the liberatory 
goals of critical pedagogy could be achieved by transmitting his knowledge to 
students.  When his efforts failed, he could only assume that he did not possess 
or transmit enough of the right knowledge, as he then believed that the critical 
project was a matter of content. Gallagher could not then understand how critical 
pedagogy differed from traditional banking pedagogies that critical pedagogues 
denounced. 
 Gallagher’s candid reflections illustrate the degree to which abstract and 
theoretical scholarship on critical pedagogy can reinforce the notion that 
education is about transmitting content.  Shari Stenberg echoes this point in 
Professing and Pedagogy: “Critical education scholarship that ‘promotes’ 
pedagogy to the level of abstraction—knowledge to be mastered more than 
engaged—in fact only replicates the most traditional professorial model” (51).  
The consequence of viewing critical pedagogy as a body of knowledge is that 
some teachers will misinterpret the transmission of that knowledge as the 
enactment of a critical pedagogy.  In other words, they will operate under the 
banner of critical pedagogy while still practicing the banking methods of 
traditional education as Gallagher initially did. 
 Not all critical pedagogy scholarship privileges theory over practice.  Ira 
Shor, bell hooks, Jennifer Gore, and Amy Lee, for example, emphasize teaching 
practices in their work.  In this regard, their scholarship closely aligns with that of 
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Paulo Freire.  Case in point: in Empowering Education, Shor reflects on his 
attempts to enact critical pedagogy within his courses.  He spend some time 
discussing the theory and goals of critical pedagogy, but his primary focus is 
clearly classroom practice: he offers strategies for generating and introducing 
themes; he analyzes some of the obstacles that he encountered in his teaching; 
he provides a number of resources to help teachers enact critical pedagogies; 
and he offers examples of the class discussions that he and his students have 
had.  Amy Lee accomplishes much same thing in Composing Critical 
Pedagogies, where she presents a “critical portfolio of one teacher’s (ongoing) 
process of coming to a specific version of critical pedagogy in the teaching of 
writing” (5). 
 Even though Shor and Lee take similar practical approaches to 
scholarship, their critical pedagogies are not the same; hence, Lee’s statement 
about her “specific version” of critical pedagogy.  One such disparity between 
versions relates to the selection of subject matter.  Shor generates course 
themes with the input of his students: he dialogues with them at the start of the 
semester to locate issues within the “unsettled intersection of personal life and 
society” (55).  The resulting themes become the subject of inquiry for the course.  
Lee does not take this approach.  She initiates course themes and selects 
discussion topics.  Nevertheless, her selections center on the theme of identity 
with the intent of empowering students to speak from a position of authority 
(179-249).  On the surface, Shor’s version of critical pedagogy appears to 
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adhere more faithfully to the Freirean blueprint of education than Lee’s version 
does because it utilizes generative themes; however, this detail seems minor 
when we consider that generative themes are designed to represent student 
views of the world and to guard against the imposition of ideas (Freire, 
Pedagogy 108-9), values shared by Lee’s version of critical pedagogy.  Through 
writing assignments and class discussion, Lee prompts her students to engage 
in examinations of their identities.  She initiates the themes, but she also permits 
the exploration of experience and the discovery of meaning through dialogue.  In 
other words, Lee still centers her pedagogy on the ideas of students.  It is also 
important to remember that Freire and Shor are not opposed to the practice of 
teachers introducing themes for investigation.  In fact, Freire encourages such 
activity because it corresponds to the dialogical relationship that critical 
education creates between teachers and students (Pedagogy 120).   
 The specific version of critical pedagogy practiced by Lee is different than 
the version practiced by Shor, but the differences lie not within the fundamental 
principles of the critical methodology but within the particulars of a specific 
manifestation.  In this regard, we might reasonably say that each enactment of 
critical pedagogy is a version, for every teacher in every classroom context will 
negotiate the methods differently.  This is not mean, however, that Gallagher’s 
first attempt at college teaching was a version of critical pedagogy.  By virtue of 
its banking methodology, his pedagogy was incompatible with Freire’s 
educational project. 
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 The type of scholarship represented by Shor and Lee gives a rounder 
view of critical pedagogy than that which foregrounds theory and social vision.  
That is not to say that it proposes a better model of critical pedagogy, only that it 
highlights to a greater extent the importance of Freire’s methodology within the 
critical project.  At the very least, the scholarship that permits praxis between 
theory and practice guards the banner of critical pedagogy against inadvertent 
misrepresentations, the sort of which Gallagher describes above; it also 
suggests that critical pedagogy is not a static project but a process that “must be 
conceptualized in relation to the real contexts, to the complex and dynamic sites 
in which our teaching takes place” (Lee 8). 
 
Defining the Freirean Project 
 While the theoretical separation of method and content is helpful in 
distinguishing critical pedagogy from popular and distorted characterizations 
thereof, McLuhan suggests that no real separation is possible.  He maintains 
that a symbiotic relationship exists between method and content, and that the 
former “shapes and controls the scale and form of human association and 
action” (9).  From an educational perspective, McLuhan’s argument suggests 
that teaching methodologies structure the relationship between students and 
knowledge: more specifically, it determines who has the authority to define 
reality and to give meaning to experience.  These determinants constitute the 
content of education and are linked to what students do in the classroom.  Under 
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the traditional model of education, students do little more than listen to teachers 
and memorize information. “They are almost never,” according to Postman and 
Weingartner, “required to make observations, formulate definitions, or perform 
any intellectual operations that go beyond repeating what someone else says is 
true” (19).  Because students rarely retain the information that they are taught 
from one test to the next, Postman and Weingartner argue that “just about the 
only learning that occurs in classrooms is communicated by the structure of the 
classroom itself” (20).  In other words, the content of a course can be found in its 
methods.  According to Freire, traditional education is oppressive because it 
teaches the following: 
(a) the teacher teaches and the students are taught; 
(b) the teacher knows everything and the students know nothing; 
(c) the teacher thinks and the students are thought about; 
(d) the teacher talks and the students listen—meekly; 
(e) the teacher disciplines and the students are disciplined; 
(f) the teacher chooses and enforces his choice, and the students 
comply; 
(g) the teacher acts and the students have the illusion of acting 
through the action of the teacher; 
(h) the teacher chooses the program content, and the students 
(who were not consulted) adapt to it; 
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(i) the teacher confuses the authority of knowledge with his or her 
own professional authority, which she and he sets in 
opposition to the freedom of students; 
(j) the teacher is the Subject of the learning process, while the 
pupils are the mere objects.  (Pedagogy 73) 
 Conversely, the content of critical pedagogy is liberation—the practice of 
freedom and democracy. Of course, critical pedagogues do not impose this 
content from the outside (e.g. lecturing about the oppressive power structures of 
society), for such constitutes oppression under Freire’s view of banking 
education; instead, they attempt to empower their students through the 
enactment of democracy in the classroom.  In other words, rather than treat their 
methodology as a means to achieving the liberatory goals of critical pedagogy, 
critical teachers treat their classroom practices as democratic achievements in 
themselves. Henry Giroux and Peter McLaren, for example, argue that schools 
are “democratic public spheres” where students learn about democracy and civic 
responsibility through the practice thereof (224).  Ann George agrees, noting that 
students learn democracy by “participating in democratic dialogue about lived 
experience, including the content and conduct of their own education” (97).  
Nevertheless, as surveyed above, critical pedagogy is sometimes characterized 
as a reformist pedagogy whose political objective is to make students aware of 
their oppressed social existences and to encourage them to engage in the 
struggle for equality and social justice.  While critical awareness is an important 
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step along the path to liberation, it should not be understood as a commitment.  
Critical pedagogues do not set out to reform their students’ beliefs or political 
opinions; rather, they attempt to enrich student learning through participation.  
To be sure, critical awareness may follow, but the course content of critical 
pedagogy is always the practice of democracy. 
 One of the ways in which Freire pursues his educational vision is the 
establishment of decentered classrooms.  In Pedagogy of the Oppressed, he 
proposes a leveling of the traditional educational hierarchy, conceiving teachers 
not as authorized distributors of knowledge but as partners in the search for truth 
and meaning.  Unlike banking models of education, which emphasize the voices 
of teachers over students, Freire’s pedagogy encourages dialogue between 
students and teachers.  He recognizes that students possess knowledge, and he 
wants them to share their knowledge with other members of the class, for just as 
teachers become learners in decentered classrooms, learners become teachers.  
Of course, such restructuring does not mean a simple reversal of institutional 
roles, as the inversion of the relevant terms suggests; instead, it means the 
destruction of the dichotomy between teacher and student, the creation of an 
environment where all course participants equally engage in the making of 
meaning. “To resolve the teacher-student contradiction,” Freire argues, “to 
exchange the role of depositor, prescriber, domesticator, for the role of student 
among students would be to undermine the power of oppression and serve the 
cause of liberation” (Pedagogy 75). 
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 Freire’s advocacy of decentered classrooms is grounded in a belief that 
humans do not exist independent of the world that they know.  According to this 
view, reality is not a completed thing but a dynamic process that is dialectically 
shaped by men and women.  Freire believes that everyone should participate in 
the process.  In fact, he says that it is the “ontological and historical vocation” of 
all human beings, regardless of social rank or status, to do so (Pedagogy 66).  
That is to say, the process of acting upon and transforming reality is the 
foundation of freedom.  If a person is not allowed the right to engage the 
process, then oppression results: he or she is subjected to an interpretation of 
reality with which he or she nothing to do.  Conceiving education as the practice 
of freedom, Freire encourages students to act upon their realities, to consider 
the extent to which received wisdom reflects their experiences and concrete 
situations and to envision alternative ways of thinking and being.  He wants to 
abandon the model of education where teachers regulate and impose reality 
upon students, adopting instead a decentered model where teachers and 
students democratically confront their existence in the world (Pedagogy 76-79). 
 Because dialogue is instrumental in creating decentered classrooms, 
Freire encourages teachers to introduce topics about which students have some 
knowledge.  If students have no knowledge or experience about a particular 
topic, then they will likely feel that they have nothing to contribute to a 
discussion, effectively refocusing the course on the teacher.  To avoid slipping 
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into the banking model and to further encourage participation, Freire maintains 
that the starting point for dialogue is the “here and now“: 
The starting point for organizing the program content of education 
or political action must be the present, existential, concrete 
situation, reflecting the aspirations of the people.  Utilizing certain 
basic contradictions, we must pose this existential, concrete, 
present situation to the people as a problem which challenges 
them and requires a response.  (Pedagogy 95-96)  
Freire wants to locate topics within concrete situations because they are relevant 
to the lives of students.  He believes that students will put more energy into their 
education when they can more readily perceive its connection to the real issues 
that they face.  Relevant topics also give students the opportunity to reflect on 
lived experiences and to speak from a position of authority.  This concrete 
approach to education, which Freire calls “problem-posing education,” is 
designed to bring learners into conversation with one another.  It encourages 
them to share their experiences about the world and to consider the extent to 
which knowledge is rooted in social situations.  Moreover, problem-posing 
education, insofar as it promotes reflective dialogue about the world, provides 
learners the opportunity to act upon reality with words. 
 Language is the final element in Freire’s educational vision.  It is the 
indispensable instrument through which learners reflect upon and transform the 
world.  “Within the word,” he writes, “we find two dimensions, reflection and 
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action, in such radical interaction that if one is sacrificed—even in part—the 
other immediately suffers” (Pedagogy 87).  Freire assigns the Greek term 
“praxis” to this interaction because it implies a kinship between theory 
(reflection) and practice (action), terms widely considered incompatible.  He 
believes that words, utilized in authentic dialogue, have transformative power.  
The ability to name the world is also the ability to change it.  However, words are 
not always instruments of empowerment.  When a dichotomy is imposed upon 
the two dimensions of the word, then positive transformation is never possible.  
Deprived of action, the word amounts to no more than verbalism or “idle chatter”; 
deprived of reflection, it amounts to no more than activism or “action for action’s 
sake” (Freire, Pedagogy 87-88).  Either dichotomy, Freire maintains, inhibits 
authentic dialogue and authentic forms of thought. 
 Because authenticity is necessary to achieve the educational goals of 
critical pedagogy, students must learn to think critically.  For Freire, this means 
perceiving a dialectical relationship between language and reality.  Students 
must see language as an instrument that is capable of transforming individuals 
and the world, both of which are constantly in the process of becoming.  In other 
words, students must accept that dialogue is praxis: 
[T]rue dialogue cannot exist unless the dialoguers engage in 
critical thinking—thinking which discerns an indivisible solidarity 
between the world and the people and admits of no dichotomy 
between them—thinking which perceives reality as process, as 
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transformation, rather than as a static entity—thinking which does 
not separate itself from action.  (Pedagogy 92) 
Freire maintains that true education is only possible when his criteria for critical 
thinking are met.  Only when students perceive their dialectical relationship with 
the world can the contradiction between teacher and student be resolved.  Only 
then can their words have transformative power and can education become the 
practice of freedom.  “Authentic education,” Freire says, “is not carried on by ‘A’ 
for ‘B’ or by ‘A’ about ‘B,’ but rather by ‘A’ with ‘B,’ mediated by the world—a 
world which impresses and challenges both parties, giving rise to views or 
opinions about it” (Pedagogy 93).  
 To achieve his vision of education as the practice of freedom, Freire 
unites linguistic praxis with relevant course topics and decentered classrooms.  
Together, these pedagogical strategies compose Freire’s critical methodology. 
Note that no single strategy—or combination of two—can achieve the status of 
critical pedagogy on its own.  The efficacy of each strategy depends upon the 
others.  For example, students cannot fully participate in class discussions and 
resolve the teacher-student dichotomy if they do not have a say in the content of 
the course.  Likewise, students have little incentive to engage class discussions 
when their voices have no authority to create meaning.  The strategies overlap 
too much to be effective on their own.  Despite such overlap, it is necessary to 
consider the strategies as discrete entities within the broader framework of 
critical pedagogy, for such delineation provides the analytical formula for 
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understanding Freire’s methodology and examining historical manifestations 
thereof.  
 Once critical pedagogy is defined as method and detached from the 
political agenda with which it is often associated, its history and scope broaden.  
That is to say, it expands its reach across pedagogical boundaries.  Moreover, 
critical pedagogy becomes compatible with a number of modern pedagogies, 
including those that adopt feminist, cultural, rhetorical, and expressive 
perspectives; it is also becomes compatible with many of the educational 
methods employed decades before Freire constructed the theoretical framework 
for critical pedagogy.  The view that critical pedagogy is a classroom method 
that traverses contemporary divisions between composition pedagogies informs 
my approach to critical pedagogy and engenders my historical investigation 
thereof.  By interpreting Freirean pedagogy as method, I have established 
parallels between critical pedagogy and the process and expressive movements 
of late 1960s and early ‘70s, the classroom practices of I. A. Richards in the 
1920s, and the deliberative methods of the English dissenting academies in the 
1700s.  As much as possible, I have attempted to focus my study on teaching 
practices, as they are they backbone of critical pedagogy.  Of course, any such 
attempt to reconstruct and understand those practices requires an examination 
of scholarly works and theoretical principles that surround (and likely inform) the 
pedagogies.  Furthermore, a consideration of the historical contexts in which the 
manifestations of critical pedagogy emerge is also necessary, for it provides 
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insight into possible social and educational motivations for revising tradition 
pedagogical methods within academia. 
 
Historical Preludes to Critical Pedagogy 
 My historical examination of critical pedagogy begins in the late 1960s 
and early ‘70s.  I begin with this period because it represents the modern rebirth 
of composition pedagogy and provides an immediate opportunity to address the 
common historical narratives surrounding the establishment of Freirean critical 
pedagogy.  Specifically, Chapter II challenges Berlin’s and Berthoff’s claims that 
critical pedagogy followed the process and expressive movements and 
represents a significant advancement in the teaching of writing.  I examine the 
works of Donald Murray and Peter Elbow and show that their pedagogies 
embody the teaching methods that later define the critical project.  Murray, for 
example, advocated the use of decentered classrooms: arguing that students 
should take a more active role in their education, he proposed a flattening of the 
traditional classroom hierarchy and encouraged students to engage meaning-
making process through writing.  Similarly, Elbow proposed a writing classroom 
where teachers become learners themselves, participating in every aspect of the 
course.  Unlike several critics of expressivism—namely, James Berlin and Ann 
Berthoff—my analysis does not seek to discredit the process and expressive 
movements by spotlighting their disparity with critical pedagogy; rather, it seeks 
to identify intersections between Murray, Elbow, and Freire.  I conclude that the 
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teaching practices of Murray and Elbow exhibit and anticipate the fundamental 
principles of critical pedagogy, as articulated in Freire’s Pedagogy of the 
Oppressed. 
 Chapter III focuses on the work of I. A. Richards, the prominent literary 
critic of the 1920s and teacher of English at Cambridge University and Harvard.  
I argue that Richards proposed and practiced the principle teaching methods of 
Freirean critical pedagogy, making him an early proponent of democratic 
education.  Central to Richards’s pedagogy is his use of relevant subject matter.  
He believed that the skills required for literary analysis are the same as those 
required for the interpretation of experience.  As such, he viewed the study of 
literature as a practical endeavor and conceived the classroom as a laboratory 
for learning to interpret the world.  To facilitate learning, Richards developed a 
strategy to elicit more authentic interpretations from his students: he removed all 
identifying markers from texts that they were asked to interpret.  His goal was to 
prompt students not to respond to the reputations of authors but to rely upon and 
develop their own interpretive skills.  Despite these intentions, the strategy has 
perpetually linked Richards to literary formalism and moved him to the fringe of 
scholarly interest within English departments.  My analysis of his teaching 
methods and theories demonstrates that Richards locates meaning not within 
form but within social praxis and that his perspective on language and meaning 
provides a solid foundation for building critical pedagogies and for conceiving 
education as the practice of freedom.     
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 While Richards employed many of the educational methods now 
associated with Freire, he was not the earliest pedagogue to practice an early 
form of critical pedagogy.  As early as the eighteenth century, ministers within 
England’s dissenting academies challenged the traditional teaching methods 
(and curriculum) of the ancient universities and developed a more deliberative 
style of education.  Chapter IV examines these developments through the 
pedagogical theories and practices of Isaac Watts and Philip Doddridge.  I argue 
that the classroom practices of these men parallel the fundamental teachings of 
modern-day critical pedagogy.  Watts, for example, believed that conversation 
was the most important instrument for intellectual growth that men and women 
possessed.  He believed it gave students an opportunity to understand the 
situated nature of knowledge and to perceive their role in the meaning-making 
process.  As such, he valued dialogue in the classroom.  Watts encouraged his 
students to interrupt lectures and to converse with him about their sentiments 
and doubts.  Doddridge took a slightly different approach, employing a 
comparative method of education that immersed students in the various 
perspectives of a topic.  The method is similar to Freire’s problem-posing 
strategy insofar as it urges students to think through difficulties surrounding 
issues, to weigh the merits of established arguments, and to form their own 
opinion on matters.  My analysis of Watts and Doddridge revises the widespread 
narrative that portrays eighteenth-century rhetorical education as current-
traditional, as emphasizing the principles of style and form and grammatical 
   30
   
 
 
correctness over the process of rhetorical discovery.  It demonstrates that 
participatory learning environments and practical concerns are not the invention 
of twentieth-century writing instructors. 
 Each of the chapters outlined above traces the social, economic, and 
political landscape in which each manifestation of critical pedagogy emerged. 
My final chapter bridges those historical contexts.  I show that Murray, Elbow, 
Richards, Watts, and Doddridge taught within similar situations—specifically, at 
times when educational access was broadening.  While the traditional methods 
of education might theretofore have been effective, they could no longer be 
reconciled with the new student constituencies.  Classrooms that were once 
filled with students from privileged backgrounds were now filled with students 
from socially- and economically-diverse backgrounds.  I argue that the historical 
preludes to critical pedagogy developed in effort to address classroom diversity 
and to discover a strategy for bringing people into dialogue with each other 
about the world.  My historical analysis of critical pedagogy also provides 
warning for the field of composition studies—namely, beware of pedagogical 
sectarianism.  Drawing a lesson from the history of the eighteenth-century 
dissenting academies, I argue that a more inclusive view of critical pedagogy 
(and composition pedagogies, in general) is vital to the continued success of 
composition studies. 
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CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND CLASSROOM DEMOCRACY: FASHIONING 
CRITICAL PEDAGOGY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 
 
 This chapter will challenge and revise the historical narratives that 
characterize the emergence of critical pedagogy in American college writing 
classrooms as revolutionary in the history of composition pedagogy, marking 
significant progress over prior pedagogical achievements, including those of the 
process and expressive movements of the late 1960s.  I argue, conversely, that 
early formulations of process pedagogy and expressivism, championed by Peter 
Elbow and Donald Murray, anticipated many of the aims and methods of critical 
pedagogy.  Their emphasis on the epistemological power of language prefigures 
the theoretical foundation upon which Freire constructs his critical methodology 
in Pedagogy of the Oppressed.  I also argue that the historical context in which 
these pedagogies emerged is important because it reveals the pedagogical and 
rhetorical exigency for reassessing and eventually abandoning traditional 
methods of teaching writing in the academy. 
 The late 1960s and early ‘70s were a period of change for American 
college English departments.  The era of current-traditional writing instruction 
was falling out of fashion as a new generation of scholars and writing teachers 
reintroduced the concepts of rhetoric to the composition classroom.  The notion 
that all communication is situated—that writing involves an interaction between 
   32
   
 
 
writer, audience, and context—challenged the then common belief that good 
writing is above all a matter of adhering to standard forms and proper grammar.  
By emphasizing the latter, Christopher Burnham notes, current-traditional writing 
instruction “reinforced middle-class values, such as social stability and cultural 
homogeneity” (22).  Accordingly, success in the first-year composition course 
was linked to the ability to assimilate and reproduce a specific set of cultural 
values encoded in the conventions of the proper English essay.  That the course 
functioned to preserve hegemonic cultural norms became more obvious in the 
wake of the G.I. Bill, open-admission policies, and the civil rights movement.  
American college campuses became more diverse and a growing number of 
students struggled to assimilate the values intrinsic to and imposed by methods 
of current-traditionalism.  Unfortunately, an inability to assimilate brought many 
college careers to an end because freshman composition courses had replaced 
economic class and then merit, as measured by SAT and scholarships during 
the 1920s and ‘30s, as gatekeeper to the university (Burnham 22). 
 Judging the current-traditional methods of writing instruction ineffective, a 
number of young pedagogues—most notably Donald Murray and Peter Elbow—
initiated the process and expressive movements of the ‘60s and ‘70s and helped 
professionalize the field of composition pedagogy.  These movements opposed 
the assumption that writing is a rote subject that can be taught via lecture and 
memorization; they maintained, instead, that writing is a process that can only 
be learned through practice.  Accordingly, they proposed that writing teachers 
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rethink the dominant approach to writing instruction: rather than teach the 
finished form of an essay, teachers ought to encourage the process of 
discovering and developing new ideas through writing.  The epistemological 
assumption behind the movement’s rhetorical stance is that the human mind is 
an essential element in the construction of reality.  While this perspective clearly 
departs from the objectivism of the dominant mode of writing instruction in the 
nineteenth century, Roskelly and Ronald argue that it was not a groundbreaking 
intellectual development.  In Reason to Believe, they show that considerations of 
the self are prominent in the history of American intellectual thought, including 
the educational philosophies of Emerson and Dewey.  Ultimately, the authors 
contend that the so-called pioneers of process pedagogy and expressivism 
established no new intellectual ground but traveled the path of earlier 
generations. 
 Roskelly and Ronald do not deny that Elbow and Murray injected the 
notion of personal experience into a pedagogical conversation then dominated 
by public forms of writing, but they do reject the narrative that mythologizes the 
expressivist turn as a groundbreaking development in educational theory.  In this 
respect, they embrace Berthoff’s view that the history of composition pedagogy 
is a series of “pendulum-swing[s]”: 
We go from sentence combining to free writing and back again to 
the formal outline; from vague notions of “pre-writing” to vaguer 
notions of heuristics; from rigid rubrics to the idea of no writing at 
   34
   
 
 
all.  Some might celebrate this uncertainty as evidence of pluralism 
and a lack of dogmatism in the field, but it could also be 
characterized as a distracted, purposeless, despairing adhocism.  
An idea which one year is everywhere hailed and celebrated 
vanishes the next without a trace.  (“Rhetoric as Hermeneutic” 279) 
Even though Berthoff believes that the latest and greatest trends in composition 
theory and practice are but routine swings between two poles, she does not view 
the extremes as polar opposites or even as distinguishable.  In fact, she says 
that both poles manifest the same dyadic conception of language where 
meaning “comes either from within or without” (“Rhetoric as Hermeneutic” 279).  
Such an approach, she says, does not concern meaning because it ruptures the 
dialectical relationship between thought and language, between individual 
knowledge and social context.  Berthoff argues that a triadic semiotics maintains 
that relationship and ought to replace dyadic theories of language in the 
composition classroom.  She says that Peirce’s triadic model—which locates 
meaning within the interaction between language, thought, and the world—is 
better suited to writing instruction because it spotlights the instrumentality of 
language in the formation of individual and social identities. 
 Berthoff’s pendulum metaphor stands in direct contrast to the evolutionary 
metaphor more common in the retelling of composition’s history.  One portrays 
teachers as oscillating between two superficially-distinct but epistemologically-
consistent pedagogical theories, while the other has them steadily progressing 
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toward a more complex and sophisticated synthesis of prior theoretical and 
practical achievements.  Despite different ways of framing the past, however, 
both perspectives envision a similar future.  They exhort the superiority of what 
Berlin calls epistemic rhetoric, a language-based theory of knowledge that 
locates reality in the discursive interaction between the material world, the 
subjective self, and society.  Although Berthoff does not classify her pedagogy 
using Berlin’s terminology, the triadic theory of meaning for which she argues is 
nevertheless structured in ways similar to the characteristics of epistemic 
rhetoric.  Berlin, one of the most prominent voices of the evolutionary narrative, 
cites Berthoff as a leader within the epistemic group.  Both Berlin and Berthoff 
specify Paulo Freire as a noteworthy practitioner of their preferred pedagogies.  
What is interesting about this convergence is that Freire’s critical pedagogy 
denotes a pedagogical advancement within both historical narratives—at once 
signifying a synthesis of and a separation from prior pedagogical achievements. 
 The contrasting images mobilized by the evolution and pendulum 
metaphors around which the histories of composition pedagogy are organized 
obscure an important similarity between them—namely, that they are both, in the 
end, stories of progress.  Berthoff sees critical pedagogy, for example, as a leap 
beyond the repetitive back-and-forth motion of prior pedagogies, and Berlin sees 
it as but one more step in a series of intermediate pedagogical advancements.  
That they interpret the history of composition pedagogy differently and define the 
nature of its progress in incompatible terms (radical versus gradual) should not 
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overshadow their mutual conviction that critical pedagogy and its epistemic 
cognates are inherently better than their predecessors, including process 
pedagogy and expressivism.   The works of Elbow and Murray, fundamental as 
they were to the process and expressive movements of the 1960s and ‘70s, 
share many key features of Freirean critical pedagogy, not the least of which is 
their propensity to place students and their ability to create meaning through 
language at the center of the classroom.  Early formulations of process 
pedagogy and expressivism parallel and anticipate critical pedagogy.  Even 
though the former movements have been criticized for being solipsistic and 
apolitical and the latter has been attacked for being overly political, they are not 
as incompatible as their distinctive designations suggest.  All three pedagogies 
manifest in their methods an emphasis on the generative power of language, the 
use of relevant subject matter, and decentered classrooms.   That Elbow and 
Murray represent part of the pedagogical past against which Berthoff and Berlin 
contrast their (purportedly) more sophisticated pedagogical visions challenges 
the narrative that critical pedagogy as such signaled an intellectual break from or 
progress over earlier composition pedagogies.  By and large, the rudiments of 
critical pedagogy were expressed in the process and expressive movements of 
the 1960s by writing pedagogues who struggled to adapt to the classroom 
changes triggered by a broadening of educational access in America over the 
course of the prior two decades.  The following review will provide a historical 
context for understanding the shift in student demographics. 
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Opening Doors to American Higher Education 
 Prior to World War II, higher education in America was largely confined to 
affluent members of society.  The high school movement increased secondary 
school enrollment and expanded the number of college aspirants; but by and 
large, higher education continued to be the financial burden of the family and 
remained beyond the reach of many.  Universities enrolled white students from 
predominately upper-middle-class backgrounds—the more elite schools 
recruiting their ranks from private boarding schools—while less affluent groups 
remained underserved by higher education.  Illustrating the degree to which 
higher education in the United States was a limited endeavor, Robert Pattison 
reports that the number of high-school students taking the SAT in the academic 
year 1951-52 was 81,000, twenty-six percent of whom eventually matriculated at 
college (183).  The extent to which college was then an elite privilege is 
especially visible when compared to statistics twenty-five years later: 
By 1976-77 the number of eighteen-year-old in the population had 
doubled while the number of graduating high school students 
taking the SAT had risen from 81,000 to 1,401,000, a seven-fold 
increase.  Meanwhile the number of institutions of higher education 
had gone up from about 1800 in 1950 to around 3100 in 1978.  
(Pattison 183) 
The increased number of students taking the SAT—indicative of greater 
educational preparation for and aspiration to attend college—as well as the 
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growing number of post-secondary institutions at which those students could 
matriculate demonstrate the extent to which America, after WWII, was edging 
towards mass participation in higher education.  “Traditionally underserved 
groups (e.g. the working class),” John Thelin writes, “could now aspire to a 
college education, at least for their children if not for themselves” (254). 
 Enactment of the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, more widely 
known as the G.I. Bill, accelerated the path to college for many military men and 
women who did not have the economic resources to attend college prior to the 
war.  The idea that the government ought to promote and help fund higher 
education for veterans sprung from Roosevelt’s concern that the reintegration of 
twenty million soldiers into the workforce might bring to an end the economic 
growth and prosperity generated by the war.  The government wanted to convert 
wartime production into peacetime economy and do so without rousing social 
discontent in droves of unemployed veterans.  By helping fund higher education, 
the G.I. Bill redirected many veterans away from the workforce and into colleges, 
reducing the number of unemployed veterans and prolonging national 
prosperity.  Many universities welcomed veterans into their classrooms and 
viewed government educational assistance to veterans as an opportunity to 
return student enrollment (and college revenue) to prewar levels.  Harvard was 
among these institutions, and so eager were its administrators to enroll 
servicemen that they launched an overseas recruitment program before the war 
had even ended (Thelin 263).  But not all colleges were as veteran-friendly as 
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Harvard.  Some of them opposed the G.I. Bill because they preferred to enroll 
traditional students and to preserve the high standards of the academy (Thelin 
263, Gutek 12).  Regardless of position, no one expected such widespread 
participation from military men and women.  By 1946, veterans represented 
nearly fifty-two percent of the nation’s total college enrollment (Gutek 12). 
 In addition to keeping veterans productive and content, the G.I. Bill was 
further motivated by the idea that higher education could help the government 
meet the needs of the nation.   Higher education had already been “effective and 
engaged” in the war, so there was little reason to assume that universities could 
not also provide valuable resources in the “large-scale planning for the transition 
to a peacetime society, including a civilian economy, long after the end of the 
war” (Thelin 261).  Consequently, federal and state governments gave more 
public attention to the formation of educational policies. President Truman, for 
instance, established a Commission on Education in 1946 to examine higher 
education and discover the best means to expand educational opportunities.  
The subsequent report addressed economic and racial inequalities in schools 
and recommended greater federal involvement in education.  Ultimately, the 
commission’s proposal that the federal government trespass into state and local 
policies proved too controversial to gain significant support throughout the 
country and in Congress.  Even though the Truman Commission failed to 
reshape higher education at the national level, it did draw attention to the many 
injustices in American colleges and universities.  Taking notice of the report, 
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many state governments, school administrators, and private foundations 
devoted themselves to resolving such injustices (Thelin 270).  The state of 
California, for example, took unprecedented steps towards mass higher 
education by significantly increasing the annual operating budget for the 
University of California system and its eight campuses, providing free tuition to 
state residents, and increasing student-teacher ratios to make learning more 
economically efficient.  California’s educational experiment eventually led to the 
Master Plan of 1960, which was heralded across the United States and Europe 
as the premier model for the expansion and governance of public education 
(Douglass 311-12).   
 Despite the excitement over the Master Plan, California was not alone in 
the quest to resolve the educational inequalities identified by the Truman report.  
New York also engaged the issue of educational injustice and worked to expand 
higher education.  Hence the creation of the SUNY and CUNY systems, which 
subsidized higher education for state and local residents across a combined 
network of nearly ninety campuses.  From its inception, the CUNY network was 
the most financially accessible of the two systems, for it provided free tuition to 
all city residents; however, given the demand for higher education in the 
decades following WWII, administrators were compelled to raise admission 
standards to limit student enrollment.  As a result of higher admission standards, 
the CUNY system no longer represented the social demographics of the city, for 
the new standards were too stringent to be met by urban students, whose public 
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schools were largely characterized by “low teacher expectations, low student 
academic achievement, poor discipline, truancy, high dropout rates, and high 
teacher turnover” (Gutek 141).  Affordable tuition alone was not enough to 
equalize educational opportunity in New York’s cities.  Therefore, in 1970, 
CUNY’s Board of Trustees implemented an open-admissions policy, which 
guaranteed admission to all residents holding a high school diploma or general 
equivalency diploma.  Under the new policy, minority enrollment quadrupled 
(Lavin and Hyllegard 32).  However, the sudden shift in student demographics 
generated by open-admissions at CUNY revealed practical problems with racial 
integration during the American civil rights movement. 
 Even though the 1954 Supreme Court decision in Brown versus Board of 
Education acknowledged that separate facilities were rarely equal and ruled de 
jure racial segregation a violation of the Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment, 
de facto segregation remained a social reality in America.   “White flight” to the 
suburbs—a phenomenon that coincided with the court’s desegregation ruling— 
effectively circumvented racial integration, making it geographically impossible 
for whites and blacks to attend the same elementary and secondary schools.  
Because geography was drawn along racial lines, over which also existed a 
considerable economic imbalance, city schools had fewer tax dollars with which 
to education students than their suburban counterparts.  Such disparities in 
funding created disparities in the quality of education between city and suburban 
public schools.  Accordingly, the issue with providing equal access to higher 
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education, as CUNY eventually learned, went beyond financial affordability to 
include academic preparedness.  Not until CUNY altered its admission 
standards could students of color widely take advantage of its affordability.  The 
same was true for minority veterans.  While the G.I. Bill gave military men and 
women of color the means to pay for college, some schools refused to admit 
them.  This remained the case even after the Brown ruling, as there was very 
little legislation in place to enforce non-discrimination.  In 1964, the federal 
government enacted the Civil Rights Act, which authorized the withdrawal of 
federal funding from any institution where illegal discrimination was found and 
also gave the U.S. Attorney General the power to file suit against any school 
practicing racial discrimination. 
 Since WWII, the federal government had established a strong working 
relationship with higher education and had been providing elite universities with 
large research grants.  However, in the 1960s, it began to rethink its uncritical 
financial support of higher education (Thelin 312).  Reacting to the widespread 
and often violent demonstrations on college campuses and the general inability 
of administrators to control their students, federal funding agencies, such as the 
Department of Defense, eventually pulled their research dollars away from the 
universities.  The loss of federal research grants put a financial strain on those 
institutions that had come to rely upon federal funding as part of their operating 
budget.  Even though the federal government had largely abandoned research 
programs within universities, it was not willing to abandon higher education 
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altogether.  That is to say, it still wanted to provide Americans the opportunity 
and means to pursue a college education.  Therefore, in 1972, Congress 
enacted the Basic Educational Opportunities Grant program—later dubbed the 
Pell Grant program—which reallocated federal educational research dollars to 
low-income students.  According to Thelin, the grant program achieved three 
government objectives: it fulfilled the recommendation of the 1947 Truman 
report; it required recipients to comply with a set of provisions; and it shifted 
attention towards civil rights (324-26).  The Pell Grant program accomplished the 
latter by expanding the number of schools receiving federal funds, thus 
encouraging them—via the terms of the 1964 Civil Rights Act—to enroll more 
minority students.  
 The Pell Grant program, the G.I. Bill, and the educational reforms in 
California, New York, and a few other states significantly broadened access to 
higher education in American.  Rather than have college remain the exclusive 
territory of economically privileged groups and SAT merit scholarship winners, a 
number of local, state, and federal officials, as well as university administrators, 
pursued measures that supported and achieved greater social representation 
and diversity in higher education.  The combined legacy of these educational 
initiatives—to expand Thelin’s remarks about the G.I. Bill to include California’s 
Master Plan, the Pell grant program, open-admissions, etc.—is that “quantitative 
change promoted qualitative change in the structure and culture of American 
campuses” (265).  More people could afford higher education, so the classroom 
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was no longer limited primarily to white middle-class students; it now included 
racial minorities and non-traditional students, too.  Moreover, by 1970, women 
represented forty-one percent of college enrollment in the United States, up from 
thirty-four percent in 1950 (Thelin 344). The physical markers represented by the 
change in student demographics from WWII to the early 1970s also mark 
differences in economic, educational, and social backgrounds of students.  Such 
diversity of mind and experience tested the pedagogical trends that had long 
dominated American college classrooms and prompted what has been 
described as a revolution in the way writing teachers teach writing. 
  
Rethinking the Role of Writing Teachers 
 In 1968, Donald Murray published A Writer Teaches Writing: A Practical 
Method of Teaching Composition.  As the title implies, Murray’s work criticizes 
the then accepted institutional approach to teaching writing on the grounds that 
most composition instructors are trained literary critics whose pedagogical 
methods are ineffective in the writing classroom, a critique to which he would 
return and more explicitly develop in “Teach Writing as a Process Not Product.”  
A professional writer himself, Murray reminds composition teachers that they are 
not the ultimate evaluators and critics of their students’ work—only the 
audiences for whom writers write can judge the effectiveness of their 
compositions; instead, he maintains that the teacher’s primary responsibility is to 
prepare students to function when he or she is not there (Writer Teaches Writing 
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129-33).  In other words, Murray wants to create an environment where students 
take responsibility for their own learning.  Their independence, he says, is cause 
for teacherly pride: 
When a teacher can stop teaching, can stand back and see his 
students teaching themselves, then he has succeeded.  His 
ambitions should be to teach as little as possible, and eventually 
not to teach at all.  He is most successful when the students have 
become their own teachers.  (Writer Teaches Writing 133) 
 What is most striking about Murray’s proposed pedagogy is that it strives 
to remove writing teachers from the center of the classroom, thus making their 
professional title a misnomer.  Murray believes that effective writing teachers are 
those who do not teach, at least not in the conventional sense of the word.  
Traditionally, he explains, teachers of writing approach their subject through 
analysis.  They talk, and students listen to their lessons on traditional grammar, 
transformational grammar, structural linguistics, and the history of the English 
language.  While such an approach offers students a historical perspective on 
how language has been used in the past, it too often isolates language from 
meaning and insufficiently prepares students to write (Writer Teaches Writing 
104).  Learning to write is not a matter of acquiring information about language 
mechanics but of having the opportunity to perform the job of a writer.  In other 
words, students must have the opportunity in their writing classes to write, 
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revise, and edit, and to share and discuss their writing with their teachers and 
peers.  Engaging the writing process makes better writers. 
 Because Murray believes that the final judge of a piece of writing is its 
intended audience, he wants writing students to share their work with a variety of 
readers.  While teachers have traditionally held the exclusive role of reader and 
evaluator in the composition class, Murray argues that students should shoulder 
some of the responsibility.  His position is rooted in the notion that small peer 
groups offer several advantages over student-teacher writing conferences:  
The peer group allows the students to reach an audience other 
than the English teacher, and the students must know that as 
writers, in school and outside of school, they have to be able to 
reach many different people in different disciplines.  The students 
should realize they may be able to help each other better than the 
teacher can help them, for they are facing comparable problems at 
a similar stage of development.  The students should also be 
convinced that through working on classmates’ papers they will 
understand the professional writer’s problem of choice, because 
the other class members will demonstrate in their own papers, as 
well as in their criticisms, that there are many appropriate ways to 
say the same thing.  (Writer Teaches Writing 131) 
The advantages of group work, as Murray explains them, are clear; 
nevertheless, they can be, as many composition teachers know, mitigated by the 
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reluctance of students to embrace their ability to assist other students and to 
productively comment on their compositions.  For this reason, Murray suggests 
that peer groups not be formed until students understand the benefits of utilizing 
the instructional method.  Furthermore, he notes that teachers should not 
proceed until they have created an environment in which students perceive the 
value of engaging a recursive and reflexive writing process.  For peer review 
groups to be effective, writing students must be convinced that “criticism and 
revision are necessary—and constructive—parts of the process of writing”; 
moreover, they should understand that “they have the primary responsibility to 
teach themselves to write and that they are capable, through re-evaluation and 
revision of their papers, of solving their own writing problems” (Writer Teaches 
Writing 131-32). 
 Although Murray wants students to take primary responsibility for 
learning, he does not advocate teacherless writing classrooms.  Instead, he 
argues for a reconceptualization of the role of writing teachers, one that shifts 
the focus of learning from the teacher to the student.  On the surface and 
through the lens of traditional teacher-centered pedagogies, such a shift 
seemingly limits or even diminishes the importance of the writing instructor, but it 
does not.  In fact, the opposite is true. Murray’s model does not have teachers 
holding forth on, say, the virtues of active voice over passive voice but has them 
instead adopting the role of a coach, diagnostician, and engineer.  To this end, 
Murray broadens and expands the role of writing teachers.  The only limitation 
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that his model proposes concerns the amount of time spent lecturing in the 
classroom.  Murray believes that writers learn to write when they are writing, not 
when they are being talked to about writing.  Accordingly, he proclaims rather 
provocatively in his 1973 essay “Teach Process Not Product” that teachers can 
motivate students to engage the writing process not by talking but by “shutting 
up” (5). 
 Fulfilling the role of an engineer under Murray’s model, writing teachers 
must create writing workshops within the physical boundaries of the classroom.  
These workshops should be open, demanding, disciplined, and flexible, just like 
lesson plans (D. Murray, Writer Teaches Writing 103).  Students must have the 
opportunity to practice the writing process, sometimes succeeding and 
sometimes failing.  They must feel comfortable taking risks when they write, for 
learning occurs and success is achieved when a person is willing to step beyond 
his or her usual boundaries.  The teacher compels students to push beyond their 
comfort zones by demanding that they take responsibility for their writing.  The 
teacher does not give students formulae for writing but challenges them to find 
the most effective ways to say what they want to say in their compositions.  This 
process of searching for and finding the appropriate voice for a text demands 
discipline and focus.  The workshop environment urges students to muster the 
intellectual courage to confront the blank page and to rethink failed drafts. 
 While Murray wants teachers to create writing workshops in which 
students assume responsibility for their own writing and learning, he does not 
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encourage or permit teachers to avoid total responsibility.  Teachers continue to 
play an important role in the writing course, even if they are not at its center.  
Murray believes that good writing teachers are like coaches because they 
design practice workouts to help students develop their individual potential and 
motivate students to exhibit their best performance.  Regarding the former, he 
suggests that writing teachers take cues from athletic coaches: 
Out on the football field he [the writing teacher] will find that the 
coach has organized the afternoon’s work so that the team is 
broken into small units, each player learning and practicing the 
skills he needs the most.  And then he will find the coach walking 
from player to player, showing one how to get a quick start, 
another how to throw a block, a third how to cut to the left, a fourth 
how to catch the ball.  (Writer Teaches Writing 18) 
As Murray suggests, there is no reason for an athletic coach to teach a single 
skill to the whole team, for each athlete has a specific skill that needs honing.  
Teaching the entire wrestling team to shoot single-leg takedown, for example, 
does little to make the experienced wrestler who is already “good on his feet” a 
better competitor.  Likewise, a technical explanation of the single-leg takedown 
will not necessarily benefit the novice wrestler who knows the proper technique 
but has practical problems finishing the move.  As long as the coach ignores the 
individual strengths and weaknesses of his athletes, no amount of technical 
instruction will make better wrestlers.  All it will do is interrupt the opportunities 
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that the wrestlers have to develop their skills through practice and deny them the 
occasion of having their individual needs addressed.  The same is true of writing 
instruction.  A one-size-fits-all lecture about comma usage, for example, is sure 
to bypass more students than it confronts.  Accordingly, good writing teachers, 
like coaches, will identify areas of improvement for their students and assign 
exercises that target and develop those areas.  This individual approach to 
writing instruction has the added benefit of communicating to students the 
message that teachers care about them.  And when students feel that teachers 
are genuinely interested in them as individuals, they are motivated to write, for 
as Murray says, “all students will respond to a listener” (Writer Teaches Writing 
151).  In other words, writing teachers who focus their efforts on individualized 
instruction fulfill another crucial aspect of coaching: they motivate students to 
display and discover their writerly potential. 
 In addition to their roles as engineers and coaches, writing teachers, as 
Murray conceives of them, must also perform the task of diagnosticians.  In 
other words, the task of teacher “is not to say that the student is writing poorly, 
but to say why he is writing poorly and to provide an answer which will work for 
him” (Writer Teaches Writing 129).  Like good medical doctors, writing teacher 
do not merely point to symptoms and say “this one is not good, and this one 
looks really bad,” ad nauseam; rather he or she studies the symptoms, 
diagnoses their cause, and provides treatment to heal or improve the writer’s 
condition.  By diagnosing and holistically treating the cause of compositional 
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maladies—instead of focusing on the manifest symptoms of the condition—
writing teachers can help students become stronger, healthier writers. 
 Like Murray, Peter Elbow also redefines the role of writing teachers.  But 
Elbow pulls teachers even farther than Murray from the central position they 
have traditionally occupied in the writing classroom.  The title of his 1973 book, 
Writing Without Teachers, makes this point clear.  Elbow believes that peer 
writing groups are the single most effective pedagogical tool that composition 
teachers have at their disposal, more important than any advice or knowledge 
that composition teachers traditionally dispense to students.  Such groups give 
writers the opportunity to share their work with and receive feedback from actual 
readers.  Because writing is an interaction between people, Elbow believes that 
students become better writers—that is, more adept at negotiating the writer-
reader transaction—when they know how readers “experience” words on a 
page, not when teachers point out their errors and make suggestions for 
improvement.  Accordingly, he redefines the role of the writing teacher as a 
participant in the composition course. 
 As active participants in a writing classroom, teachers must participate in 
every aspect of the composition course.  This means that they must follow the 
same pedagogical procedures outlined for students: writing when students write, 
sharing their work with the other writers in class, and offering reactions to 
student compositions (Elbow, Writing Without Teachers ix).  When teachers join 
students in these activities, the consequences are all but trivial.  Teachers who 
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engage the learning process as Elbow recommends, not only challenge the 
educational status quo but also begin to collapse the dichotomy that traditionally 
separates students and teachers.  Elbow argues that the structural breakdown of 
the established educational hierarchy is beneficial because the roles traditionally 
ascribed to teachers and students are fallaciously connected.  In other words, 
teaching is not pivotal to learning.  Most instructors understand this, yet many 
continue to teach as though learning depends upon what they say or do in class.  
Elbow discourages the use of such teacher-centered pedagogies, arguing that 
writing teachers “are more useful when it is clearer that they are not necessary” 
(Writing Without Teachers x).  The notion that teachers are unnecessary 
underlies Elbow’s proposal for “teacherless” writing classes. 
 While Elbow elevates the status of teacherless writing classes, he does 
not expect writing teachers to abandon the halls of academia in search of new 
careers and professional identities. He does, however, expect teachers and 
students to revise their pedagogical assumptions about what it means to teach 
and learn.  The term “teacherless” is thus a bit of a misnomer, chosen not for its 
ability to portray such classrooms in a literal sense but for its capacity to define 
symbolically the responsibilities of both students and teachers.  In other words, 
he is trying to say, “we are all learners.”  Because Elbow’s model transforms the 
milieu of the writing course and because teachers are but one part of that social 
equation, Writing Without Teachers does not limit its focus to teachers and what 
they do in the classroom.  Contrary to that which remains standard scholarly fare 
   53
   
 
 
in works on composition pedagogy, Elbow’s treatise also focuses on students 
and their educational responsibilities. Instead of presenting student perceptions 
about learning as behavioral responses to a teacher’s pedagogical methods, 
Elbow treats writing students as autonomous individuals and urges them to 
rethink their assumptions about education. His use of the term “teacherless” 
provides the exigency.  It aspires to encourage students to claim responsibility 
for their own learning.  For Elbow’s educational model to work, teachers and 
students must adjust their roles with synchronicity and harmony. A writing 
teacher, for example, who initiates a decentered writing course will always 
struggle in her efforts to help students become better writers when her students 
are unwilling to engage the course and assume responsibility for their learning.  
Conversely, students who actively participate in their education will have a more 
difficult time developing their writing skills when their teacher stands at the 
blackboard lecturing to them each period.  When one party accepts its revised 
role and the other does not, students learning is no greater than had instruction 
occurred under the traditional model of teaching composition.  Moreover, when 
such is the case, those who initially embrace their revised roles will typically 
revert back to more familiar and traditional forms of teaching and learning, 
ultimately acknowledging the futility of their purpose. 
 Understanding the challenge that comes with trying to break down the 
traditional dichotomy between teachers and students—a structure that has been 
assembled and reinforced through years of formal schooling—Elbow 
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encourages teachers to share their compositions with their writing classes, 
especially those pieces about which they are still unsure.  The benefit of sharing 
“rough” drafts is that teachers and students will have the opportunity to see that 
their counterparts do not hold the trademark on the activities by which their roles 
are traditionally defined.  A situation is created wherein teachers learn and 
learners teach. Awareness of this possibility—which is remote under the 
traditional model of education—is essential to the teacherless writing course, as 
students are more likely to engage the course when they know that they add 
value to it.  In addition to sharing his writing, Elbow further facilitates the 
acquisition of such awareness by circumventing his traditional role as teacher 
during peer review, offering not the usual teacherly assessments of student 
writing but highly personal and idiosyncratic reactions to student compositions.  
Such reactions stress that reader feedback should not evaluate the quality of a 
composition but describes what happens to the reader when he or she 
experiences the words on the page.  Because every reader is an expert at what 
he or she feels during reading, every student is a valuable resource to the other 
writers in class.  As long as students provide subjective feedback, then they are 
helping their peers become better writers, helping them learn to use language to 
more effectively negotiate the writing situation.  By demonstrating and 
participating in this feedback process, Elbow begins to shift the responsibility for 
learning from teacher to student and redefines his role in the classroom as that 
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of a learner, a role that he says makes writing teachers more useful to students 
(Writing Without Teachers ix-x). 
 While Elbow and Murray define the role of composition instructors in 
different terms, they agree that teachers should not be the center of learning.  
Accordingly, both pedagogues treat the writing classroom as a laboratory where 
students practice their craft and engage the writing process.  The extent to which 
the laboratories are sites of learning depends mutually upon the teacher’s ability 
to establish an environment conducive to student-centered learning and upon 
students’ willingness to actively engage their responsibilities as learners.  When 
these conditions are met, the traditional hierarchy of the classroom is razed and 
students no longer expect teachers to tell them how to become better writers.  In 
this regard, the classrooms that Elbow and Murray promote resemble those that 
are constructed under critical pedagogies, insofar as they subvert the oppressive 
teaching practices and institutional structures of traditional education.  According 
to Freire, the traditional methods and structures are oppressive because they do 
not regard students as human beings but as empty vessels that teachers must 
fill with knowledge.  Under the traditional model of education, students believe 
that they are ignorant and that teachers alone possess the authority of 
knowledge.  “Almost never,” Freire writes, “do [students] realize that they, too, 
‘know things’ they have learned in their relations with the world and with other 
women and men” (Pedagogy 63). Like Freire’s critical pedagogy, the student-
centered writing laboratories that Elbow and Murray construct challenge this 
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view by operating on the assumption that students possess knowledge.  Such 
treatment restores the student’s humanity. 
 In addition to dismantling the oppressive teacher-student dichotomy that 
characterizes most writing education, Elbow’s and Murray’s student-centered 
pedagogies also break down the perceived division between subjective and 
objective theories of meaning and knowledge.  When teachers abandon their 
usual positions in the classroom and engage the writing process alongside 
students, they send the message that good writing does not proceed from the 
mastery of external knowledge but from the interaction between writer and 
reader.  This message is reinforced through the writing process, in which writers 
frequently share with their work with other students.  When those readers offer 
their reactions to a composition, writers begin to see that their words are not 
always experienced as intended.  They see that meaning resides between the 
writer and reader. 
 Here is where Berthoff and Berlin mischaracterize expressive pedagogy.  
They argue that expressivism locates meaning exclusively within the subjective 
mind.  Berlin pushes this point to its logical conclusion: 
Since truth must finally be discovered or, at the least, confirmed 
through a private act of intuition, teachers cannot communicate 
truth.  Indeed, the teacher cannot even instruct the student in the 
principles of writing, since writing is inextricably intertwined with the 
discovery of truth. (Rhetoric and Reality 13) 
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Berlin believes that expressivism asserts an epistemology that negates any 
possibility of teaching of students to write.  To him, expressivist classrooms are 
teacherless on a whole new level: all that teachers can do is create an 
environment in which students can learn to write by themselves; they cannot 
participate in or contribute to the learning process.  However, Elbow and Murray 
do not profess the subjective pedagogies for which they are criticized; they view 
writing as a social and collaborative activity through which meaning is explored 
and revised.  In this regard, their pedagogies present writing not as an isolated 
individual event but as a rhetorical process. 
 The notion that meaning and knowledge are grounded in social 
interaction is also an important principle of critical pedagogy, one that Freire 
says is denied by current-traditional writing instruction: “Implicit in the banking 
concept [of education] is the assumption of a dichotomy between human beings 
and the world: a person is merely in the world, not with the world or with others” 
(Pedagogy 75).  Freirean critical pedagogy rejects this dichotomy.  It holds, in its 
place, that humans exist together with the world.  We do not live apart from our 
surroundings; we are a part them.  This connectedness gives us the ability to 
create and recreate meaning in the world.  It gives us the power to transform 
reality through acts of cognition. 
 In decentered writing courses, like those proposed by Elbow and Murray, 
writers can engage their creative and transformative powers though praxis, the 
term Freire gives to the recurrent and cyclical process of reflection and action.  
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As writers compose, they consider the effects that their words have on readers, 
the degree to which their language will shape thought and influence how other 
people interpret the world.  And when readers read, they will be moved by the 
composition, assimilating or synthesizing from it some truth about their world.  
The process of speaking the world and transforming it are so intertwined that the 
distinction between words and actions can no longer be reasonably dissociated.  
As a consequence, those who speak or write their voices have the freedom to 
create the world.  The decentered classrooms of Elbow and Murray foster such 
freedom.  To this end, process pedagogy and expressivism parallel Freirean 
critical pedagogy insofar as they, too, value and promote democracy and 
freedom within the classroom.  They do not want students to inherit their 
teacher’s interpretation of the world but, instead, want to create environments 
where students have the freedom to critically engage the world and to interact 
with others in a collaborative existential search for meaning. 
 
Discovering the Subject of Writing 
 One of the primary goals of achieving democracy in the classroom is 
nurturing what Freire calls “authentic thinking” (Pedagogy 77). Freire believes 
that thinking and communication are intertwined to such an extent that the world 
is meaningless outside of human social interaction.  Accordingly, where 
education is defined as the process by which men and women critically engage 
reality and learn to participate in the world, it must be grounded in dialogue. 
   59
   
 
 
Although such interaction is facilitated by the resolution of the teacher-student 
contradiction, it cannot be equitable until course content is mutually accessible 
to students and teachers.  Traditional views of education are not suitable for 
shared dialogue because they project ignorance onto students.  In other words, 
they operate on the assumption that teachers are knowledgeable and students 
are not.  According to this model, students are unfit to enter meaningful dialogue 
with teachers.  The relationship between the two parties is one of transmission 
and reception; dialogue in the classroom is largely confined to issues of 
clarification.  To circumvent this arrangement, Freire recommends that course 
topics originate not from those ivory towers for which academia is known but 
from the practical concerns of everyday life, the reality of lived experiences of 
which students also have knowledge (Pedagogy 77).  Because authentic 
thinking is grounded in communication, teachers must—if their goal is to prepare 
students for participatory democracy and active citizenship—introduce and raise 
questions about topics that are both relevant and practical to the lives of 
students. 
 The classroom practice of introducing, discussing, and raising questions 
about relevant topics is as much a part of process pedagogy and expressivism 
as it is critical pedagogy.  However, because each pedagogy stresses a different 
mode of language-use (i.e. writing versus discussion), the vehicle for addressing 
relevant topics varies.  Freire, for instance, believes that discussion topics begin 
with teachers.  He believes they are responsible for “present[ing] the materials to 
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the students for their consideration” (Pedagogy 81).  He does not want teachers 
to encroach upon human freedom and tell students what to think, but he does 
want them to pose challenging questions to students about the world.  When 
those questions address concrete reality over concepts, he says that students 
engage the course material and the world more critically: 
Students, as they are increasingly posed with problems related to 
themselves in the world and with the world, will feel increasingly 
challenged and obliged to respond to that challenge.  Because 
they apprehend the challenge as interrelated to other problems 
within a total context, not as a theoretical question, the resulting 
comprehension tends to be increasingly critical and thus constantly 
less alienated.  Their response to the challenge evokes new 
challenges, followed by new understandings; and gradually the 
students come to regard themselves as committed. (Pedagogy 81) 
Like Freire, Elbow and Murray also strive to critically engage students in the 
world, but their approach does not rely upon teachers to introduce discussion 
topics through questions.  They rely upon students.  Because Elbow and Murray 
give students the opportunity to choose their own writing topics and because 
student compositions provide the basis for small group discussion, course topics 
originate with student-writers, and discussions proceed from the questions and 
comments that student-readers advance. 
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 Elbow says the subject of a composition matters less than the act of 
composing.  Therefore, he does not care about what students write as long as 
they are writing (Writing Without Teachers 79).  In an effort to motivate students 
to put words on paper, Elbow does not pre-select course topics but gives 
students the freedom to write about their experiences and interests.  In other 
words, he encourages them to write about those things that they deem relevant 
to their lives.  Unfortunately, my experience indicates that students do not 
always appreciate such latitude.  They have been told what to write for so long 
that they do not trust their ability to choose what they consider to be a suitable 
academic topic.  Elbow’s concept of freewriting helps to mitigate such doubt by 
providing a practical method for discovering topics and what to say about them.  
Elbow rejects the conventional wisdom that writing is a two-step process 
whereby “[f]irst you figure out your meaning, then you put it into language” 
(Writing Without Teachers 14).  He argues instead that meaning emerges 
through language use.  Writers might have an idea about what they want to 
write, but they discover new connections and insights as they work with words 
and often end up in unexpected places.  When writers free themselves from the 
pressures of maintaining control over the traditional writing process—deciding 
what to say, creating a plan of development, sticking to the outline, etc.—they 
can more readily generate words and more comfortably explore questions and 
ideas that arise in the writing process.  Freewriting provides students the 
opportunity to find worthwhile topics. 
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 Elbow’s instructions for discovering writing topics is quite simple: “think of 
a person, place, feeling, object, incident, or transaction that is important to you 
[and perform] one or two freewriting exercises while trying to hold it in mind” 
(Writing Without Teachers 9).  This procedure, he says, will yield writing topics 
and starting points, unfocused though they may initially be.  Perhaps it can be 
argued that Elbow’s instructions yield topics only because they impose topics, 
violating his claim that the act of writing is more important than the subject.  But I 
think any such claim blurs the boundaries between instruction and direction.  
The former implies learning, while the latter implies guidance.  Elbow is not 
trying to direct or guide students to a topic; he is merely providing the method 
and motivation for them to discover topics on their own.  Because he wants them 
to write with energy and authority, he does advocate personal writing; however, 
students still have near limitless freedom within such parameters yet are not 
overwhelmed by an utter lack of bearing or orientation.  As many writing 
teachers know, students are frequently driven to frustration and writer’s block 
when assignments are too wide open or vague.  Elbow’s instructions position 
students narrowly enough to start writing but widely enough to discover their 
own subjects.  He encourages them to find points of interest or energy in their 
freewritings and develop those points though further freewriting exercises. 
 Elbow does not want students to worry about writing grammatically-
correct sentences and coherent paragraphs, as these concerns distract writers 
and interrupt writing; he wants them instead to “pour more attention, focus, and 
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energy” into writing about their topics, which become more focused as they 
move from one freewrite to the next.  (Writing Without Teachers 8).  He 
understands that an emphasis on non-stop writing will create some amount of 
garbage, but he also maintains that “the good bits will be much better than 
anything else you can produce by any other method” (Writing Without Teachers 
9).  Moreover, from those good bits comes a more sophisticated understanding 
of the topic and its meaning in the world. Elbow’s freewriting technique is 
designed to do more than facilitate the invention of relevant writing topics; it also 
puts students in conversation with themselves.  While students will generally 
start out with only vague conceptions of their topic, the process of extracting 
ideas and passages from one freewrite and expanding upon them in the next 
allows students to interact with their own words and ideas and develop more 
coherent and meaningful interpretations of their topics.  They restate, refine, 
expand, question, and struggle with what they have said, just as a conversant 
might do.  The process, Elbow notes, often compels writers to see things in 
unfamiliar or unsuspecting ways.  And just when they have organized their 
thoughts on a topic, they invite further discussion by sharing their work with their 
peer groups, where new questions, comments, and considerations emerge. 
 Murray also believes that course topics should be relevant to students.  
For this reason, like Elbow, he does not think that composition teachers should 
force writing topics on students; instead, he thinks students should write about 
those topics that interest them most.  In the event that students struggle to find 
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topics, he encourages them to look at events within their personal histories from 
different points of view.  Like Elbow’s freewriting instructions, Murray’s approach 
to writing can be viewed as a way of forcing topics on students.  To be sure, 
Murray’s recommendation encourages personal writing; however, it also allows 
more flexibility than most essay prompts.  Consider, for example, the following 
assignment that Amy Lee gave her first-year writing students:  
For the first assignment, students interrogated stereotypes from a 
personal perspective.  We discussed, and they wrote about 
assumptions they commonly encounter about their own identity, 
what groups they are typically assigned to, what characteristics are 
attributed to them as a result of this grouping, how these 
assumptions vary or remain the same according to context, who 
was most likely to buy into and act on these stereotypes, how 
these assumptions function not only to affect them individually but 
also to produce broader social and political implications, and how 
and why (and whether) individuals respond when they encounter 
them. (111) 
Even though Lee’s assignment begins with personal experience, such is the 
extent to which it parallels Murray’s topic recommendation.  Lee controls the 
direction of her students’ compositions far more specifically than Murray.  She 
asks students to consider the ways in which they are assigned to certain social 
and political groups and how those assumptions about membership shape their 
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identities.  In other words, she wants them to discuss one narrow aspect of their 
lives.  Murray, on the other hand, does not limit the range of topics within the 
scope of student experience. 
 Contrary to the nature of most contrasts, I am not suggesting that Lee’s 
assignments are antithetical to Murray’s.  Perhaps on the continuum of student 
autonomy, she offers few choices; however, her assignment still lets students 
choose from a variety of experiences in which normative discourses have 
figured them.  I am also not suggesting that Lee, a self-proclaimed critical 
pedagogue, rejects student-centered teaching. Such criticism is only applicable 
where student-centeredness is defined in terms of student autonomy, which it 
rarely is.  Student-centeredness is more widely understood as the practice of 
valuing student perspectives and experiences and of including students in the 
pursuit and discovery of knowledge.  By asking students to write about their 
experiences with stereotypes, Lee obliges them use language to explore their 
vision of the world and to disrupt dominant discourses.  To this end, her 
assignment is consistent with the student-centered approach that she 
advocates.  Writing prompts in teacher-centered classrooms, on the other hand, 
generally direct students to compose essays on topics that teachers already 
know and have probably discussed in class—e.g. symbolism in Shirley 
Jackson’s “The Lottery” and character in John Updike’s “A&P.”  Such prompts 
fail to include students in the meaning-making process; they are only designed 
to show teachers how much students know and how well they can inscribe 
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(established) thought into prose.  Yet Murray’s suggestion for finding writing 
topics nowhere approaches the level of control imposed by traditional writing 
prompts.  This variance reveals the extent to which Murray’s topic 
recommendation does not impose a topic.  Nevertheless, such comparison is 
not necessary to show the absence of imposition in Murray’s writing 
assignments, for topic choice is not a relative matter under his pedagogy.  
Remember that Murray only offers his recommendation—i.e. to look for topics in 
personal experiences—when students are having difficulty finding writing topics.  
Such qualification suggests that Murray is fine with students writing on topics 
that do not involve personal history. 
 Ultimately, Murray believes that the inability to find an interesting writing 
topic is actually an inability to find something interesting to say about it (Writer 
Teaches Writing 27).  Accordingly, one of his invention strategies includes a 
consideration of perspective: 
The writer develops his subject by putting things in focus, by 
developing a point of view.  It may be his own point of view about 
the subject or it may be the point of view within the subject.  And 
he may discover this subject by switching his point of view, moving 
around the subject the way a photographer moves around his 
subject.  (Writer Teaches Writing 41) 
Murray’s photography metaphor is fitting because it illustrates the notion that a 
subject is less important than its depiction.  Ordinary objects are often rendered 
   67
   
 
 
interesting in photographs through the creative control of space—camera angle, 
depth of field, focus—and, most importantly, light.  The Belgian photographer 
Léonard Misonne explains this: “Light glorifies everything.  It transforms and 
ennobles the most commonplace and ordinary subjects.  The object is nothing; 
light is everything” (qtd. in Sussman 19).  The concepts of space and light are as 
important to writing as they are to photography.  Once a writer determines her 
point of view—angle and focus, as Murray describes it—she must next decide 
what to say about a topic.  In photographic terms, this corresponds to how much 
light she directs through her camera lens, which shapes the depth and 
dimension of her photographed object, as well as the degree to which that object 
contrasts with the other objects in the frame.  Murray prompts writing students to 
experiment with various exposure settings by composing what journalists call 
leads, the first few—and most important—lines of a news story.  He encourages 
students to write several leads and then outline an essay for each.  The process 
helps students find an interesting perspective from which to view and write about 
their experiences.  Moreover, Murray says, it shows students “how the beginning 
of a piece of writing shapes the entire piece of writing” (Writer Teaches Writing 
60). 
 Murray’s assumption that the beginning of a composition shapes the 
entire work is grounded in the belief that meaning cannot be separated from 
language.  According to this view, writing is a process of making meaning and 
discovering the world.  When writers compose, they confront a number of 
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possibilities related to voice, diction, and syntax, each of which influences 
meaning at the most local levels of an essay.  With each new choice in the 
writing process, the overall number of possibilities narrows; at the same time, 
however, that newest range of possibilities can be seen more clearly.  In this 
respect, each decision shapes the overall meaning of a composition, even if that 
decision is made halfway through an essay.  The shape of a composition is not 
exclusively determined by the start, as Murray suggests; nevertheless, writers 
are more likely to discover new interpretations (and less likely to reproduce 
dominant discourses) when they shift perspectives and make unconventional 
choices in the early stages of essay writing.  The traditional view of language—
that it is the communicative vehicle of preexisting ideas—does not allow for 
Murray’s assumption that early writing choices shape the meaning of a 
composition.  While language is considered an imperfect medium for the 
transmission of information under the traditional view, it does not have the 
epistemological power to create knowledge.  It can distort but not create, for 
truth is believed to exist independent of language. 
 Another benefit of lead-writing, Murray says, is that it focuses on content 
over form.  Murray knows that many composition students have a preoccupation 
with the formal elements of writing.  He also knows that that preoccupation shifts 
attention away the writing topic, frequently inhibiting progress and preventing the 
discovery of new meanings.  Murray attempts to mitigate this shift by employing 
writing activities that promote promiscuity over perfection.  That is to say, much 
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like Elbow, he encourages waste.  Because good writing rarely results from the 
first effort, Murray argues that writers must give themselves permission to write 
badly in order to write well (Writer Teaches Writing, 2nd ed. 29).  Lead-writing 
grants such permission.  However, consent should not be confused with intent: 
garbage is not a goal but a byproduct of discovering what to say and how to say 
it.  Elbow notes the same of his invention strategies, which is not altogether 
surprising given the similarity between lead-writing and freewriting.  Both writing 
activities are performed in small units of time; they encourage the unexpected; 
they help writers find and explore their topics; and most importantly, they get 
writers writing.  And even though some garbage will accumulate during the lead-
writing (or freewriting) process, Murray argues that good writing frequently 
accompanies garbage.  To this end, writers in search of a subject have even 
more in common with photographers than what Murray initially acknowledges, 
for the latter often waste rolls of film (or megabytes of memory in today’s digital 
age) to capture but a few good moments. 
 Murray’s invention exercises reflect a belief that all writing, to some 
extent, is autobiographical.  Every person, he argues, has a unique way of 
viewing the world and of using language to communicate that vision.  Romantic 
and humanistic perceptions of the self maintain that personal uniqueness is the 
exclusive invention of individuals; however, this is not the sense in which Murray 
interprets distinctiveness.   Human beings, he suggests, are also shaped by 
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social discourse.  Consider the following statement about his personal 
configuration: 
I confess that at my age I am not sure about the source of most of 
my autobiography.  I have written poems that describe what 
happened when I left the operating table, looked back and decided 
to return.  My war stories are constructed of what I experienced, 
what I heard later, what the history books say, what I needed to 
believe to survive and recover.  (“All Writing” 72) 
What Murray describes is a dialectical man, someone who is influenced by 
personal and social experiences alike.  Accordingly, he is as much constituted 
by social structures as he is personal psychology.  The consequence of this 
position is that all writing might also be considered social.  But Murray does not 
say this.  He suggests instead that the aggregate of social experiences, which 
varies from person to person, constitutes one’s individuality.  In other words, 
uniqueness is a matter of composition: one collection of experiences will shape 
an individual differently than another collection.  In “All Writing is Autobiography,” 
Murray gives the following examples: 
I have my own peculiar way of looking at the world and my own 
way of using language to communicate what I see.  My voice is the 
product of Scottish genes and a Yankee environment, of Baptists 
sermons and the newspaper city room, of all the language I have 
heard and spoken.  (67) 
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What is interesting about Murray’s statement is that he appropriates the social 
influences in his life.  Rather than saying that his highland heritage and religious 
background, for example, influence the way he interprets the world, he takes 
ownership of them.  They no longer exert external influence over their subject 
but emanate from within: “my voice,” “my particular way.”  From this perspective, 
particular ways of knowing and composing the world cannot be separated from 
their linguistic agents.  Hence Murray’s claim that all writing is autobiography 
that “grows from a few deep taproots that are set down into our past in 
childhood” (“All Writing” 67). 
 Given his view that personal history can never be extracted from a piece 
of writing, Murray encourages students to write subjectively by exploring their 
interests and experiences.  He sees no reason to attempt to suppress the 
idiosyncrasies that inevitably pervade all communication.  Some scholars have 
criticized this personal approach to composition on the grounds that it promotes 
solipsism.  James Berlin, for example, writes that expressivism “locate[s] truth 
either within the individual or within a realm that is accessible only through the 
individual’s internal apprehension, apart from the empirically verifiable sensory 
world” (Rhetoric and Reality 11).  But just because Murray encourages students 
to begin writing through the lens of personal history does not mean that he 
promotes solipsism.  In fact, as Murray describes the process of motivating 
students to write, his pedagogy sounds not solipsistic but transactional.  That is 
to say, it appears to search for truth within the interaction of the writer, reader, 
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subject, and language.  Accordingly, his approach mirrors the rhetorical theory 
that Berlin ranks highest.  Consider the trajectory Murray would have students 
follow:  
[S]tudents may write about an important incident in their life.  This 
starts most subjectively with a listing of the relevant parts, but 
when they expand the incident, perhaps changing the point of view 
and the tone, showing the life-long implications of that incident for 
their own lives, then for other lives, and perhaps for all lives, they 
control and use their material.  Hopefully, they have read widely 
enough so that they can combine their own experiences with the 
insights of others who are more intelligent, more perceptive, or 
more experienced.  (Writer Teaches Writing 153) 
Murray’s writing process clearly encourages students to move beyond solipsism. 
Lead-writing exercises, for example, prompt students to consider different points 
of view on their subjects, which lead to new insights, while interaction with other 
writers provides even further perspective and insight.  As Murray notes, the latter 
can occur with writers of published works, by actively and critically engaging 
their texts; it can also occur with other writers in class, through group workshops. 
  The workshop—or peer review, as it is commonly known—lets writers 
share their work with and receive feedback from other writers in class.  Murray 
advocates the process because it gives student writers the opportunity to help 
each other “develop their own meanings and their own voices” (Writer Teaches 
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Writing, 2nd ed. 187).  While Murray puts emphasis on developing one’s own 
meanings, he knows that reader feedback will help move writers further away 
from their initial subjective positions.  When readers ask for clarification, when 
they point out contradictions, or when they ask for more detail about an idea, 
then writers have an opportunity to see their work through the eyes of others and 
to consider their subjects from the diverse perspectives of others.  These new 
perspectives often allow writers to achieve greater objectivity. By thus engaging 
the workshop process—as part of the larger composing process—the writer, as 
Murray notes, “discovers the universal through the personal” (Writer Teaches 
Writing 153).  That is to say, personal and expressive writing is not necessarily 
antithetical to thoughtful and critical writing, as Joseph Harris has charged.  
Asking writers to explore familiar and interesting topics from their personal lives 
helps them to find motivation to enter the writing process.  And that process is at 
once a critical exploration of reality and a search for meaning through language.  
Lest anyone persists labeling the subjective approach to writing instruction “anti-
intellectual” (Harris 31), Murray reminds his readers that even scholarship, if it is 
good, “evolves from personal curiosity” (Writer Teaches Writing 153). 
 
Language Matters in the Writing Classroom 
 The idea that writing is the process of discovering meaning through 
language further aligns process pedagogy and expressivism with critical 
pedagogy.  Freire believes that the ability to name the world is the ability to 
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transform it (Pedagogy 88).  He argues that human beings have a dialectical 
relationship with the world and, as such, have the potential to interact with and 
shape reality through language.  This view of the world as an unfinished reality 
under constant revision underlies the pedagogies of Elbow and Murray and 
motivates their emphasis on the writing process.   Each stage of the process, 
including each revision, gives writers the opportunity to make new connections 
between ideas and leads them closer to discovering the meaning of their 
experiences and thus the truth about the world. 
 In Writing Without Teachers, Elbow notes that language is the principal 
means by which people can interact with themselves.  “Without a symbol system 
such as language,” he writes, “it is difficult if not impossible to think about more 
than one thing at a time, and thus to allow two thoughts to interact” (55).  The 
process of placing thought into symbols allows humans to easily move from one 
idea to another without losing the first.  Furthermore, it allows us to hold two or 
more ideas in our minds at one time and explore the relationship between them.  
In short, language lets us objectify our noetic inventions and place our thoughts 
at a distance (Elbow, Writing Without Teachers 55).  Walter J. Ong claims that 
the extent to which we can objectify ideas and distance ourselves from thought 
increases with writing, opening the human psyche to greater introspection and 
analysis (105).  This distancing effect is what Elbow hopes to achieve through 
his writing process. He believes that the traditional understanding of writing is 
backwards.  Meaning is not something that writers formulate before they begin 
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writing; rather, it is something they discover as they write. 
 While I agree with Elbow’s claim that writing is a process of discovering 
meaning, I also think that his argument is too simplistic in its portrayal of thinking 
and writing.  It assumes that thinking, as an activity, is less sophisticated than 
writing, that it is unable to provide the same level of critical analysis.  This 
perspective echoes what E. M. Forster believed when he asked, “How can I tell 
what I think till I see what I say?” (101), and what Joan Didion thought when she 
declared, “I write entirely to find out what I’m thinking, what I’m looking at, what I 
see and what it means” (2).  For Elbow, Forster, and Didion, the act of putting 
words on paper facilitates critical reflection and analytical insight in ways that 
thinking cannot.  But this does not mean that thinking is incapable of generating 
creative and interesting ideas.  Case in point: Socrates is rumored to be one of 
the greatest minds in the history of Western civilization, yet he never wrote a 
word.  He did, however, if we believe Plato, discover new insights through 
dialogue with others.  To be sure, Socrates was as critically competent through 
speech as most intellectuals are through writing.  This point challenges the 
notion that writing occasions greater critical analysis exclusively because it 
objectifies the word to a greater degree than speech.  Perhaps the analytical 
strength of writing resides also in its tendency to slow the thinking process—a 
tendency shared by conversation.  When students, for example, write or vocalize 
ideas, they give themselves the space necessary to consider their subjects more 
carefully and thoroughly.  However, as many teachers will attest, the space is 
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not always utilized.  Herein lies the problem with the implication that writing can 
discover knowledge more readily than thinking.  Some students will take the time 
to discover ideas without writing, often talking though ideas with themselves; 
they will have developed greater knowledge about their subject than those who 
write but do not utilize the opportunity for reflection and analysis that the process 
affords them.  In other words, the thinking process can yield as much intellectual 
fruit as writing.  Nevertheless, my experience as a writer and teacher suggests 
that where the composing process is actively engaged, it wields greater potential 
for intellectual discovery than other modes of cognition.  Because the products 
of writing are less fleeting than other linguistic events, writing can objectify 
language and accommodate a prolonged contemplation of ideas to a greater 
extent than intracranial thinking and deliberative discourse.  To this end, I agree 
with Elbow’s claim that writing uncovers meaning.  Unfortunately—and herein 
lies my disagreement with Elbow’s sweeping portrayal of thinking and writing—
students do not always pursue or realize this potential in their writing. 
 The process of putting words on paper, Elbow maintains, can help 
students conceive of their ideas as objects, as things exterior to the self.  This 
distance gives them the opportunity to interact with their words—to find gaps in 
their reasoning, pinpoint contradictions in their beliefs, and realize new 
connections between ideas.  It also lets students more impartially test their 
perceptions against received wisdom and the experiences of others.  The result 
is that writers will discover new meaning in their experiences and articulate fresh 
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truths about the world.  The process is one of reflection and action via language 
and parallels Freire’s notion of praxis.  By reflecting on their experiences through 
dialogue with themselves (made possible through the objectification of the word) 
and with others in their peer groups, writers actively participate in the creation 
and transformation of reality, a cornerstone of critical pedagogy.  Accordingly, 
process pedagogy and expressivism are not as narrowly concerned with the 
individual as some critics have charged.  Insofar as the pedagogies encourage 
the re-examination of experience and meaning, both of which are situated within 
specific social and political contexts, they encourage a reinterpretation of social 
and political realties.    
 Murray also sees language as a powerful instrument capable of creating 
and transforming the world.  This notion is so central to his idea of writing that it 
undergirds his definition of the writing process.  “A writer,” he says, “is an 
individual who uses language to discover meaning in experience and 
communicate it” (“Interior View” 21).  What is important about this definition is 
that it locates meaning outside of experience.  It acknowledges that an event or 
happening has no inherent meaning but only achieves significance when it 
undergoes interpretation.  Moreover, the definition suggests that the 
interpretation of the experience must be discovered through language.  
Existential philosophers may hasten to suggest that lived experience is the 
organizing unit of life and of the world, but they overwhelmingly ignore the role 
that language plays in establishing the meaning of an experience.  Murray does 
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not.  He believes that language is an essential element in the search for 
meaning and truth in the world.  Writing facilitates the search for meaning by 
objectifying words and ideas. Elbow appreciates the distancing potential of 
language; so does Murray.  The ability to place ideas outside of oneself and 
view them more objectively gives a writer the opportunity to see connections that 
might otherwise be imperceptible.  As Murray describes it, “’words are put down 
to see what they reveal when they bump into other words on the page” (“Interior 
View” 23). 
 According to Murray’s model, as writers interact with their written words 
and ideas, new meanings emerge.  Sometimes those meanings reinforce what 
we already know, but sometimes they run contrary to established knowledge.  
The latter situation compels writers to reconsider what they believe to be the 
truth about the world.  Such reconsiderations exercise what Freire calls the 
ontological right of humans to speak their truth about the world and remake 
reality.  To the extent that I perceive my common humanity with others, I agree 
with Freire that each person has a right to name the world; however, universal 
attainment of that right may never be secured, as power is encoded in countless 
varieties of cultural institutions, practices, and discourses.  But no matter how 
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 In Critical Teaching and the Idea of Literacy, Knoblauch and Brannon 
argue that process pedagogy and expressivism are “the precursors to critical 
teaching, despite the fact that they don’t, for the most part, derive from the 
customary sources of liberatory praxis—Marxism, feminism, post-modernism” 
(126).  Such a statement can easily be supported by methodological overlaps 
between the pedagogies.  This chapter explores the degree to which process 
pedagogy and expressivism parallel the practices of critical pedagogy insofar as 
they promote the generative power of language to remake reality, decenter their 
classrooms, and advocate the use of relevant topics for writing and discussion.  
Given that these classroom practices form the backbone of critical pedagogy as 
Freire articulates it, process pedagogy and expressivism can comfortably be 
interpreted as precursors to critical pedagogy. Elbow and Murray may be viewed 
as the American forefathers of critical teaching.  Such a reading of the history of 
critical pedagogy and of the process and expressive movements is important 
because it revises the common historical narratives of composition theory.  The 
advantage of this revision is that it considers the sources of critical pedagogy 
and their consequences on pedagogical practice.  According to Roskelly and 
Ronald, such reflection is absent from most pedagogical scholarship: 
In the last three decades, composition has often embraced visions 
of itself as revolutionary, cutting-edge, and above all, new.  Insofar 
as it fuels change and energizes teachers, revolutionary 
   80
   
 
 
sloganeering probably does a lot of good.  Yet this kind of 
fascination with the new resists reflection; the harm lies in ignoring 
the consequences or the sources of new approaches.  (104) 
 This chapter examined the teaching practices of Elbow and Murray and 
argued that they exhibited and anticipated several key features of Freirean 
critical pedagogy.  The next chapter will argue that I. A. Richards, in the first half 
of the nineteenth century, developed and practiced an early form of critical 
pedagogy that embodied Freire’s principle methods. 
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PRACTICAL CRITICISM / PRACTICAL PEDAGOGY: I. A. RICHARDS 
PROMOTES INDEPENDENT THINKING 
 
 The purpose of this chapter is to show that I. A. Richards, during the 
1920s and ‘30s, anticipated the principal teaching methods of critical pedagogy 
first articulated by Paulo Freire in the 1970s.  I argue that Richards’s pedagogy 
embodied the Freirean focus on the generative power of language, the study of 
relevant subject matter, and instructional methods grounded in democracy and 
praxis.  Like the radical American pedagogues of the 1960s, Richards and his 
colleagues at the University of Cambridge taught during a time of significant 
social change.  By the early nineteenth century, industrialization and war had 
moved England towards greater social, economic, and political equality: the 
middle classes enjoyed increased prosperity; women and the working classes 
gained political power; and traditional markers of class status were deteriorating.  
Moreover, following a number of legislative reforms, including the elimination of 
public education fees and increases in the legal dropout age, a wider variety of 
men and women pursued an education.  This expansion of the student 
population soon highlighted deficiencies in traditional pedagogical models.  
Richards took these deficiencies seriously and devoted much of his work to 
developing more efficient methods for teaching non-traditional students. These 
methods made Richards an early champion of student-centered education.  “His 
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pedagogical inventions,” writes Ann Berthoff, “are all conceived of as ways and 
means of placing the process of composing, or framing, in the control of the 
meaning-maker” (“I. A. Richards” 197). 
Current-traditional writing instruction—which emphasizes the modes of 
discourse and technical proficiency—had reigned supreme in writing classrooms 
since the late eighteenth century, but it was not until he 1940s that it began to 
include the study of literary texts as formal manifestations of the principles of 
discourse.  To some extent, eighteenth-century pedagogues also included 
criticism as a means of rhetorical instruction, yet their focus, as Thomas Miller 
notes, was not literature per se but “cosmopolitan forms of public discourse, 
particularly essays of taste and manners” (194).  While both methods of 
instruction challenged the traditional association between rhetoric and civic 
participation, the eighteenth-century approach nevertheless emphasized more 
conventional rhetorical works than the latter.  The introduction of literary texts 
into composition classrooms, according to Sharon Crowley, follows the rise of 
new criticism as both a teachable and legitimate method for studying literature.  
Because composition teachers were largely students of literature, and because 
there was no established theoretical framework for teaching composition, writing 
instructors exploited the formalist biases of current-traditionalism and new 
criticism and began to “[conflate] poetic principles with rules for exposition” 
(Crowley 115).  This impulse to drive literary criticism into the domain of 
composition was further assisted by the publication of several writing textbooks 
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that borrowed from the principles of new criticism, some of which were written by 
prominent new critics, including Monroe Beardsley’s Writing with Reason and 
Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren’s Modern Rhetoric. 
Given the influence of new criticism on current-traditional writing 
instruction in the mid-twentieth-century American composition classroom, it 
comes as no surprise that I. A. Richards, the purported father of new criticism 
(Russo 523), despite significant contributions to the field of rhetoric and writing, 
has been a scarce figure in the throng of post-1960s’ scholarship in composition 
pedagogy.  Today less than a handful of his twenty books remain in print; his 
works earn only brief and perfunctory appearances in graduate English 
seminars; and his name seldom receives mention in professional journals of 
rhetoric.  Over the years, a few scholars have tried to rescue Richards from this 
well of silence.  In 1991, for example, Ann Berthoff published Richards on 
Rhetoric, a collection of twenty-five essays and passages taken from Richards’s 
most important rhetorical works.  Her explicit goal was to make Richards’s ideas 
on language and learning more accessible to scholars, for as she proclaims in 
the introduction to her edited collection, “[Richards] is a critic we urgently need” 
(ix).  In the spring of 1992, Stuart Brown echoed Berthoff’s assertion, arguing 
that Richards “identified the major critical components needed to formulate a 
rhetoric for the twenty-first century” (219).  These small but significant steps 
towards a renewed interest in the works of Richards never gained momentum. 
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 The widespread resistance to re-engage Richards may be grounded in 
the tension between what Peter Elbow calls the institutional “cultures or 
traditions or identities of literature and composition” (“The Cultures” 534).  
Because modern composition developed in response to the text-centered 
pedagogy of literary studies that valued product over process and scholarship 
over teaching, compositionists seem unwilling to embrace any aspect of the 
period immediately preceding the institutional formation of their field in the 
1960s, an era in which writing instruction had not only been co-opted by new 
criticism but was also treated as inferior to literary studies (see Kinneavy 1; 
Elbow “The Cultures” 541).  Perhaps they are concerned that a return to 
Richards might signify a move towards acknowledging the value (or even the 
superiority) of the formalist principles of current-traditional writing instruction, 
which might then be viewed as a revocation of composition’s institutional 
authority.  To fear this slippery slope is gratuitous, for finding value in the 
pedagogies of the past will not negate or discredit composition’s claims of 
progress.  This is especially true in the case of Richards, who remains, even by 
1960s’ standards, a progressive writing instructor.  Richards saw the direction 
his country was headed and worked to develop educational methods that 
prepared student to communicate and participate in an increasingly diverse 
society.  The result was an early incarnation of critical pedagogy that stressed 
participatory learning, critical reflection, and the epistemological influence of 
language. 
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 In the opening paragraph of Practical Criticism, published in 1929, 
Richards defines the aims of his project.  There are three, but only the second 
and third concern pedagogy.  One of his goals is “to provide a new technique for 
those who wish to discover for themselves what they think and feel about poetry 
(and cognate matters) and why they should like or dislike it” (3).  Another is “to 
prepare the way for education methods more efficient than those we use now in 
developing discrimination and the power to understand what we hear and read” 
(3).  On the surface these aims appear only to address consumption and 
critique.  However, as Richard E. Miller points out, “practical criticism was born, 
in part, out of a desire to get students to write about poetry in a different 
(Richards would say more ‘discriminating’) way” (176).  In other words, 
Richards’s project concerned the teaching of composition as much as it did the 
teaching of criticism per se.  And because his goal was the formulation of new 
techniques for teaching criticism and composition, it seems certain that Richards 
found ineffective the old methods of the university.  Retrospectively, his efforts 
might be interpreted as indication that an educational disruption upset the 
traditional paradigm for teaching students to analyze and write about literature.  
This disruption can be attributed to a broadening of student constituencies in 
higher education, which followed and facilitated the political rise of England’s 
lower and middle classes. 
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Political Power and Educational Access 
Until the mid-nineteenth century, the English government played a very 
small role the in education of its citizenry.  It had provided limited grants to 
religious institutions to build schools and teach basic literacy to the lower orders, 
but there remained no organized system of education.  Accordingly, despite the 
opportunities made possible by government grants, laboring classes continued 
to receive sporadic and unsatisfactory schooling.  Because children often shared 
in the domestic and financial responsibilities of household, they did not regularly 
attend school.   Roy Strong estimates that under such class conditions many 
children had but three or four years of formal education (415).  This neglect of 
public education eventually drew criticism as England’s position in the industrial 
world began to slip.  A prominent voice in the debate over education reform was 
W.E. Forster, a member of parliament.  He introduced the Elementary Education 
Act of 1870, which universalized elementary education and established elected 
local school boards.  When he brought his bill to the House of Commons, he 
argued that England’s industrial prosperity, constitutional system, and national 
power depended upon “the speedy provision of elementary education” (HC Deb 
c465).  
Even though England had ushered in the Industrial Revolution in the late 
eighteenth century, T. L. Jarman notes that it was one of the last industrial 
nations to create a national system of education (213).  Consequently, England 
had no viable mechanism for preparing its citizenry to meet the demands of 
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industrialization.  As scientific farming and machine-based manufacturing 
replaced primitive methods of agriculture and domestic craftsmanship, the 
demand for technicians and engineers, as well as clerks and accountants and 
other trained personnel increased (Jarman 212).  All these jobs, writes Jarman, 
“needed at least an elementary education: in reading, writing, and arithmetic” 
(213).  The Elementary Education Act of 1870 was an important step towards 
meeting these demands of human economy.  It did not make primary education 
mandatory or free, but it did make elementary schools available for those who 
wished to attend them.  As a corollary, the bill paved the way for further 
legislative acts making elementary education compulsory until the age of twelve.  
Ironically, however, the industrial pressures that initiated the Educational Act of 
1870 and its nineteenth-century successors would eventually drive juveniles to 
leave school once they reached the dropout age.  According to Asa Briggs, the 
number of working children ages fourteen and under quadrupled during World 
War I (263).  This spike in the number of young workers in the early twentieth 
century may be the product of wartime changes in social roles.  Regardless, 
English officials were not comfortable with the idea that juveniles were primarily 
seen as cheap substitute labor, thus prompting the Minister of Education,         
H. A. L. Fisher, to introduce and defend a bill raising the dropout age to fourteen 
and abolishing all fees for public elementary education (Briggs 263).  The Fisher 
bill also supported secondary education by directing local school authorities to 
make provisions for students who wished to stay in school beyond their 
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fourteenth year (Jarman 197; Andrews 84).  To be sure, Fisher believed that 
education should be available to all classes of citizens and that success should 
reward ability, not just privilege. 
The educational reforms of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries primarily concerned elementary and secondary education, but their 
impact on higher education cannot be overstated.  Because children from less 
privileged backgrounds were now given greater opportunity to pursue a 
comprehensive education until their eighteenth year, many young men and 
women who had historically been shut out from universities found themselves 
prepared to pursue a higher education, and statistics indicate that many did.  
According to the Report of the Robbins Committee on Higher Education, the 
number of students entering university in Britain doubled between 1900 and 
1938 (qtd. in Ross 27).  For the first time, a significant number of those students 
hailed from the lower and middle classes.   A measure of the degree to which 
education reform increased access to higher education is that boys from manual 
backgrounds born between 1910 and 1929 reached university at twice the rate 
of those born before 1910, and boys from business and professional 
backgrounds reached university at thrice the rate of the earlier birth cohort 
(Floud 114, 137). 
While the Educational Acts of 1870 and 1918 provided the means by 
which all children could prepare to enter the university, they were not solely 
responsible for increasing university enrollment and diversity.  They worked in 
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concert with a number of other developments.  One contributing factor was the 
establishment of new universities.  The first wave of charters began as early as 
1900 and included the universities in Birmingham, Sheffield, and Bristol.  Unlike 
Oxford and Cambridge, these newer civic, or “redbrick,” universities taught 
technical knowledge over the purely academic. Their focus on practical learning 
was grounded in their origins as working-men’s institutions that were typically 
“founded and endowed by local businessmen, with the express commitment of 
providing opportunities for social advancement for young men from the region” 
(Ross 25).  That the founders were motivated by meritocratic advancement is 
impressive, especially when viewed through the corporate mentality of education 
today, where colleges and universities are increasingly viewed as factories that 
manufacture employees for the job market and where institutional success is 
defined and measured by graduate employment rates and starting salaries; 
nevertheless, it is probably a bit naïve to assume that the motivation behind 
these colleges and institutions was strictly philanthropic.  As businessmen, the 
founders also stood to benefit from the education of those who did not have the 
wealth and social status to attend Oxford or Cambridge: by providing young men 
of ability the opportunity to obtain job-related skills, the founders increased the 
number of qualified individuals in the workforce.  Local professionals later joined 
these members of commerce and manufacturing to lobby for university status 
(Ross 25).  The path to securing such charters was assisted by the increasing 
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political power and social status of the lower and middle classes in the early 
twentieth century. 
As manufacturing activity continued to increase before and during the 
Great War, the rural masses steadily migrated to the cities.  As this occurred, the 
landowning gentry began to the sell its estates, for that which had once been the 
basis for its aristocratic and political power was no longer profitable.  Agriculture 
was in decline and taxes were rising.  Fortunately, the gentry found prospective 
buyers from among the increasingly wealthy business and professional classes 
who nostalgically desired the upper-class rural lifestyle (Strong 489).  
Accompanying these changes in land ownership were a host of other 
developments that further deteriorated traditional class markers, including the 
advent of the BBC, which Strong says hastened the leveling of social status by 
“introducing to the public for the first time a universally accepted voice for 
speech” (489).  Such ruptures in the façade of social hierarchy are tangible 
markers of England’s democratic progress during the war, which arguably 
culminated with the Representation of the People Act of 1918.  This extension of 
franchise extended voting rights to all men over the age of twenty-one and to 
women over the age of thirty.  Because the war-front effort so heavily relied 
upon machinery produced by factory labor at home, workers gained leverage, 
trade unions expanded their membership, and women joined men in the 
industrial labor force (Porter 173).  Their political strength of the workers could 
not be denied, and they soon gained unprecedented access to the political 
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process, first with the creation of the Ministry of Labor and next with the 
extension of voting rights.  The latter gave laboring classes enough influence to 
tip the electorate, thus making the interests of workers the interests of the state 
(Strong 481). 
These moves towards political equality—initiated as they were by the 
interests of the governing elite—increased opportunities for lower- and middle-
class children to pursue a university education.  And even if those students were 
initially financially limited to local redbrick universities, the state eventually saw 
the value of meritocratic advancement and began to offer scholarships to those 
students whose families could not afford to send them to Oxford or Cambridge.  
The state initially provided two hundred scholarships in 1919, in addition to the 
smaller number that was offered through private university endowments and by 
local authorities (Ross 26).  The result is that a growing number of students 
attending England’s most elite and prestigious universities hailed from 
economically- and socially-diverse backgrounds.  These demographic changes 
reduced the exclusivity of Oxford and Cambridge, placing a premier education 
within the reach of talented young men who had not the advantage of inherited 
privilege.  Moreover, given their diverse backgrounds, scholarship students, 
unlike typical Oxbridge men, did not hail from the most prestigious independent 
boarding schools in Britain, making their educational (and social) experiences 
quite different from those who generally matriculated.  These differences made 
the transition to university a more challenging affair for scholarship students and 
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also agitated the status quo.  Nevertheless, the ancient universities welcomed 
such diversity during a time when working-class men had acquired political 
power, for it provided them an opportunity to “reassert [their] claim as the 
premier national institution, with a special responsibility to train the nation’s 
leaders” (Vernon 173). 
Class is not the only indicator of increased educational diversity in 
England during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—so is gender. 
Women began to receive undergraduate education in 1869 with the founding of 
Girton College, the first residential college for women.  The college was located 
in Cambridge but was not then affiliated with the university there.  Consequently, 
its students could not attend lectures or sit for examinations at the University of 
Cambridge.  Moreover, Girton did not have the charter to grant degrees and held 
a very low rank within the university community (Deslandes 185).  Eventually, 
the women of Girton began to receive limited privileges at Cambridge, including 
the right to attend lectures, to sit for examinations, and to participate in university 
organizations.  Despite such progress on the policy front, the male students at 
Cambridge behaved belligerently towards the women entering the university 
community—their university community. Paul Deslandes says that male 
students felt threatened by female students and would protect and exert their 
cultural dominance through unflattering sexual characterizations and harsh 
oppositional rhetoric (187-96).  Nevertheless, by 1910 the number of women 
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attending courses at Cambridge steadily increased to about ten percent of the 
total student population. 
While women had been earning degrees since the turn of the century at 
local redbrick universities and received twenty-three percent of all first degrees 
awarded in 1922 (Hicks and Allen 10), Oxford and Cambridge continued to deny 
them such privileges until after the war.  The increased presence of women in 
industry and the extension of franchise in 1918 gave women considerable 
political weight alongside the working classes, and the government began to 
heed the interests of women.  In 1919, a Royal Commission was established to 
“force the universities to clarify women’s status” (Deslandes 209).  In response, 
Oxford began to extend full university privileges to women.  Cambridge refused 
to do the same but did make a small concession in 1921 to award titular degrees 
to women.  Full privileges were not granted until 1948 when Girton College 
received its official status as a college of Cambridge University. 
Alongside women, foreign students attended England’s universities at 
higher rates in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  They began to 
attend English universities after a number of educational reforms, not the least of 
which was legislation abolishing religious tests at Oxford and Cambridge in 
1871. Indian students made up the majority of international students by the end 
of the nineteenth century, yet they never exceeded two to three percent of the 
student population (Deslandes 209-10).  After the war, the number of foreign 
students grew exponentially.  By 1920, thirty percent of the incoming class at 
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Oxford, for example, came from other countries, including the Commonwealth of 
Nations, Europe, and the United States (Deslandes 210). 
 
Richards and the Instrumentality of Language 
Understanding the history of educational reform and social progress in 
England between 1870 and 1920 is paramount to understanding the climate in 
which Richards began his teaching career at Cambridge and the impetus behind 
his early experiments in pedagogy.  By the time he began lecturing at 
Magdalene College in 1922, the university had become quite diverse.  It was no 
longer an institution of privilege for white upper-class Anglican boys, as various 
social and political developments had opened the doors of higher education to 
more diverse demographics, including women, foreigners, and working class 
scholarship students.  Such diversity posed a pedagogical problem for educators 
at the University of Cambridge, for the one-size-fits-all model of education is 
rendered ineffective in classrooms where students themselves are not the same 
size.  Because learning styles vary from student to student and are shaped in no 
small part by culture and background (see Swanson 9-13, Bond 246-53), 
Richards and his colleagues had to revise their pedagogical assumptions in 
order to meet the diverse needs of their students and remain effective teachers. 
I believe that Richards’s understanding of language, thought, and 
meaning made him particularly sensitive to cognitive differences related to 
culture, class, and gender. He develops these points and establishes a 
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comprehensive theory of context in The Meaning of Meaning, co-authored with 
C. K. Ogden and published in 1923.  The implication of starting with linguistic 
theory as common ground is that misunderstanding is viewed primarily as 
misuses of language.  Such awareness obliges men and women to more 
carefully control the meaning of their words and to more prudently pursue an 
understanding of others.  Richards begins Meaning of Meaning by addressing 
what he calls the “proper meaning superstition,” the common yet false belief that 
words have inherent meaning.  “Words, as everyone knows, ‘mean’ nothing by 
themselves,” he writes.  “It is only when a thinker makes use of them that they 
stand for anything, or, in one sense, have ‘meaning’” (Meaning 9-10).  Richards 
maintains that words are signs that have arbitrary connections to the concepts 
that they signify and acquire meaning only through the process of interpretation.  
Moreover, he says that the meaning of signs is always shaped by the situations 
in which those signs have previously been experienced.  Accordingly, when a 
thinker makes use of signs, he or she does so through remembered contexts; 
that is, through the prior situations in which those signs have appeared to the 
interpreter.  While this view of interpretation seems to make meaning subjective, 
it does not ignore or trivialize its social foundations.  Richards recognizes that 
the “norms of existence” are manifest in linguistic categories (Russo 159).  He 
believes that individual members of various cultures and groups inherit with their 
languages distinctive patterns of organizing experiences and that social 
background provides context for meaning. 
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The influence of background on interpretation is strong.  Because thought 
relies upon language, and because language projects the values, beliefs, and 
prejudices of the communities to which people belong, background will always 
contribute to the perceived meaning of any given event.  A person will process 
her experiences using the associations and categories habitual to her language.  
In other words, her interpretation of a particular experience—i.e. her perception 
of reality—is dominated by the cognitive structures of her language.  Richards 
explains this connection between language and reality in the following terms: 
It must be remembered, disconcerting though the fact may be, that 
so far from a grammar—the structure of a symbol system—being a 
reflection of the structure of the world, any supposed structure of 
the world is more probably a reflection of the grammar used.  
(Meaning 96) 
The mirror imagery used by Richards here is valuable because it illustrates the 
process by which reality is perceived: far from experiencing the world as neutral 
subjects, human beings actually perceive their own reflections when they look at 
the world.  Of course, the reflections we see, as Richards presents it, are 
reflections of thoughts, which are, in turn, reflections (or echoes) of language. 
 Because words think for us, language takes possession of active thinking.  
Our thoughts and minds—our entire existential being—is ruled by what Richards 
calls the “tyranny of language” (Meaning 4).  Fortunately, we are not powerless 
against such tyranny.  Richards argues that liberation can be achieved through 
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an awareness of the controlling influence of language (Meaning 47). That is to 
say, we can more readily resist intellectual colonization when we understand 
that meaning develops in context.  By developing an understanding of the 
relationship between words and things, people can communicate more 
effectively, envision alternative possibilities, and more actively shape their 
worlds.  These potentialities establish the framework for greater human freedom 
and tolerance.  The Meaning of Meaning nurtures these ideals by advocating for 
a “more alert and efficient use of language—self-willed, self-controlled, bound for 
some purposes, free of others, but free at the root—to help order the mind” 
(Russo 113). 
 Richards does not find many virtues in language.  This is evident 
throughout Meaning of Meaning in the various metaphors of manipulation that 
he applies to language—e.g. tyranny, magic, hypnosis—and the persistence 
with which he urges us to escape the treacheries thereof.  Richards’s negative 
view toward language recapitulates some of the earliest known attitudes about 
rhetoric: Gorgias, for example, compares the power of speech to a drug, while 
Plato likens it to seduction.  The dominant theme conveyed by these metaphors 
is that language is an instrument of misdirection and control.  Richards intends 
his contextual theory of meaning to guard men and women against such verbal 
exploitation.  Unfortunately, his negative approach obscures the possibilities of 
language, namely, its ability to open the mind to alternative ways of interpreting 
the world.  Richards clearly believes that language is not just an instrument of 
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control but also one of liberation; however, his skepticism towards language 
often conceals his more optimistic belief that words accord power 
democratically. 
Richards’s view that language is a powerful instrument that summons 
great responsibility and awareness from its users is shared by Paulo Freire, who 
makes language and dialogue the center of his pedagogy.  In Pedagogy of the 
Oppressed, Freire argues that human beings exist dialectically with the world, 
and that the world is not a static reality but an ever-changing process (64).  
According to this view, the ways in which we interpret the world—a manifestation 
of language, as both Richards and Freire contend—actively transform reality.  
While words have the unique ability to expand the world, both authors lament 
that words can also collapse it.  That is to say, language can limit one’s creative 
capacity to imagine possibilities in this world.  Consequently, Freire argues that it 
can also limit the ability to become more fully human, especially for those who 
have been denied the right to name the world and seek their own truth 
(Pedagogy 70).  Because Freire’s pedagogy values freedom above all else, he 
is adamant that people have the primordial right to speak for themselves: “If it is 
in speaking their world that people, by naming the world transform it, dialogue 
imposes itself as the way by which they achieve significance as human beings.  
Dialogue is thus an existential necessity” (Pedagogy 69). 
Dialogue is essential to Freire because it is a shared and equitable 
conversation between two or more people about the world.  It is the process 
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whereby dialoguers reflect on their experiences and create meaning and reality 
through language.  It is not a one-sided activity whereby one person imposes his 
truth upon another.  If each person does not share equally in the creation of 
truth, then a situation is created where some people speak on behalf of others.  
Such domination interferes with the ontological vocation of all those involved to 
be more fully human.  Freire thus appropriately argues that (humanizing) 
dialogue must be founded upon love, humility, and faith (Pedagogy 72).  When 
dialogue includes these three elements—and dialogue as such always does—
then men and women can actively recreate reality with others, critically engaging 
and negotiating a diverse collection of experiences and truths.  To engage these 
realities dialogically is also to engage the contexts in which various meanings 
are negotiated and formed and to understand that divergent views of reality 
proceed from what Freire calls “the concrete, existential, present situation of real 
people” (Pedagogy 74).  Reality, in other words, is not the province of any one 
group; it is open for all to name and varies according to situation. 
 
Dialogue and Difference in the Classroom 
Richards and Freire certainly agree upon the point that meaning is rooted 
in context and that each person has the right to speak a particular meaning as it 
relates to his or her situation.  Moreover, they both view any infringement on the 
right to name the world as an encroachment on human freedom.  These points 
are fundamental to the pedagogies that Richards and Freire, each in his time, 
   100
   
 
 
advocate and practice.  For example: Because Freire believes that any attempt 
to “deposit” ideas into another is an act of dehumanization, he is averse to any 
teaching model that does not abolish the dichotomy between teachers and 
students and nurture a dialogue that is based on mutual respect and inquiry.  
Educators, he maintains, must recognize that educational programs designed for 
students—if they are to be successful—must consider the concrete situations 
that students occupy: 
We simply cannot go to the laborers—urban or peasant—in the 
banking style, to give them “knowledge” or to impose upon them 
the model of the “good man” contained in a program whose 
content we have ourselves organized.  Many political and 
educational plans have failed because their authors designed them 
according to the own personal views of reality, never once taking 
into account (except as mere objects of their actions) the men-in-a-
situation to whom their program was ostensibly directed.  
(Pedagogy 75) 
While the pitfalls that accompany one-sided, teacher-oriented pedagogies are 
always present, they become all the more evident when there is diversity in the 
classroom.  If students have backgrounds similar to their teachers, then both 
parties will likely share similar social and ideological realities.  Such is the case 
when education is the limited province of the privileged classes.  When financial 
assistance is not available and schooling is dependent on wealth, those who 
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have financial advantage enough to obtain an education will share a classroom 
with teachers and other students whose backgrounds are very much like their 
own.  On the other hand, when students hail from diverse cultural and 
socioeconomic backgrounds, there is very little homogeneity between the parties 
who occupy the learning space of the classroom.  Any educational program that 
ignores differences and is founded on a singular view of reality will alienate 
students whose diverse situations render a reality different than that upon which 
a program is based.  “Such a program,” Freire writes, “constitutes cultural 
invasion” (Pedagogy 77).  Moreover, it is ineffective. 
 As the social and educational history of England makes clear, university 
classrooms were increasingly and significantly more diverse in the early 
twentieth century than they had been before.  As noted above, this is the period 
in which Richards began his teaching career at Cambridge.  Accordingly, his 
lectures were presumably attended by a sizable number of students from 
various cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds.  While the exact ratio of new 
students to traditional ones is uncharted, Richards makes clear in his 
introduction to Practical Criticism that his students are far from homogenous.  
First, he notes that about half of his student-respondents were women.  This 
statistic suggests that Richards taught female students in disproportionate 
numbers, as they only represented ten percent of the overall undergraduate 
population at Cambridge.  Second, he notes that Practical Criticism is a “record 
of a piece of fieldwork in comparative ideology” (6).  While this statement speaks 
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less explicitly on the composition of his participant group than his first statement, 
it nevertheless implies that his protocol-writers were a diverse group.  We can 
thus reasonably conclude that the general population at Cambridge, to some 
significant extent, reflected such diversity.  What is more, we may further reason 
that the number of young men from disadvantaged backgrounds and colonial 
nations who attended Richards’s lectures surpassed the number of women who 
attended, for it is unlikely that Cambridge appreciably restricted enrollment of 
non-traditional students who, unlike women, enjoyed full university privileges.  
All of this is to say that Richards’s recognized a considerable amount of diversity 
in his lecture halls.   
Given Richards’s awareness of the existential power of language and his 
underlying theme of human freedom in Meaning of Meaning, we can reasonably 
contend that Richards was mindful of the dehumanizing effects of coerced 
silence on men and women.  Such presumption potentially identifies the 
philosophical underpinnings of his pedagogy. Richards believed that language 
had the ability to possess the mind and influence thought, even in academic 
settings.  Accordingly, he likely considered the extent to which teacher-centered 
educational models suppress the voices of students and impinge upon their right 
to interpret the world.  Such models, Freire says, create situations where 
teachers interpret the world for students.  Moreover, they elude learning and 
value cultural reproduction and information accumulation over critical thinking.  
Predictably, the shortcomings of non-dialogic education are less obvious when 
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all parties share similar backgrounds, as was the case in nineteenth-century 
England.  In such instances, teachers and students interpret the world in like 
fashion.  However, when students come from a variety of backgrounds and 
multiple realities are present in the classroom, the deficiencies of non-dialogic 
education become more pronounced.  Richards was so fully aware of the 
shortcomings of the dominant teacher-centered pedagogies of his time that he 
embarked upon an experiment to help discover “educational methods more 
efficient than those we use now in developing discrimination and the power to 
understand what we hear and read” (Practical 3).  And because he also wanted 
his study to “provide a new technique for those who wish to discover for 
themselves what they think and feel about poetry (and cognate matters)” 
(Practical 3), it is clear that his vision of a more efficient pedagogy placed 
greater focus on the ideas of students than those of teachers. 
 The pedagogy for which Richards argues in Practical Criticism, the 
published record of his experiment in literary analysis, anticipates many of the 
aims of critical pedagogy.  First and foremost, and not at all surprising given his 
views of language, Richards placed students and their perspectives at the center 
of the learning situation and recast instructors as co-investigators of knowledge.  
He did not believe that teachers were the sole possessors of truth whose job it 
was to dispense knowledge to passive student-recipients.  He valued their minds 
and experiences.  Instead of ignoring the diverse perspectives of students and 
reacting negatively to their interpretations of texts and events, Richards believed 
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that he should try harder to understand why his students interpreted things as 
they did.  He maintained that any attempt to disparage an interpretation without 
adequately investigating its foundation was dogmatic and counterproductive: 
When views that seem to conflict with our own prepossessions are 
set before us, the impulse to refute, to combat or to reconstruct 
them, rather than to investigate them, is all but overwhelming.  So 
the history of criticism [...] is a history of dogmatism and 
argumentation rather than a history of research.  And like all such 
histories the chief lesson to be learnt from it is the futility of all 
argumentation that precedes understanding. (Practical 7-8) 
In this passage, Richards sheds the elitism for which he is sometimes scorned 
(see, e.g., Said 5, Welleck 624)  and suggests that there is much to be learned 
from diverse opinions and analyses of literary works.  He does not suggest that 
a work of criticism is wrong because it does not conform to, say, received 
institutional knowledge of what the work “really” means; he maintains instead 
that such analyses, no matter how unconventional or inaccurate they initially 
seem, enrich our knowledge of the poem, as well as our appreciation for it, 
provided we understand how it evokes the responses it does. 
 Ultimately, Richards is engaging in what Freire calls conscientização, or 
consciousness-raising.  He is well aware that privileged forms of literacy silence 
the voices of marginalized groups, and he actively combats such oppression in 
and through his pedagogy.  While the details thereof are not as well formulated 
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and theorized in Practical Criticism as in Freire’s work, they still have the same 
general sense.  Freire wants to empower students in the classroom: he wants 
them to understand that they possess knowledge and that their voices matter.  
Richards wants this, as well.  Accordingly, he does not advocate the monological 
model of learning where teachers tell students what to think.  He favors creative 
and democratic learning environments where students have the opportunity to 
reflect on their worlds and actively create meaning.  In other words, Richards 
believes that classrooms should be thought of as workshops or laboratories for 
the practical analysis of texts (Berthoff, “I. A. Richards” 209; Russo 215).   He 
believes that such classrooms are both educational and moral because they 
provide occasions to understand and assess the meaning-making process and 
allow students to exercise their ontological right to name the world, providing 
them a greater degree of human freedom (So Much Nearer 196-98; Speculative 
Instruments 104-06).  This pedagogical process facilitates an awareness of 
oneself as a creative and self-determining subject, not an impuissant object of 
others.  Such awareness has implications far beyond the classroom.  
 
The Practical Side of Literary Analysis 
 Richards maintains in Practical Criticism that there is a correspondence 
between the skills involved in literary analysis and those used to interpret other 
experiences.  Accordingly, literary study is a practical and relevant endeavor 
because it develops one’s ability to communicate with others and to creatively 
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interpret the world beyond the classroom.  For Richards, the indispensable 
feature of literary training and its relevance to the “real world” is its focus on 
language: 
[I]f there be any means by which we may artificially strengthen our 
minds’ capacity to order themselves, we must avail ourselves of 
them.  And of all possible means, Poetry, the unique, linguistic 
instrument by which our minds ordered their thoughts, emotions, 
desires . . . in the past, seems to be the most serviceable in the 
interests of our standard of civilisation.  It may well be a matter of 
some urgency for us, in the interests of our standard of civilisation, 
to make this highest form of language more accessible.  From the 
beginning civilisation has been dependent upon speech, for words 
are our chief link with the past and with one another and the 
channel of our spiritual inheritance.  (Practical 301) 
Because the study of literature has the potential to strengthen one’s ability to 
structure reality, Richards argues that a literary education ought to cultivate in 
students “a better receptive command of these resources of language” (Practical 
302).  Richards believes the best way to develop such reader competency is to 
have students respond to works of literature.  By asking them to engage 
literature—through writing or class discussion—teachers free students from 
oppressive learning situations.  When students are encouraged to interpret 
literary works on their own, they are empowered to discover alternative 
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meanings within a text. Moreover, Freire argues, instructional methods that 
engage students in the meaning-making process prepare students to actively 
engage civil society and to envision alternative possibilities for the future.  
Richards’s pedagogy has a similar aim: “He was hopelessly optimistic” Berthoff 
writes, “about the capacity of education to change society, to say nothing of 
saving the planet, energetically demanding of himself practical demonstrations 
of just what was required in language teaching in order to make a crucial 
difference in the way we conceive of the human future” (Richards on Rhetoric x).   
 Victor Villanueva says in “Considerations for American Freireistas” that 
student-centered pedagogies, despite their purported humanistic and democratic 
virtues, are a challenge to enact, especially when less-privileged students aspire 
to climb the ranks of the existing oppressive social structure, rather than 
recreate a society that respects the voices of all its citizens.  When such 
students see the world as divided between the “haves” and the “have-nots” and 
view themselves as members of the latter group, they often strive to obtain the 
knowledge of the “haves,” perceiving it to be the instrument of success and 
upward mobility (631-2).  The desire to acquire a specific tract of knowledge 
obstructs critical pedagogies because it treats learning as the procurement of 
information and regards teaching as a top-down authoritative event.  Such views 
promote the self-reflexive perception that students have no knowledge and that 
they should not trust their intellectual ability to interpret and judge literature or 
other life experiences.  Consider, for example, the novice literature student who 
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announces during his introduction on the first day of class that his favorite book 
is Orwell’s 1984 or Salinger’s Catcher in the Rye.  He is generally trying to 
establish with his statement that he possesses the requisite knowledge for 
proper literary judgment.  However, when asked to explain why he reveres the 
book as he does, he often cannot articulate a response.  He knows not why he 
likes a particular work, only that it is judged favorably by the educated privileged 
class of which he wants to be part.  He therefore regurgitates their appraisals of 
literature in an attempt to achieve sodality with his instructor, which he believes 
will afford him success in the classroom without having ordered his personal 
thoughts on the subject. 
 Richards addresses such responses in Practical Criticism.  He calls them 
“stock responses.”  Students, he says, are prone to draw inappropriately from a 
repertoire of acquired responses when they are themselves unsure of how to 
respond.  Sometimes these responses arise out of preconceptions about what is 
to be admired or despised in poetry.  And sometimes they arise solely from the 
rank or public opinion of an author.  Regardless of where they come from, 
Richards maintains that students ought not permit them into critical responses: 
If we wish for a population easy to control by suggestion we shall 
decide what repertory of suggestion it shall be susceptible to and 
encourage this tendency except in the few.  But if we wish for a 
high and diffused civilization, with its attendant risks, we shall 
combat this form of mental inertia.  (Practical 295) 
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Here Richards insists upon the value of diversity of mind and culture and the 
depravity of groupthink.  Accordingly, in the name of diversity, Richards attempts 
to eliminate stock responses from his poetic experiment at Cambridge, 
developing a methodology that will forever link him to the new critical school of 
literary criticism.  Before giving students the poems to which they are asked to 
respond, he removes all identifying markers, such as titles and names.  He gives 
them only the texts.  Without these identifying markers, he hopes to coax more 
authentic poetic analyses from his students and avoid superficial responses that 
rely on the reputations of poets. 
  Richards was aware that poets with established reputations are often 
approached differently than poets with little or no rank.  He understands that “we 
take a hint for our response from the poet’s reputation [and] the traditional view 
runs through our response like the wire upon which a climbing plant is trained” 
(Practical 297).  In order to reach a better understanding of how readers actually 
respond to poetry, Richards refused to provide his experimental subjects with 
titles of poems or names of authors, for he feared that they might respond in a 
manner not genuine but consistent with the authors’ reputations.  “There cannot 
be much doubt,” he writes, “that when we know we are reading Milton or 
Shelley, a great deal of our approval and admiration is being accorded not to the 
poetry but to an idol” (Practical 297).  Reading poetry without the cues of author 
and title puts pressure on students to develop their own assessments of a poem, 
independent of the traditional value judgments established by past critics. 
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Despite his explicit reasons for withholding the titles of poems and names 
of authors from his protocol-writers, Richards’s experimental methods are largely 
interpreted as a methodological achievement in new criticism.  Consequently, 
Practical Criticism is considered by new critics a fountainhead of objectivist 
poetics.  Richards was uncomfortable with this association and “tended to 
apologize for the varieties of ‘practical criticism’ that his method promoted” 
(Russo 216). The new critics see reading as an act of uncovering meaning that 
is objectively planted in a work of literature.  Such a view transforms readers into 
passive agents who strive to uncover the revealed truths of a work.  This notion 
that meaning is inherent in literature or any other cultural text overwhelmingly 
contradicts Richards’s theory of interpretation.  He believed that meaning was 
“‘subjective’ in the sense that it is a psychological event determined by the 
needs and resources of a mind” (Practical 326).  In other words, it resides in 
people, not in words or texts.  He argues this fact extensively in Meaning of 
Meaning and returns to it in the closing paragraph of Practical Criticism: 
The critical reading of poetry is an arduous discipline; few 
exercises reveal to us more clearly the limitations under which, 
from moment to moment, we suffer.  But, equally, the immense 
extension of our capacities that follows a summoning of our 
resources is made plain.  The lesson of all criticism is that we have 
nothing to rely upon in making our choices but ourselves.  (328-29)  
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To be sure, Richards believes that the mental processes of readers are the most 
important factors in the interpretation of the meaning of a poem, as well as the 
judgment of its value. 
Practical Criticism, although its proper subject is literary judgment, 
extends Richards’s rhetorical schema to literature, insofar as it treats literary 
interpretation in the same way that The Meaning of Meaning and The 
Philosophy of Rhetoric treat (non-literary) experiential interpretation.  The 
relationship between literary and rhetorical interpretation is grounded in the 
principles of multiple meanings and remembered contexts.  In Practical 
Criticism, for example, Richards writes, “the all-important fact for the study of 
literature—or any other mode of communication—is that there are several kinds 
of meaning” (174).   That literature is open to ambiguity and overdetermination 
draws it into Richards’s realm of rhetoric, which he famously defines as the 
“study of misunderstanding and its remedies” (Philosophy 3).  Because rhetoric 
and literature are equally open to multiple valid interpretations of meaning, 
Richards “discourag[es] our habit of behaving as though, if one passage means 
one thing it cannot at the same time mean another” (Philosophy 38).  Moreover, 
such interpretations, as he and Ogden suggest in Meaning of Meaning, are 
largely grounded in the remembered contexts of individual readers.  Therefore, 
when Richards argues that responses to poetry, including those of his students, 
are psychological events shaped by the resources of the mind, he means that 
poetic interpretations occur in the collective tensions between each word’s 
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“usual applications and contexts and its special context in the poem” (Practical 
200).  The associations that readers have with words in remembered contexts 
vary from reader to reader, creating a multiplicity of meanings in any given 
literary text. 
Despite the claim that poems can have several valid interpretations, 
Richards notes in Practical Criticism that many of his students are unable to 
interpret the meanings of the poems to which they are asked to respond (12).  
Such an assertion seemingly contradicts his contextual theory of interpretation, 
even though he does argue, in this and other critical works, against the idea that 
poems have universally correct interpretations.  In Principles of Literary 
Criticism, for example, he writes the following: 
[W]e tend constantly to overlook differences in situation which 
would explain differences in behaviour.  We assume to a ridiculous 
extent that what is stimulating us will stimulate others in the same 
way, forgetting that what will happen depends upon what has 
happened before and upon what is already happening within, 
about which we can usually know little.  (196) 
It is certainly possible that Richards overlooks the different situations in which he 
and his students are engaged when he claims that certain interpretations of 
poems are incorrect; however, it is not very likely that he would do so when the 
principles of overdetermination and ambiguity are major theoretical motifs in his 
scholarly work.  Nor does it mean that Richards briefly abandons the concept of 
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multiplicity in favor of the single-meaning doctrine of the new critics.  It means, 
instead, that he believed some interpretations of poetry are better than others 
(Practical 326).  Just because Richards argues that a single experience or work 
of poetry has multiple meanings does not mean that he thinks any interpretation 
thereof was valid.  Such an assumption commits the either-or fallacy. 
 While Richards argues that the backgrounds and experiences of readers 
shape their literary interpretations, he also maintains that young learners often 
lack the experience and maturity necessary to produce satisfactory judgments.  
Hence the following statement about his students at Cambridge: 
Thus the gaps in these readers’ equipments are very significant.  
First may be placed the general immaturity of the readers.  Their 
average age would be between nineteen and twenty.  Yet with 
several of the poems [ . . . ] one important reason for erratic 
opinions seems undeniably to be the lack of general experience.  
(Practical 293) 
Youthful inexperience and immaturity is an important pedagogical topic.  In fact, 
it is so central to educational theory that John Dewey discusses it extensively in 
Experience and Education.  Dewey’s progressive education does not include 
linguistic theory, but it does emphasize democratic learning.  In this latter regard, 
it is similar to the educational models of Richards and Freire.  Dewey identifies 
the challenge of enacting democracy in the classroom as the experiential gulf 
between teachers and students.  On the one hand, he wants to share 
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educational control with students, as opposed to imposing his interpretations 
and experiences upon students; but on the other hand, he does not want to 
relinquish complete control and authority to students.  He believes that teachers 
have important experiences to share, and that to withhold such experiences is 
immoral.  Dewey maintains that teachers have an obligation to evaluate the 
immature experiences of young students and to help them organize the 
conditions thereof without imposing external control over said experiences (38).  
Teachers must establish, he says, educational conditions that nurture interaction 
between mature and immature experiences, between teachers and students.  
Such is the only way to awaken the desire to learn and to successfully educate 
students. 
The interaction of experiences between students and teachers is likewise 
fundamental to Richards’s pedagogy.  In fact, it provides the means of resolving 
his apparent contradiction between the principle of multiple meanings and the 
notion that some interpretations are better or more valid than others.  Richards 
believes that the interaction of minds can help develop the ability to think.  This 
is especially true in a classroom, where students interact with the adult minds of 
teachers. “When we consider the dehumanizing and even brutalizing conditions 
amid which so many children grow up,” writes Richards, “contact with an 
instructing mind, real participation in a joint exploration can often be the one 
thing that can enlighten—relieve and illumine—minds so endangered” 
(“Sens/Sits” 266).  Richards’s view of education is clearly collaborative.  He 
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wants students to think for themselves—to interpret literature and the world 
through their experiences—yet he also wants to problematize their 
interpretations by introducing other perspectives and examining their contexts.  
So rather than treat education as a problem-solving activity where students 
search for and find meanings in a text, Richards treats it as an examination of 
the situations in which knowledge and meaning are formed, an educational 
exercise that “puts the learner into a cooperative and creative contact with what 
is being studied, with his own endeavors, and with the would-be helpful 
presentation offered to him” (“Sens/Sits” 266).  At this tripartite intersection, 
students attempt to form their own ideas while simultaneously engaging the veil 
of established knowledge and the thinking of others (“Sens/Sits” 266).  Richards 
argues that teachers ought to design instruction such that it fosters this 
dialectical process, the interaction between reflection and action that Freire calls 
the praxis. 
In Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Freire argues that human activity is 
praxis, dialectic between theory and practice, or reflection and action.  The 
constituent elements of praxis do not occur in distinct stages but simultaneously.  
That is to say, theory relies upon practice, and practice upon theory.  Each 
informs the other.  Praxis is important in education because it enables human 
freedom, allowing learners to more critically engage reality and envision 
alternative ways of being in the world.  Richards provides opportunities for praxis 
in his instruction by offering students “assisted invitations to attempt to find out 
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just what they are trying to do and thereby how to do it” (“Learning and Looking 
251).  He believed that people learn how to do things while in the process of 
determining what to do.  Accordingly, he offered students opportunities in class 
to reflect upon the various situations is which meanings are formed and to create 
alternative possibilities. Berthoff explains the process thus: 
The composer—the one who forms; the meaning-maker; the 
interpreter; the one who constructs and construes, writes and 
reads—poses questions in order to determine what the choices 
are, the choices of perspective and purpose, context and words, 
which will thus determine meanings.  The process is never stable 
or linear or “correct”; it is not, to repeat, a matter of solving 
problems but of posing them in the light of tentative solutions.     
(“I. A. Richards” 197) 
The process described here is the process of negotiating meaning.  It is the goal 
to which the critical pedagogies of Richards and Freire aspire.  It is tantamount 
to “critical thinking” or “thinking for oneself.”  The movement between reflection 
and action (i.e. between established knowledge and generated knowledge) 
conveys to students that knowledge is formed in situations and that new 
situations call for alternative interpretations.  What is more, this movement 
between contexts—what Freire calls praxis, and Richards calls dialectic—
develops a certain interpretive flexibility that Richards suggests is necessary for 
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mutual understanding and productive communication among the people, 
societies, and cultures of the world: 
The mind that can shift its view-point and still keep its orientation, 
that can carry over into quite a new set of definitions the results 
gained through past experience in other frameworks, the mind that 
can rapidly and without strain or confusion perform the systematic 




 Richards designed his pedagogy to develop minds for the future because 
he clearly saw in the early twentieth century the direction in which his country 
was heading.  Owing largely to industrialization and war, the social structure of 
England changed.  The middle classes gained prosperity; the working classes 
gained political power, as did women; and traditional class markers began to 
deteriorate.  The educational benefits that accompanied these changes were 
enormous.  More students from a wider variety of backgrounds were given 
access to schooling at all levels.  Richards’s classrooms became significantly 
diverse as England moved towards greater social equality, and the traditional 
methods of instruction were no longer effective.  Richards therefore worked to 
develop better teaching methods that prepared students to communicate and 
participate in an increasingly diverse society.  The result was an early 
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incarnation of critical pedagogy, one that exhibited Freire’s emphasis on 
language, practical learning, and praxis. 
 The next chapter will examine the teaching practices of Isaac Watts and 
Philip Doddridge, two eighteenth-century pedagogues, and show that they, too, 
practiced an early form of critical pedagogy.  Much like Richards, Watts and 
Doddridge developed their teaching methods to address student diversity in the 
classroom and to meet the desire for a practical and relevant education.  Their 
pedagogical efforts yielded teaching methods that encouraged students to 
challenge received wisdom and to explore alternative ways of knowing. 
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DISSENT FROM DIDACTICISM: CRITICAL PEDAGOGIES IN EIGHTEENTH-
CENTURY ENGLISH DISSENTING ACADEMIES 
 
This chapter will examine the teaching practices of two lesser-known 
eighteenth-century British pedagogues—namely, Isaac Watts and Philip 
Doddridge—in order to show that the archetypal treatment of eighteenth-century 
rhetoric as current-traditional ignores alternative visions of writing instruction 
during the period.  Within the dissenting academies, Watts and Doddridge 
employed a number of teaching practices that parallel the fundamental 
teachings of modern-day critical pedagogies, the most important of which are 
the creation of participatory learning environments, the use of dialogue in the 
classroom, and an emphasis on practical learning.  
Today, critical pedagogy is understood as enacting democracy in the 
classroom and empowering students to envision and voice alternatives, yet it 
has a largely unexplored history in the eighteenth century.  Interestingly, the 
social and political context of that history is not unlike that which surrounds 
critical pedagogy in twentieth century.  Both emerged in a time of widespread 
antiauthoritarianism; both emerged in the midst of a diversity movement; and 
both emerged in the face of an overwhelming demand for practical learning.  
These likenesses in historical context let us see that the methods and goals of 
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both were similar, especially insofar as they valued democracy inside and 
outside the classroom. 
 
A History of Dissenting Education 
Participatory pedagogies surfaced in eighteenth-century English 
classrooms after a number of social and political changes tested the efficacy of 
traditional teaching practices in higher education.  However, unlike those in the 
mid-twentieth century, pedagogical revisions in the eighteenth-century did not 
take place within the traditional university system.  They took place, instead, 
within dissenting academies.  The academies were formed to give students from 
myriad backgrounds access to higher education, for the ancient universities of 
England refused to admit religious dissenters.  They were also formed to give 
students a more practical learning experience than was available at Oxford and 
Cambridge, both of which provided a classical curriculum. As Thomas Miller 
notes in The Formation of College English, the dissenting academies were the 
first institutions of higher education in England to make learning a practical 
endeavor. They opted, for example, to teach courses in vernacular literature and 
composition while the ancient universities maintained a strict adherence to the 
classics. 
The demand for practical learning in England, according to Irene Parker, 
grew under the influence of Puritanism in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries.  With the strengthening of the protestant notion of individual worth, the 
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people of England increasingly wanted influence over church and state matters.  
Accompanying these desires was a strong commitment to realistic and universal 
education (Parker 24).  While many efforts were made on that front, especially 
during the Commonwealth, the Restoration ultimately thwarted the Puritan 
project.  After the return of Charles II in 1660, Lord Clarendon passed the Act of 
Uniformity, requiring all schoolmasters to conform to the liturgy as established by 
law and to obtain a license to teach from the Church.  The goal of the conformity 
legislation was to crush reform efforts and to secure the power of the Church 
and State.  Despite its intents, the statute actually compelled nonconformists to 
fulfill the educational project of the Puritans (Parker 46).  These new schools 
were England’s dissenting academies. 
While the religious grounds upon which the dissenting academies 
formed—specifically, Anglican dissent and the Protestant notion of individual 
worth—are largely responsible for the success of the academies, several other 
factors contributed to their popularity as institutions of practical learning.  Many 
families would send their children to dissenting academies because they 
believed higher education was the means to job security and higher social 
standing.  And while such families may have always viewed education as the 
instrument of social mobility, the prospect of sending a child to an elite university 
was largely unappealing, especially given the curriculum and cost.  Lawrence 
Stone notes that there was a sharp decline in the number of students attending 
the elite universities in England during the eighteenth century and argues that 
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their regimen of classical studies was to blame.  “Many of the urban middle 
classes,” he writes, “became hostile to the classics as a gentlemanly but futile 
waste of time, offering few job prospects except in the lower ranks of the church” 
(132).  Focusing on modern languages, natural history, commerce, geography, 
political history, and other “modern” subjects, the dissenting academies fulfilled 
the practical learning needs of students in a way that Oxford and Cambridge 
could not.  What is more, their tuition costs were significantly lower, making a 
college education possible for the less well-to-do. 
The combined results of these social and political developments on 
education in the eighteenth century are not unlike the educational effects of the 
diversity movement in the 1960s and ‘70s: they made it possible for a wider 
range of student to pursue higher education.  Accordingly, tutors at the 
dissenting academies in England moved beyond the sterile teaching methods 
that had been employed for years in the elite universities.  For not only did their 
students lack the educational foundations necessary to engage a curriculum of 
Greek and Latin studies, but also, as Thomas Miller suggests, their experiences 
often called into question received knowledge, making them less than ideal 
subjects for traditional teaching methods (62).  What they required were 
classroom models that treated learning as a generative process and not as a 
mastery of information.  
Responding to the needs of their diverse student constituencies and 
exemplifying the antiauthoritarian attitude of the nonconformity movement, tutors 
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at the dissenting academies developed democratic pedagogies that fostered 
critical inquiry and debate.  Arguably the most important of these eighteenth-
century tutors were Isaac Watts and Philip Doddridge.  Watts was best known 
for his advocacy of the inductive method associated with Locke, and Doddridge 
for his comparative method of instruction (T. Miller 87).  While each of these 
men did their fair share of lecturing in the classroom, they never refused 
students the opportunity to critically challenge the contents of their lessons, as 
their colleagues did in the elite universities.  Instead, these pedagogues 
regularly encouraged discussion questions from their students and welcomed 
occasions to debate contrary positions.  Furthermore, as Thomas Miller notes, 
these pedagogues often presented their students with conflicting views on 
controversial issues, and then required them to research and compose essays 
arguing their positions (86).  Teaching methods such as these engaged students 
in critical thought and “were consistent with the dissenters’ belief that free inquiry 
would advance political reform and economic and moral improvement” (T. Miller 
86).  Because of the innovative and open-minded teaching methods of their 
tutors, dissenting academies, according to Ana Acosta, were “an essential 
component of the public sphere and the style of debate that emerged from it” (7). 
 
Isaac Watts and Linguistic Praxis 
Isaac Watts was born in 1674 to a family of well-known dissenters.  His 
father, who was a clothier, schoolmaster, and respected figure in the community, 
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was imprisoned twice for nonconformity.  In fact, the elder Watts was serving 
sentence the year that young Isaac was born.  “[T]radition reports,” writes Arthur 
Paul Davis, “that Watts was often suckled on the steps of Old Town Gaol, 
Southampton, when his mother made her daily visits to the prison” (2).  Despite 
his family’s history of dissent, Watts received a classical education under the 
tutelage of the Reverend John Pinhorne, schoolmaster of the Free-School in 
Southampton and minister of the Establishment.  His course of study was 
orthodox for his age and included Latin at four, Greek at nine, and Hebrew at 
thirteen.  Watts excelled in his studies and was generously offered a scholarship 
to attend one of the universities. “The whole community,” Davis notes, “Anglican 
and dissenter alike, seems to have been proud of the young scholar” (9).  
Preferring, however, to follow family tradition and take his place among the 
dissenters, Watts declined the scholarship and opted to study instead at Thomas 
Rowe’s academy at Stoke Newington. 
Watts developed an interest in education at a young age.  Perhaps this 
was owed in part to the influence of Rowe, whose untraditional teaching 
methods at the academy encouraged free inquiry and stimulated classroom 
debate.  Walter Wilson writes the following regarding the latter’s critical 
practices: 
[Rowe] possessed a noble and generous mind, free from the 
shackles of a party, and utterly averse to all impositions in the 
concerns of religion.  It was this that made him a decided 
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Nonconformist.  To his pupils he allowed the most enlarged 
freedom of enquiry, and it is well known that some of them 
followed a path in controversy very different to that of the tutor.  
(171) 
That Rowe would allow such academic freedom in the seventeenth century 
makes him an early champion of liberal education.  Yet his penchant for 
empowering students in such ways seems less than astounding when his own 
academic character is considered.  For as Alexander Gordon suggests, Rowe 
merely bestowed upon his students the same academic freedoms that he 
regularly employed: 
Thomas Rowe, the London Independent, was the first to desert the 
traditional text-books, introducing his pupils, about 1680, to what 
was known as “free philosophy.”  Rowe was a Cartesian at a time 
when the Aristotelic philosophy was dominant in the older schools 
of learning; and while in physics he adhered to Descartes against 
the rising influence of Newton, in mental science he became one of 
the earliest exponents of Locke.  (18) 
Rowe had a profound influence on Watts’s intellectual life.  By way of his 
influence, Watts learned to challenge received knowledge, to think critically 
about matters of religion, philosophy, politics, and education.  Posthumously 
honoring Rowe for cultivating in him such critical awareness, Watts composed a 
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tribute to his schoolmaster in the form of a poem entitled “Free Philosophy.”  In 
his poem, he celebrates Rowe for challenging traditional modes of learning: 
I love thy gentle influence, Rowe: 
Thy gentle influence, like the sun, 
Only dissolves the frozen snow, 
Then bids our thoughts like rivers flow, 
And choose the channels where they run.  (15-19) 
Watts began his career two years after his graduation from the academy 
as a tutor for the son of Sir John Hartopp.  During his tenure at the Hartopp 
residence, Watts composed Logick and part of Improvement of the Mind, his 
student guide to academic study.  In outlining his principles for academic study 
and the attainment of knowledge in the latter work, Watts demonstrated that his 
pedagogy is much indebted to Rowe.  Like his admired schoolmaster, Watts 
encouraged students to exercise reason and to form a critical awareness of the 
world.   He advised them against developing a dogmatic spirit and urged them to 
improve their knowledge through conversation.  In his chapter entitled “Rules for 
Improvement by Conversation,” Watts writes, 
Confine not yourself always to one sort of company, or persons of 
the same party or opinion, either in matters of learning, religion, or 
the civil life, lest if you should happen to be nursed up or educated 
in early mistake, you should be confirmed of the same sentiments.  
A free and general conversation with men of very various countries 
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and of different parties, opinions, and practices (so far as it may be 
done safely) is of excellent use to undeceive us in many wrong 
judgments which we may have framed, and to lead us into juster 
thoughts.  (Improvement of the Mind 233) 
By focusing his attention on the common act of conversation, Watts strongly 
suggests that learning is not limited to formal education.  For the opportunities to 
engage in free conversation are both widespread and frequent.  Watts contends 
that all persons, regardless of wealth or position, harbor the capacity for 
intellectual growth. 
Despite spending his academic life in formal settings—having been 
educated at the finest grammar and secondary schools, and then tutoring the 
children of wealthy families—Watts believed that learning was possible where 
formal education was not.  Improvement of the Mind is indicative of this point, as 
it addressed an audience of self-learners alongside an audience of traditional 
students.  In a footnote following his general rules for the attainment of 
knowledge, Watts makes his diverse audience known:   
Though the most of these following rules are chiefly addressed to 
those whom their fortune or their station require to addict 
themselves to the peculiar improvement of their minds in greater 
degrees of knowledge, yet every one who has leisure and 
opportunity to be acquainted with such writings as these, may find 
something among them for their own use.  (179) 
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To speak of conversation and sociability as avenues of intellectual 
refinement situates learning outside of the formal classroom.  This seems a 
radical idea in the eighteenth-century, when education was structured around 
the knowledge of teachers.  The teacher-based model of education common to 
this era (and beyond) had defined education as a top-down transference of 
information.  By way of this mechanistic process (to which Freire later applies his 
banking metaphor), teachers stand atop a classroom hierarchy dictating their 
expert knowledge to students.  Conversation eludes the learning process 
because students are cast as passive agents in a hierarchical learning model 
where they are presumed to possess no real knowledge of their own.  Despite 
the prevalence of teacher-centered learning in eighteenth-century education, 
Watts encouraged his students to actively engage class lectures.  He felt that 
students should never satisfy themselves with the mere attendance of lectures, 
but ought to frequently ask questions of their instructors.  “A young disciple,” 
Watts writes, “should behave himself so well as to gain the affection and the ear 
of his instructor, that upon every occasion he may with the utmost freedom ask 
questions, and talk over his own sentiments, his doubts and difficulties with him, 
and in an humble and modest manner desire the solution of them” (Improvement 
of the Mind 214).  Accordingly, when Watts speaks of conversation as a means 
of intellectual improvement, he is not strictly situating learning outside of the 
classroom as the term “conversation” may seem to suggest. 
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Conversation is only one element of Watts’s pedagogy and his proposed 
path to intellectual growth.  He also cites the importance of observation, 
instruction, and reading.  The value of these activities, he suggests, resides in 
their ability to convey the notions and sentiments of others.  But knowing the 
minds of others is not a terminal value to Watts.  He believes that education is 
the critical process whereby students learn to challenge received knowledge and 
to think for themselves.  Conversation, observation, instruction, and reading do 
not guarantee independent thinking.  However, they do provide a starting point, 
a foundation of ideas from which one may form his or her judgments.  Meditation 
and study, according to Watts, are the keys to critical thinking. 
By study and meditation, we improve the hints that we have 
acquired by observation, conversation, and reading; we take more 
time in thinking, and by the labour of the mind we penetrate deeper 
into themes of knowledge, and carry our thoughts sometimes 
much farther on many subjects, than we ever met with either in the 
books of the dead or discourses of the living.  It is our own 
reasoning that draws out one truth from another, and forms a 
whole scheme of science from a few hints which we borrowed 
elsewhere.  (Improvement of the Mind 194) 
 Even though Watts sometimes places study and meditation atop a 
hierarchy of educational essentials, almost exclusively on the strength of their 
ability to allow individuals to form propositions of truth out of the ideas of others 
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and to “perfect” the other methods of intellectual improvement, he argues that 
study and meditation must nonetheless accompany conversation, observation, 
instruction, and reading, for these practices expose students to the diverse 
minds of others.  A person without such exposure “will be in danger of a narrow 
spirit, a vain conceit of himself, and an unreasonable contempt of others; and 
after all, he will obtain but a very limited and imperfect view and knowledge of 
things, and he will seldom learn how to make that knowledge useful” 
(Improvement of the Mind 194-95). 
Watts’s focus on free and frequent conversation as a means to 
intellectual growth in Improvement of the Mind nicely overlays his earlier work in 
Logick, which deals largely with the nature of language and its role in the 
process of making meaning and knowledge.  Watts never explicitly says that the 
two works ought to be read in tandem; however, a prefatory remark in the latter 
work indicates that Improvement of the Mind picks up where Logick left off. 
Examined with this relationship in mind, Logick exposes the conceptual 
framework upon which Watts’s pedagogical methods, as outlined in 
Improvement of the Mind, derive significance.  His analysis of concept and 
perception in Logick reflect what Berlin calls a transactional epistemology insofar 
as it situates knowledge-production within a complex web of language, material 
reality, and social interaction.  By treating knowledge as a dialectical process 
involving the elements of the rhetorical situation, Watts expands the 
epistemological role of language and relocates truth as the product of inquiry 
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and discussion; moreover, he empowers individuals to transform reality and to 
imagine new possibilities through alternative discourses, a manifestation of 
Freirean praxis that animates participatory pedagogies. 
Published in 1724, Logick is divided into four parts: Perception and Ideas, 
Judgment and Proposition, Reasoning and Syllogism, and Disposition and 
Method.  Each section builds upon the ideas outlined in the section it follows, 
beginning with a discussion of the relationship between words and things, which 
places Watts amid the historical development of modern semiotics, nestled 
between Augustine and Ockham on one side and Peirce and Richards on the 
other.  Watts contends that ideas, although first acquired through sensory 
perception, can only be conveyed via a language system.  Accordingly, he 
suggests that a sizable portion of what we know is procured through words, in 
our verbal interactions with others.  But just as words lead us to knowledge, they 
equally have the ability to lead us astray (Logick 27).  Watts, therefore, offers a 
few observations to help guard against the abuses of language. 
The first observation that Watts makes about language is that it has no 
foundation in the physical world.  Words stand for things and ideas not because 
they have a natural connection to the things they signify, but because society 
has agreed to associate certain words (i.e. certain combinations of sounds or 
graphic marks) with certain objects.  It is a mental operation whereby words are 
arbitrarily linked to things and ideas.  Watts writes, 
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There is no manner of affinity between the sounds white in English, 
or blanc in French, and that colour which we call by that name; nor 
have the letters, of which these words are composed, any natural 
aptness to signify that colour rather than red or green.  Words and 
names therefore are mere arbitrary signs invented by men to 
communicate their thoughts or ideas to one another.  (Logick 27) 
Pointing out that different languages have different names for the same idea is 
an effective way to substantiate the claim that words are not motivated to signify 
objects by virtue of the inherent characteristics of either, but that words and 
objects are tied together through repetition and social agreement.  Indeed, what 
Watts is challenging is the common belief that words have a one-to-one 
relationship to their referents, a false assumption that Ogden and Richards later 
call the “proper meaning superstition.” 
Also present in Watts’s initial observation about language is the notion 
that signification is a two-part process that is always negotiated by the individual 
minds of those persons involved in a communicative act.  Watts unpacks this 
idea in his subsequent observations about language, which he begins with the 
following premise: “If one single word were appointed to express but one simple 
idea, and nothing else, [ . . . ] there would be scarce mistake about them”  
(Logick 27).  Unfortunately, he notes, such is not the case, as a single word will 
sometimes express a number of simple ideas, whereas others will sometimes 
express an entire network of ideas.  Concerning the latter, Watts writes, “one 
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word will never distinctly manifest all the parts of a complex idea; and thereby it 
will often happen, that one man includes more or less in his idea, than another 
does, while he affixes the same word to it” (Logick 28).  Whether a word 
expresses a simple idea or complex one, Watts implies that its meaning is rarely 
obvious.  He clearly perceives the use of language as a complex social activity 
requiring human interpretation.  And even though the act of interpretation may 
be facilitated by interpretive cues—by way of extra-linguistic behaviors and 
social contexts—the meaning of an utterance takes shape in the human mind, 
where a seemingly endless chain of assumptions and experiences will bear 
upon the message.  Language, therefore, must always confront the potential for 
misinterpretation and misunderstanding.   
Watts contends that once the human mind has framed ideas about things, 
it proceeds next to the process of judgment, whereby ideas are compared to one 
another, and either joined through affirmation, or disjoined through negation, as 
we see them to agree or disagree (Logick 72).  This process, the inclusion of 
which gestures to Francis Bacon’s system of “true induction,” while seemingly 
straightforward, is no less involved than the forming of ideas.  Just as the mind 
negotiates the bond between words and things, the mind also intervenes in the 
forming of judgments. This interference of the mind, an act of will, according to 
Watts, can lead us to false judgment.  In other words, it is not always the case 
that judgments are the result of our perceptions of agreement or disagreement 
between ideas, but that they are the result of the interplay between our minds 
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and ideas.  Given that our ideas are also framed by our minds, the obstacles 
that potentially hinder the forming of correct judgments—namely, coloration and 
distortion, introduced by idiosyncratic and conventional patterns of thinking—are 
evermore compounded.  Judgments are often passed from one person to 
another through propositions—i.e. a statement (combining words to form 
sentences) that affirms or negates relationships between ideas.  Because 
propositions, when communicated, undergo an encoding/decoding process, they 
are subject to interpretive errors, as ambiguity resides at their most basic level—
words. 
Once ideas have been framed, and after propositions have joined or 
disjoined those ideas, reasoning emerges as the third operation of the mind. 
“When we are unable to judge of the truth or falsehood of a proposition in an 
immediate manner, by the mere contemplation of its subject and predicate,” 
Watts writes, “we are then constrained to use a medium, and to compare each 
of them with some third idea, that by seeing how far they agree or disagree 
among themselves” (Logick 136).  The medium to which Watts refers is the 
syllogism.  He maintains that reasoning is the process of employing learned 
logic to join propositions and draw conclusions from accepted truths.  While the 
conclusions are generally the result of logical deduction, they may also be born 
through induction, a sort of argument that Watts considers an irregular syllogism, 
one that stands not independently yet not unproblematically next to the syllogism 
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(Howell 337).  Watts offers in this chapter the rules governing the construction of 
various syllogisms, both regular and irregular. 
Having completed the third division of logical inquiry—drawing 
conclusions by way of syllogistic reasoning—Watts turns to the fourth operation 
of the mind, method and disposition.  This final operation is the process of 
arranging thoughts in such a way that we may more readily recall them and 
more easily communicate our ideas, judgments, and propositions to others.  He 
offers in this concluding chapter some guidelines for the orderly disposition of a 
variety of thoughts on a number of different subjects.  But what he does not do in 
this or the preceding chapter is confront the problem that resides upstream of 
these final two operations—that is, the instability of meaning.  Instead, he 
proceeds as though the propositions upon which the discovery and 
communication of truth are based are reliable statements that do not have an 
arbitrary and ambiguous relationship to the world. 
Howell points out in his quantitative analysis of Logick that Watts spends 
three-quarters of his space on the first two chapters of his work—“Of Perception 
and Ideas” and “Of Judgment and Proposition”—and less than one-quarter on 
his last two chapters—“Of Reasoning and Syllogism” and “Of Disposition and 
Method.”  According to Howell, this valuable statistic reveals the following about 
Watts’s pedagogical priorities: “To him perception and judgment were the points 
that young [students] should be taught at greatest length, while syllogism and 
method were to be given nothing beyond a conventional emphasis” (335).  While 
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Howell’s conclusion appears faultless within the context of Logick, we must 
remember that Watts sees Improvement of the Mind as an extension of this 
earlier work and emphasizes therein the last two operations of the mind, 
particularly method.  But we must also remember that the first two operations—
perception and judgment—have primal immediacy over the others, for they are 
the foundation upon which reason and method build.  And even though Watts’s 
first two chapters of Logick do not discuss in great length the ambiguous nature 
of meaning—an amalgamation of words, perceptions, judgment, and 
propositions—he does identify at the start of each chapter the inherent difficulty 
that language mediation poses to existing knowledge and the development of 
new knowledge.  The significance of knowing that meaning eludes an essential 
connection to the world is that knowledge, truth, and reality become social and 
linguistic constructs.  They are the mutable products of what Freire would later 
call praxis. 
Watts’s view of language as central to the production of knowledge 
positions him at the frontier of postmodern and poststructural thought, a detail 
that enables his critical teaching.  For those who posit that language is a social 
construct, meaning emerges (and is transformed) through social and symbolic 
interaction.  It precedes individuals and influences their perceptions about the 
world.  As Berlin notes, Freire takes this position a step further: while many 
social constructionists emphasize the controlling aspects of language, Freire 
highlights its ability to liberate men and women (“Freirean Pedagogy” 414).  He 
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wants people to recognize—and exercise—their fundamental right to engage the 
interaction from which meaning is derived and to transform the conditions that 
govern their experiences.  According to Berlin, the duality of language as an 
instrument of oppression and emancipation places each person at “the 
intersection of a multitude of discourses” (“Freirean Pedagogy” 415).  These 
discourses have the ability to define individuals as passive cultural consumers 
upon whom the world acts, or as active citizens who willingly engage the world 
around them.  Watts’s emphasis on classroom conversation and intellectual 
reflection in Improvement of the Mind indicates that he wished to cultivate minds 
of the latter persuasion. 
By empowering students to actively participate in their educations and to 
use their words to challenge the ascendancy of received knowledge, Watts 
develops in his students the requisite intellectual capital for civic participation.  
Consequently, his pedagogy advances what Davis identifies as the primary goal 
of the dissenting academies, the establishment of a strong and stable middle-
class government (18).  In Teachers are Cultural Workers, Freire notes that 
citizenship conveys freedom; but to whom that freedom extends is variable, for 
the concept of citizenship is a social construction (90). Through participation in 
public matters, men and women can engage the concept of citizenship and 
remake its meaning.  Much of the history of eighteenth-century England can be 
interpreted as a struggle for the lower and middle classes and dissenters of all 
ranks to secure a greater degree of citizenship, a greater degree of freedom.  
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Watts’s pedagogy benefits this cause by honing the critical literacy skills of 
students and empowering them to transform the realities of their condition 
through public dialogue and debate.  By gaining an awareness of the situated 
nature of knowledge, Watts’s students can more readily critique established 
traditions and authorities.  Moreover, they can also more easily perceive their 
role within the meaning-making process, empowering them to transform the 
dominant systems of society. 
Watts was not alone in linking the power of language to knowledge 
production; nor was he alone in suggesting that the production of alternative 
knowledge calls into to question the authority of the stats quo and lays the 
foundation for civic participation.  Philip Doddridge, a fellow dissenting minister 
and tutor, held similar intellectual and pedagogical views.  In fact, Watts thought 
so highly of Doddridge’s mind and character that he recommended Doddridge 
for appointment to the dissenting academy at Northampton.  Moreover, as Davis 
notes, Watts entrusted Doddridge to write The Rise and Progress of Religion in 
the Soul when he was too weak to do so himself (63-64).  That Watts would ask 
his friend to take over such an important intellectual task speaks volumes about 
the degree to which these pedagogues likely shared a common ideological 
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Philip Doddridge and the Comparative Method    
Doddridge was born the youngest child of twenty in London in 1702.  His 
father was a well-known oilman, while both of his grandfathers were ministers.  
Doddridge was born into a tradition of nonconformity on his father’s side, which 
bore legacies of several ejected ministers (Nuttall 12), including his grandfather, 
John Doddridge, an Oxford-educated minister and one-time rector at 
Shepperton in Middlesex (Harsha 23).  Doddridge attended private school at St. 
Alban’s, under the tutelage of Samuel Clark, and was later given an opportunity 
to pursue a university education by the Duchess of Bedford.  She offered to 
underwrite his education at Oxford or Cambridge on the condition that he 
conform to the Church of England.  Despite the generosity of her proposition, 
Doddridge, like his friend-to-be Watts, turned down the scholarship so that he 
might contribute to the advancement of the dissenting cause.  He instead 
enrolled in the academy at Kibworth in Leicestershire in 1719 to train for the 
ministry under John Jennings.  When Jennings left Kibworth for Hinckley (taking 
his academy with him), Doddridge was asked by the church at Kibworth to 
succeed his mentor as minister of the congregation in 1723.  He accepted, and 
two years into his tenure as minister at Kibworth, he removed his residence to 
the neighboring town of Market Harborough.  There Doddridge entered into an 
arrangement with his friend and fellow minister David Some, whereby the two 
men would share a joint pastorate of the congregations at Kibworth and Market 
Harborough. 
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As Doddridge worked to establish his reputation as a minister, the 
untimely death of John Jennings and the subsequent closing of his academy, 
just one short year after leaving Kibworth, had left the midlands without a liberal 
evangelical institution.  While Jennings had looked to Doddridge to continue his 
work, the Presbyterian board had someone else in mind (Taylor 18).  However, 
when Doddridge submitted to Isaac Watts an account of Jennings’s methods, 
Watts recommended to David Some that Doddridge, “the man who so admirably 
described this scheme of education,” take the post (“From a Manuscript” 461).  
Observing the recommendation, Some proposed, at a minister’s meeting in 
Lutterworth, the establishment of an academy at Market Harborough, of which 
Doddridge should be appointed tutor.  The ministers voted unanimously in favor 
of the proposal, and the academy opened three months later, in July of 1729  
(Taylor 18).   A mere five months after the opening of the school, however, 
Doddridge accepted a pastorship at Castle Hill.  Because dissenting academies 
were usually attached to ministers and not to specific churches or towns, 
Doddridge’s newly-formed academy followed him to Northampton. 
While Doddridge’s academy filled the vacancy left by Jennings for 
theological training, it did not strictly serve those entering the ministry.  It was 
open to students of various pursuits and included practical and secular courses 
in mathematics, physics, geography, and modern languages.  The study of 
these subjects prepared students for careers in commerce and industry during at 
time when Oxford and Cambridge held strong to their antiquarianism.  This is not 
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to say, however, that Doddridge ignored the classics in favor of a modern 
curriculum.  He found value in both approaches. “He was one of those,” writes A. 
Victor Murray, “who saw learning as a whole and to whom literature, theology, 
science and philosophy were aspects of the one eternal mind at work in the 
world” (102).  Accordingly, Doddridge believed that a well-rounded education 
included the study of modern and classic subjects alike.  His modern curriculum 
was therefore tempered with courses in Latin, Greek, Hebrew, and ancient 
history and philosophy.  Courses in divinity and Church history rounded out his 
academic program, although students who planned to enter the ministry would 
stay an additional two years, where they would engage a theology-intensive 
course of study.  Doddridge, like John Jennings, believed that divinity was a 
post-graduate affair that must be supported by a well-established bedrock of 
education and culture (A. Murray 106). 
In addition to providing a secular education that siphoned knowledge from 
both classic and modern subjects, Doddridge’s academy gave theology students 
a non-sectarian education.  Although Doddridge identified himself as Calvinist “in 
all the most important points,” (“To Mr. Mason” 439), A. Victor Murray insists that 
he was “Catholic in his theology as well as his sympathies” (120).  Alexander 
Gordon agrees with Murray’s assessment (30), although neither scholar actively 
seeks to undermine Doddridge’s stated denominational identity.  Their goal is 
only to emphasize the extent to which Doddridge valued religious diversity and 
the freedom of individual religious thought.  In other words, their use of the term 
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“catholic” is non-ecclesiastical.  As Murray explains, Doddridge’s catholicism 
was not a sectarian classification but a universal one:  “For him ‘Catholic’ was 
not the badge of a party, but the symbol of the universal love of God seeking to 
save the lost” (120-21).  That Doddridge embodied a catholic sensibility is easily 
supported by his aversion to sectarian dogma.  He sought truth in scripture and 
encouraged his students to do the same, to eschew doctrinal interpretations 
(Calvinist or otherwise) in favor of their own (Gordon 24).  Interestingly, as 
Murray points out, Doddridge was never doctrinaire in his anti-doctrine 
approach: 
Many men have been fanatical in their dislike of fanaticism, and 
dogmatic in their opposition to dogma.  Doddridge was not of this 
sort.  He had an extraordinary wholeness about his character so 
that his refusal of theological subscription, his encouragement of 
free enquiry among his students, and his wide charity towards 
opposing views were all part of an attitude to life.  (111) 
While the “wholeness” of Doddridge’s character may be questioned on the 
grounds that his nonconformity pits him against the Establishment, Gordon 
explains that his support for the dissenting cause was not principally an 
objection to the Anglican Church, but instead a commitment to the freedom to 
serve the evangelical cause: “[Doddridge] claimed that Dissent should not be 
viewed or treated as schismatical; and he urged upon Archbishop Herring, that 
Dissent ought to be relieved of this stigma, by an authorized interchange of 
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pulpits between the Established and the Tolerated clergy” (30)  Doddridge’s 
proposal to bring Anglican ministers before dissenting congregations is a 
powerful gesture that not only reveals the extent to which he was tolerant of 
intolerance, but also reveals his highest regard for intellectual inquiry and open-
mindedness over dogma.  These qualities garnered him so much respect across 
ecclesiastical lines that he attracted to his academy nonconformists and 
conformists alike.  What is more, “some few were from the first intended for the 
Anglican ministry” (Gordon 27). 
 There is no stronger evidence that Doddridge offered an open-minded, 
non-sectarian education to his pupils than the fact that future Anglican ministers 
occasionally pursued their theological training at his academy, especially when 
his school at Northampton was not the only alternative to the poor education 
offered at Oxford and Cambridge.  As Thomas Miller reports, the Scottish 
universities also offered a quality education (157-66). If members of the 
Establishment suspected that Doddridge might attempt to enlist students into the 
service of religious dissent—or at the very least, make them sympathetic to the 
movement’s cause—then those members would not have allowed their 
ministers-in-training to study at Doddridge's academy, nor would they have 
confirmed through ministerial ordination the caliber of the education received 
under his tutelage.  But Doddridge was known for the degree to which he 
shunned classroom proselytism, and Anglicans trusted his educational integrity.  
In fact, so trusted was Doddridge that John Wesley, a prominent priest of the 
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Established Church, once consulted him on the matter of education.  A. Victor 
Murray reports that Wesley, in 1746, was so concerned about the education of 
his preachers that he asked Doddridge to compose a reading list for his clergy; 
and from this list of texts, Wesley formed the idea of publishing A Christian 
Library, a compendium of the “best approved” English writers on matters of 
divinity (119).  That Wesley trusted Doddridge to compile such a list speaks 
favorably of the catholic spirit with which Doddridge approached education, a 
spirit that he inherited from Jennings. 
As a student of Jennings at Kibworth academy, Doddridge admired his 
mentor’s unique perspective towards theological study.  It was a perspective that 
traversed sectarian boundaries, and a perspective that Doddridge would 
emulate at his own academy years later.  Highlighting the details of Jennings’s 
methods in a letter to his brother, Doddridge writes the following: 
I have almost finished Mr. Jennings’s system of divinity: and the 
better I am acquainted with it, the more I admire it.  He does not 
entirely accord with the system of any particular body of men; but 
is sometimes a Calvinist, sometimes a Remonstrant, sometimes a 
Baxterian, and sometimes a Socinian, as truth and evidence 
determine him. He always inculcates it upon our attention, that the 
scriptures are the only standard of orthodoxy, and encourages the 
utmost freedom of inquiry. He furnishes us all with all kinds of 
authors upon every subject, without advising us to skip over the 
   145
   
 
 
heretical passages for fear of infection.  It is evidently his main 
care to inspire us with sentiments of Catholicism, and to arm us 
against that zeal, which is not according to knowledge. (198) 
The educational procedure that Doddridge describes above—and attributes to 
Jennings—is known as the “comparative method of instruction” (T. Miller 21).  It 
is a method whereby teachers present students with multiple perspectives on 
issues. When practiced honestly and fairly, it gives students the opportunity to 
draw their own conclusions and form their own ideas, rather than simply adopt 
the findings of their teachers.  The method represents a radical departure from 
that which it follows.  According to Gordon, the “old method” was far more 
doctrinaire in its application and aim, as tutors would define propositions—
generally those held by their churches—and advance one-sided arguments to 
defend the validity of those positions, all the while dismissing divergent opinions 
as aberrations and heresies (24).  The value of the comparative method, as 
Doddridge practiced it, was that it made no attempt to suppress opposing ideas 
and that it openly addressed the controversies and difficulties confronting any 
given proposition.  Consequently, it urged students to think through the 
difficulties surrounding an issue, to judge the merits of each argument, and to 
form their own opinions.  
 The comparative method of instruction that Doddridge inherited from 
Jennings parallels what Freire calls “problem-posing education,” a mainstay of 
twentieth-century critical pedagogy.  The method flattens the vertical pattern of 
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traditional education and places students and teachers together on the horizon 
of free inquiry.  Rather than inculcate knowledge by way of classroom authority, 
problem-posing educators create dialogical relationships with their students as 
they critically engage ontological and existential problems.  As Freire explains, 
teachers and students alike benefit from the dialogue: teachers present material 
to students, encouraging them to engage the material not as passive and docile 
listeners but as critical co-investigators who equally reflect on the material 
through dialogue with their teachers; the teachers, in turn, having thus created 
the conditions for critical inquiry, re-consider their understanding of the material 
as students discuss their considerations (Pedagogy 61-61).  In this model, all 
parties involved in classroom dialogue—regardless of vocational role—learn 
from and teach one another.  “They become,” as Freire succinctly puts it, 
“responsible for a process in which all grow” (Pedagogy 61).    
Intellectual growth, for Freire, is the means by which women and men 
fulfill their ontological purpose of becoming more completely human.  It is the 
process of developing an awareness of our dialectical relationship with the world 
and living authentically through the creative transformation of reality.  Traditional 
education—the method to which Freire applies his banking metaphor—obstructs 
the path to authenticity.  It imposes upon students an oppressive hierarchical 
order whereby teachers didactically load knowledge into the (perceived) empty 
minds of students.  This traditional educational model chokes the pursuit for 
authenticity and full humanity for two reasons: it strips students of their 
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fundamental human right to grow, and it promotes a view of reality that is 
permanent and complete.  In other words, it obscures the notion that reality is a 
dynamic and unfinished presence over which human beings have transformative 
power.  Accordingly, when students receive knowledge in the traditional 
classroom, they inherit a particular view of the world, one that does not always 
correspond to their experiences yet is presented as indisputable fact.  To assert 
that objective knowledge exists independent of human cognition is to deny that 
men and women interact with the world and actively contribute to its 
configuration.  A pedagogy that rejects the dialectical relationship between 
knower and known does not allow students to form their own conclusions 
because it places the world beyond their collaborative reach.   That is to say, 
students can only access knowledge about the world but cannot participate in 
the making or remaking thereof.  Accordingly, traditional education “regulate[s] 
the way the world ‘enters’ into’ the students” (Freire, Pedagogy 57) and 
consequently shapes their judgments, beliefs, and actions.  Problem-posing 
education seeks to emancipate students from such repressive educational 
conditions.  It empowers them to engage and challenge received knowledge 
through reflective action and dialogue and to unearth the “real” knowledge 
residing beneath and obscured by doxa (Freire, Pedagogy 61)—that is, popular 
opinion rooted in the appearance of things. 
 While Doddridge’s comparative method of instruction manifests the 
democratic characteristics and humanizing potential of Freire’s problem-posing 
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method, it is rather mathematical in its formulation, proceeding by means of 
proposition, demonstration, axiom, scholium, corollary, and lemma (A. Murray 
105).  At face value, this approach has very little in common with Freire’s, which 
centers almost exclusively on class discussion.  But a closer look at Doddridge’s 
lectures reveals that he posed problems to his students by citing the common 
arguments in favor of various propositions and offering objections to those 
arguments.  Such efforts condensed and approximated the discussions 
surrounding controversial topics and prompted students to form their own 
conclusions via dialectical involvement in the pseudo-dialogues.  Lecture 200 
(“Of Christian Baptism”), for example, begins with the proposition that “[t]he law 
of Christ requires that all who believe the gospel should be baptized; i.e. should 
be separated from unbelievers, and joined to the visible christian church, by 
being solemnly washed with water” (Works 316).  His demonstration of the 
proposition consists of five arguments, all of which derive their justification 
through common interpretations of biblical passages.  Seven corollaries—
statements that readily proceed from the presumed truth of the proposition—
follow the demonstration and conclude this first of two lectures on the necessity 
of baptism.  Lecture 201 (“Of the Continuance of Baptism”) begins where the 
previous lecture ended, with seven scholia that address Doddridge’s earlier 
demonstration of the topic.  The scholia offer divergent interpretations of 
baptism—proposed by biblical scholars and various denominational leaders—
and are sometimes followed by Doddridge’s responses.  For instance, the 
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second scholium addresses the argument of Mr. Emlyn and other Socinians that 
baptism “was and is only to be used by those who are converted to christianity 
from a different profession, [and] all that descended from them after they were 
initiated into the christian church were to be considered as baptized in them” 
(Works 319). Doddridge responds to this scholium by noting that while the bible 
never explicitly mentions the baptism of Christian descendents, it nevertheless 
referred to all Christians generally as “baptized persons” (Works 320). 
 In the two lectures discussed and excerpted above, Doddridge occupies 
the center of the classroom, talking to students rather than with them.  Typically, 
according to Freire, such one-sided conversations bespeak oppressive learning 
situations; however, such appears not to be the case with Doddridge, who relies 
upon his lectures not to inculcate specific judgments but to introduce students to 
different perspectives on a topic.  Gordon explains that Doddridge used his 
lectures “to see that [students] were in possession, as far as might be, of the 
materials of judgment” (24).  In other words, his lectures illuminated other 
possible paths in Plato’s dark cave of illusions and encouraged students to find 
their own ways to the light.  Andrew Kippis, editor of the Biographia Britannica 
and former student of Doddridge at Kibworth academy, offers the following 
account of this method by which Doddridge prepared and encouraged students 
to make their own judgments on important and difficult issues: 
He represented the arguments, and referred to the authorities on 
both sides.  The students were left to judge for themselves; and 
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they did judge for themselves, with his perfect concurrence and 
approbation; though, no doubt, it was natural for him to be pleased 
when their sentiments coincided with his.  Where this was not the 
case, it made not alteration in his affection and kind treatment, as 
the writer of this present narrative can gratefully witness.  (280). 
While Kippis and his peers found the features of the comparative method 
“useful” (280), conservative and evangelical dissenters criticized Doddridge’s 
approach for giving students “the impression that they were qualified to be 
judges” (A. Murray 105-06, Thomas 136).  Such criticism manifests the view that 
students have no knowledge of their own, that they are empty containers that 
must be filled with information.  This view of education is the same one to which 
Freire applies the banking metaphor.  It is the same view that maintains a fixed 
distinction between human cognition and objective knowledge and that stifles 
creative and authentic engagement in the world. 
Doddridge anticipates the contemporary understanding of language as an 
important element in the dialectical relationship between human cognition and 
the world.  In a confession of faith at Northampton, he defines the role of 
language in shaping concepts and beliefs: 
I have used some human phrases which seemed to me properly to 
express the sense of Scripture, yet I would by no means offer any 
of them as a standard by which opinions are to be tried, nor quarrel 
with any who may not be thoroughly satisfied with them, for it is 
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one very important article of my faith that I am bound in duty 
affectionately to esteem and embrace all who practically comply 
with the design of the revelation and love of our Lord Jesus Christ 
in sincerity, how much soever they may differ from myself in their 
language or their conceptions about any speculative points.  (qtd. 
in Waddington 287) 
Doddridge is very clear in his confession that the language he uses to express 
the truths of Scripture might not represent an accurate truth for others.  He does 
not suggest that his expressions diverge from the revelation and love of Jesus 
Christ but that they simply diverge from other ways of expressing the same.  
Because words have complex social and historical meanings, a single 
expression can mean different things to different people.  As Doddridge’s good 
friend Watts explains in Logick, divergent meanings can arise from, among other 
things, the experiential associations and emotional prejudices of words (94-113).  
Accordingly, where one group has come to accept a certain interpretation or 
expression of Scripture as truth, another may reject it.  Even though both 
expressions may attempt to capture the general sense of a specific scriptural 
passage, their different ways of expressing that sense betray their commonality.  
Doddridge’s statement on phraseology may provide insight into his religious 
liberalism, for it hints at the notion that sectarian division is foremost a matter of 
language prejudice.  In postmodern terms, the idea can be explained through 
the concept of discourse communities, where denominational boundaries are 
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drawn and distinguished by different ways of expressing scriptural revelation.  
Because the concept holds that language is the foundation of human thought 
and belief, different expressions denote different ways of knowing (and creating) 
the world. 
 Doddridge’s idea that linguistic behavior shapes cognition and influences 
interpretation and understanding of the world anticipates modern cognitive 
linguistics, especially the work of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson.  In 
Metaphors We Live By, they argue that metaphors are not the exclusive 
ornamental property of literature and rhetoric but also play an indispensable 
epistemological role in everyday language use.  According to the authors, 
human concepts are structured metaphorically.  That is to say, we understand 
things in terms of other things.  Whereas the traditional view of metaphor—as a 
literary and rhetorical device—centers on expression, Lakoff and Johnson’s view 
centers on the degree to which metaphor structures reality.  The authors do not 
maintain a distinction between word and world but establish unity between them. 
They argue that ways of talking are ways of knowing and that ways of knowing 
define reality: 
Our concepts structure what we perceive, how we get around in 
the world, and how we relate to other people.  Our conceptual 
system thus plays a central role in defining our everyday realities.  
If we are right in suggesting that our conceptual system is largely 
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metaphorical, then the way we think, what we experience, and we 
do everyday is very much a matter of metaphor. (3) 
Because different cultures and communities structure their concepts around 
different metaphors, a variety of realities and truths exist simultaneously in the 
world.  As Lakoff and Johnson put it, “truth is always relative to a conceptual 
system that is defined in large part by metaphor” (159).  This statement 
addresses the point that Doddridge makes about language, concept, and truth.  
It suggests that the elements cannot be divorced. And even though Doddridge 
seemingly subscribes to this epistemological view of language, he temporarily 
dismantles the relationship between expression and truth when he speaks of a 
“sense” of Scripture—that is, the general meaning of Scripture, unmediated by 
language.  The significance of separating substance from style is that he can 
consider the possibility that sectarian disagreement is an apparition of language 
and not necessarily veritable theological disparity. 
 I agree with supposition that language can create a façade of 
disagreement where it does not otherwise exist, but only to an extent.  Because 
there exists no prepackaged terminology for which to explain new and emerging 
concepts—especially the transcendental—we can only, as Lakoff and Johnson 
say, “get a grasp on them by means of other concepts that we understand in 
clearer terms” (115).  Of course, when different terms are applied to similar 
concepts, those concepts will no longer appear similar.  What is more, as they 
are absorbed into the collective consciousness of cultures and communities, 
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awareness of their metaphorical nature eventually subsides.  This is the point at 
which I cannot fully accept the possibility of disagreement as a manifestation of 
language, for if ways of talking about concepts shape those concepts, then 
linguistic difference is substantive difference. 
 From the position that language and thought are inseparable—a position 
that Doddridge hints at holding—the clearest path to free inquiry and the best 
way to think beyond dogma would be a new academic language, one whose 
expressions were not as fully associated with specific ideas and doctrines as 
Latin.  During Doddridge’s time, Latin had a strong presence in higher education.  
Of course, it was the primary language of learning at Oxford and Cambridge, 
where classical education was still the curriculum de rigueur; but it was also 
common in the dissenting academies, where practical education reigned 
supreme.  “Up to the time of Doddridge,” writes Gordon, “the lectures in divinity, 
philosophy, science, in all Dissenting Academies had been delivered in Latin” 
(23).  Many tutors, including Watts, taught English composition in their schools, 
but they continued to use Latin for many subjects.  Doddridge did not.  
According to Gordon, he found no use in Latin and abolished it from his 
academy, making him the first theology teacher to lecture in English, an 
innovation that signified a repudiation of ancient prejudice and an acceptance of 
a new approach to theological study (23).  Because different ways of expressing 
Scripture could influence scriptural interpretation and shape sectarian dogma, 
English gave students an opportunity to study theology from a perspective that 
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was fresh and new.  This is not to say that vernacular English sidesteps the 
potential for dogmatism.  It harbors the same potential for dogmatism as Latin or 
any other language.  However, as a newcomer to the intellectual study of 
philosophy and theology, English gave students and scholars greater 
opportunity to think beyond inherited theological traditions and to develop new 
ideas for a new age.  In the following quote, Gordon explains the significance of 
Doddridge’s decision to lecture in English, and though he speaks primarily of 
theology, his statement is applicable to all academic disciplines:  “Theology, 
released from the trammels of unvarying technical terms, could take on new 
forms of expression; a living language is the only right vehicle for living thought” 
(23). 
  Just as Rowe and Jennings influenced the pedagogical visions of their 
students, Watts and Doddridge had a marked influence the teaching practices of 
their students, the future tutors of England’s dissenting academies.  Two tutors 
in particular illustrate Doddridge’s influence: Caleb Ashworth and Samuel Clark, 
the junior.  Both men were students of Doddridge and simultaneously filled the 
vacancy at Northampton when their teacher died in 1751, eventually moving the 
academy to Daventry.  Ashworth and Clark respected their former teacher’s 
critical approach to education and worked to employ Doddridge’s comparative 
method of instruction and to welcome classroom debate.  According to Gordon, 
lectures were structured such that Ashworth would argue the conservative side 
of an issue, while Clark argued the opposite (28).  By way of their two-pronged 
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approach, Ashworth and Clark would eventually pass Doddridge’s comparative 
method on to Joseph Priestley, who Thomas Miller claims is the “most broadly 
significant teacher of English in the dissenting academy tradition” (98).  Much of 
Priestley’s pedagogical success derives from the comparative method that he 
inherited by proxy from Doddridge.  As Thomas Miller notes, Priestley’s 
pedagogy centered on classroom discussion, student debates, and prepared 
arguments (100).  Furthermore, much like Watts and Doddridge, he focused on 
practical learning, teaching courses that prepared students for clerical 
appointment in dissenting churches and for careers in business during a time 
when Oxford and Cambridge were still teaching the classics. 
 
Conclusion 
While the dissenting academies, under the influence of tutors like Watts 
Doddridge, were well on their way to achieving their goal of political and social 
reform, they lost their direction by the end of the eighteenth century.  While the 
academies were affiliated with ministers of various nonconforming churches—
ranging from Baptist to Unitarian—denominational interests rarely trumped their 
commitment to education.  When it came to choosing a school, the academic 
reputation of an academy would often overshadow commitment to religious 
denomination.  In fact, many Anglicans sent their children to dissenting 
academies because they provided better education than the universities at 
Oxford and Cambridge.  However, as sectarian competition in England grew 
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more intense near the end of the century, denominational organizations 
exercised greater authority over dissenting academies (MacArthur 277), and 
tutors began to require that all entering students subscribe to a definite creed 
(Parker 136).  “This narrowing of their borders,” writes Parker, “was the cause of 
the decay of the academies as centres of general learning” (136).  Because the 
dissenting academies offered the means to social and political change, the 
narrowing of their borders might also be said to have significantly obstructed 
reform efforts.  Where the academies once fostered critical thought, they now 
promoted the orthodoxy of their governing bodies.  This sectarian turn undercut 
the democratic approach to education that methodologically distinguished 
dissenting academies from the universities and once again silenced student 
voices in the classroom.  From a Freirean perspective, that silence signifies a 
departure from the historical ideals of the dissenting academies, for they no 
longer provided education for citizenship. 
The luxury of hindsight lets modern pedagogues assess the history of 
eighteenth-century critical pedagogy in the context of a similar educational 
endeavor unfolding today, the twentieth-century reincarnation of critical 
pedagogy.  Because critical pedagogy is still practiced in American writing 
classrooms, its directions and future developments remain unknown.  Such 
uncertainty, however, does not mean that teachers should blindly contribute to 
its developing narrative.  By examining the circumstances and pedagogies of 
England’s eighteenth-century dissenting academies, writing teachers will be 
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better prepared to lead critical pedagogy to a successful future, achieving its 
ambitious goal of radical democracy.  In this endeavor, writing pedagogues must 
eschew the tendency to define too narrowly their pedagogical boundaries.  Such 
delineation can blind them to advancements in writing instruction and alienate 
pedagogues of a different theoretical constitution.  When a sectarian agenda 
becomes more important than pedagogical advancement, teachers begin to 
work against each other in competition, often to the peril of students. 
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CONCLUSION: CRITICALLY ASSESSING THE COURSE OF 
CRITICAL PEDAGOGY 
 This dissertation attempts to provide an alternative history to the practice 
of critical pedagogy in college writing classrooms.  I have argued that the key 
principles of critical pedagogy, first articulated by Paulo Freire in Pedagogy of 
the Oppressed, were practiced by a number of pedagogues as early as the 
eighteenth century.  I have examined the teaching methods of these men and 
argue that they anticipate the methods of critical pedagogy.  My analysis 
spotlights the need to reinterpret the historical narrative of critical pedagogy and 
to select a wider lens through which to understand the current pedagogical 
scene. 
 My examination of critical pedagogy has centered on the three dominant 
characteristics that define Freire’s critical methodology: decentered classrooms 
where students and teachers democratically engage course material through 
dialogue; the use of relevant discussion topics in which students have expertise, 
experience, and interest; and a focus on the generative power of language and 
its ability to create and transform reality.  Contrary to most scholarship on critical 
pedagogy, I do not focus on the content of the critical classroom.  Because 
Freire views education as the practice of freedom, he is more concerned with 
how teachers teach than what they teach.  He is not interested in imparting a 
political agenda, as critics of critical pedagogy have argued, for such would 
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contradict his message of freedom and subject him to his own attacks against 
banking education.  Freirean critical pedagogy opposes the model of instruction 
that Hairston says is dominant in freshman writing programs, “a model that puts 
dogma before diversity, politics before craft, ideology before critical thinking, and 
the social goals of the teacher before the educational needs of the students” 
(“Diversity” 180).   My historical examination preserves Freire’s emphasis on 
classroom practice and methodology. 
 Approaching critical pedagogy as practice, I have located several 
parallels between critical pedagogy and the process and expressive movements 
of the late 1960s and early ‘70s.  Although some critics (e.g. Berlin and Berthoff) 
have drawn sharp distinctions between the pedagogies, I have shown that the 
work of Elbow and Murray anticipate many of the aims and methods of critical 
pedagogy.  One of the most contentious points relates to epistemology.  Berlin 
and Berthoff argue that expressivism takes a subjective approach to meaning 
that is incompatible with the social aspects of critical pedagogy.  Accordingly, 
they dismiss the former as either solipsistic or not concerned with meaning.  My 
analysis of the works of Elbow and Murray dispute these claims. Both 
pedagogues create writing laboratories where students interact and share their 
work with each other.  This process gives writers an opportunity to gain insight 
into how their words are experienced by actual readers.  When readers react, 
writers can see that their words are not always experienced as intended, that 
meaning resides within the social interaction between both parties.  The process 
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embodies Freire’s claim that humans exist with the world and with others.  
Moreover, it provides an opportunity to reflect upon and transform reality through 
dialogue.  These opportunities are engendered by the student-centered 
classrooms and writing topics that process pedagogy and expressivism support.  
My interpretation of the teaching methods of Elbow and Murray suggests that 
they are not irreconcilable with critical pedagogy and other social-epistemic 
rhetorics and can be viewed as preludes to critical pedagogy.  Accordingly, I 
revise the narratives that characterize the emergence of critical pedagogy in the 
1970s as an evolutionary (or revolutionary) leap beyond the so-called subjective 
pedagogies of expressivism and process pedagogy. 
 I have also argued that the pedagogical advancements of I. A. Richards 
anticipated the principle teaching methods of critical pedagogy.  My analysis of 
Practical Criticism, for example, suggests that Richards was an early proponent 
of democratic education.  Richards believed that literary analysis developed the 
same skills that are necessary for interpreting experience and reality, and he 
developed a strategy for improving those skills.  Noticing that his students often 
responded to the reputations of authors instead of texts, he began to remove 
identifying markers from works of poetry analyzed in class.  He intended the 
strategy to elicit from students more authentic responses to literary texts.  
Nevertheless, the strategy was co-opted by a new wave of formalist critics, the 
new critics, who interpreted it as an affirmation that works of literature are best 
approached as self-contained artifacts.  Such appropriation has long linked 
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Richards to New Criticism, causing him to fall out of fashion with the decline of 
literary formalism.  My analysis of Richards’s teaching methods and theories 
shows that he actually resisted the objective view of meaning that underlies 
literary formalism; it shows that he saw meaning, instead, as a triadic event in 
which subjects, symbols, and objects interact.  Richards was hopeful that 
awareness of this dialectical process might provide a foundation for better 
communication between people and for the positive transformation of society.  
Accordingly, he tried to establish an educational environment where students 
could engage the meaning-making process.   Such attempts, I have argued, 
situate Richards more comfortably among contemporary approaches to writing 
instruction like critical pedagogy than it does among formalist approaches like 
current-traditionalism. 
 Lastly, I have argued that Isaac Watts and Philip Doddridge, two 
eighteenth-century English nonconformist educators, employed a number of 
teaching methods that parallel contemporary critical pedagogy.  Within their 
classrooms, Watts and Doddridge created participatory learning environments 
that centered on practical subjects.  They were among the first educators to 
teach in the English vernacular and to augment the traditional classical 
curriculum with new learning in science and reason.  Watts, especially, 
encouraged participation in the classroom.  He believed that students should 
engage lectures, rather than merely attend them.  He encouraged students to 
ask questions during lectures and to enter conversation with their teachers and 
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fellow students.  He viewed dialogue as an instrument for participating in 
education and for engaging knowledge, a process that parallels Freire’s notion 
praxis.  Doddridge’s approach to learning was slightly different.  He practiced a 
comparative method of instruction that embodied several features of Freire’s 
problem-posing model.  Doddridge would present students with multiple 
perspectives on controversial issues and urge them not merely to side with 
established positions but to enter into pseudo-dialogues with those positions, a 
process that prepared and encouraged students to form their own conclusions.  
My analysis and interpretation of the teaching methods of Watts and Doddridge 
revise the dominant narrative that portrays eighteenth-century writing instruction 
as exclusively current-traditional.  I demonstrate that the pedagogies of Watts 
and Doddridge parallel critical pedagogy, to the extent that they embody Freire’s 
emphasis on linguistic praxis, classroom participation, and practical learning. 
  
Bridging Historical Contexts 
 While the emphasis of my research is classroom practice, I am also 
interested in the contexts in which these preludes to critical pedagogy emerge.  
I, therefore, begin my chapters with an overview of the social, political, and 
economic situations that mark each time period, especially insofar as they shape 
the scene of higher education.  My study reveals some commonalities between 
the contexts of these historical periods: antiauthoritarian movements shook the 
political establishments of England in the 1700s and of the United States in the 
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1960s and ‘70s, and underrepresented groups gained political power in England 
during the first World War and in the United States during the second World War 
and Vietnam Conflict.  Although the details of these events and others vary, they 
nevertheless contributed to the changing scene of education in their time.  
Specifically, they made higher education more widely accessible to men and 
women.  I believe that the pedagogies of Elbow, Murray, Richards, Watts, and 
Doddridge developed in an attempt to deal with the diverse demographics of 
their classrooms. 
 The historical exigency of process pedagogy and expressivism is well 
established and documented.  Scholars believe that these pedagogies emerged 
because current-traditionalism, the then dominant mode of writing instruction in 
the United States, was not capable of teaching diverse groups of students how 
to write.  As I explain in Chapter II, a number federal and state policies initiated 
after World War II made higher education more accessible to a wider student 
demographic; at the same time, however, they also accelerated a pedagogical 
crisis in the composition classroom.  Maxine Hairston echoes this common 
interpretation of policy and pedagogy in “The Winds of Change”: 
[T]he external conditions which have hastened the crisis in 
teaching of writing are open admissions policies, the return to 
school of veterans and other groups of older students who are less 
docile and rule-bound [ . . . ], and the ever larger number of high 
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school graduates going on to college as our society demands more 
and more credentials for economic citizenship. (82) 
Prior to these changes in student populations, American colleges and 
universities were limited to more affluent sectors of society.  College-bound 
students, therefore, largely came from similar social, economic, and educational 
backgrounds.  Current-traditional writing instruction was well-suited to this 
demographic because it “reinforced middle-class values, such as social stability 
and cultural homogeneity” (Burnham 22); however, it was not well-suited to the 
increasingly diverse student populations of the post-WWII era.  Non-traditional 
students did not share the same values as traditional students, and the dominant 
method of teaching writing—reflecting and reinforcing, as it did, the hegemonic 
norm—could not effectively bridge the divide. 
 Finding the methods of current-traditionalism ineffective, Murray and 
Elbow led a movement of new composition pedagogies. Their methods opposed 
the controlling assumptions of traditional writing instruction and placed students 
at the center of the learning process.  To the extent their methods foreground 
the experiences and insights of students, Murray and Elbow seem to have been 
trying to fashion an alternative approach to writing instruction that could more 
effectively address issues of diversity within in the classroom.  While Murray’s 
and Elbow’s ideas about writing—particularly, that it is a recursive process 
beginning with the interests and knowledge of writers—might have seemed 
revolutionary at the time, their teaching methods are what posed the greatest 
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challenge to current-traditionalism.  For as some scholars have pointed out, it is 
possible to teach the ideas of process and expressive writing in a manner that is 
as teacher-centered and rule-bound as the traditional paradigm of writing 
instruction.  Consider the following anecdote by Lab Tobin, in which he recounts 
the story of a colleague who decided to embrace process pedagogy a decade 
after the movement had begun. 
I remember being surprised and pleased that Evelyn had come 
over to the process side of the force, but not so surprised or 
pleased when the next week, from the other side of the partition, I 
heard her explaining her version of the method to one of her 
students: “You have not done any freewriting here.  You can’t just 
jump from brainstorming straight to composing.  You can’t skip 
steps.” (11). 
As Tobin’s story demonstrates, the ideas of Murray and Elbow can become 
products themselves, static regimens imposed by the very teaching methods 
that process pedagogy and expressivism originally sought to critique and 
supplant.  As such, they are no more able than current-traditionalism to deal with 
classroom diversity, at least not when teachers impose the ideas via the banking 
model of education.  However, when a student-centered methodology, such as 
critical pedagogy, accompanies the ideas of process and expressive writing, as 
Murray and Elbow explicitly intended, then the pedagogies are able to deal more 
effectively with diversity in the classroom.  The strength of critical pedagogy lies 
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in its ability to reflect (and empower) the diverse voices of students.  Murray and 
Elbow developed their pedagogies in an effort to draw these voices out and to 
engage students in the making and remaking of knowledge. 
 The context in which the critical pedagogies of the 1960s and ‘70s 
developed is similar to that in which I. A. Richards developed his teaching 
methods in the 1920s.  Like Murray and Elbow, Richards taught during a time of 
social change.  By the early nineteenth century, industrialization and war had 
moved England toward greater social, economic, and political equality.  This 
movement was accompanied by educational reforms that eliminated public 
education fees and increased the legal dropout age.  As a result, a wider variety 
of young men and women stayed in school and were prepared to pursue higher 
education.  By the time Richards began his teaching career at Magdalene 
College, Cambridge, the university was no longer an exclusive institution for 
upper-class Anglican boys.  It had opened its doors to women, foreigners, and 
working-class scholarship students.  This demographic expansion of student 
population revealed inadequacies in traditional pedagogies; hence Richards 
mission to find “educational methods more efficient than those we use now” 
(Practical Criticism 3). 
 Considered through the lens of the late-twentieth-century pedagogical 
crisis in the United States, Richards’s teaching innovations can be interpreted as 
an attempt to discover more effective ways of teaching diverse students.  Like 
Murray and Elbow in their time, Richards found traditional teaching methods 
   168
   
 
 
incapable of addressing the learning needs of students.  That the shortcomings 
of these traditional methods would surface in 1920s, after years of dominating 
higher education without significant challenge, suggests aggravation to the 
educational status quo.  Because the most noteworthy change to the university 
environment in England in the early twentieth century was a shift in student 
enrollment demographics, it is reasonable to conclude that classroom diversity 
provided the exigency for Richards to develop new pedagogical methods.  
Furthermore, it is no coincidence that Richards’s methods parallel those of 
critical pedagogy.  Like Murray and Elbow, Richards pursued and found a 
pedagogy that could deal with diversity in the classroom, one whose methods 
establish learning environments where participants dialogue about differences in 
their perspectives and experiences, consider the extent to which their concrete 
situations shape their interpretations, and collaborate on the production of 
knowledge. 
 Diversity also suffused the educational environment in which Watts and 
Doddridge pursued their pedagogical advancements in the eighteenth-century.  
Whereas Oxford and Cambridge opened their doors to a very narrow 
demographic, the dissenting academies flung their doors wide open.  They 
made it possible for students from a variety of backgrounds to pursue a higher 
education.  Because the dissenting academies had no religious restrictions and 
their financial burden was minimal, dissenters from all ranks attended the 
academies.  Moreover, because the practical curriculum of dissenting 
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academies was often more desirable than the classical curriculum of the 
universities, members of the establishment would also attend the academies.     
The result was a diverse student constituency of underprivileged and privileged, 
nonconforming and conforming young men of varied educational backgrounds. 
 Unlike their peers at Oxford and Cambridge, Watts and Doddridge could 
not take the one-size-fits-all approach to education.  Their students came from a 
variety of backgrounds that shaped their perspectives, experiences, knowledge, 
and skills.  To teach from a single position or viewpoint would be to ignore those 
differences.  Given that Watts and Doddridge were both dissenters, it is not likely 
that they would look beyond diversity and promote conformity in the classroom, 
for their public identities centered almost exclusively on their own nonconformity.  
Just as they believed their voices mattered in the social and political world, they 
seem to have believed that their students’ voices mattered in the classroom.  
Their pedagogies, thus, seem to reflect the view that discussions about 
difference matter, that dialogue provides a means for understanding and 
resolving social inequalities.  Like Murray and Elbow in the twentieth century, 
Watts and Doddridge practiced a critical methodology that empowered their 
diverse students to transform the world. 
 Across the historical contexts of the various preludes to critical pedagogy 
lie a single constant:  diverse student constituencies.  Unlike their professional 
predecessors, Watts, Doddridge, Richards, Murray, and Elbow did not stand 
before homogenous groups of students in the classroom; they stood, instead, 
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before groups of students from myriad backgrounds.  Histories of contemporary 
composition theory interpret the pedagogical revolutions of the 1960s and ‘70s 
as largely a response to changes in student demographics.  Given the similarity 
of contexts, the pedagogical innovations of the 1700s and 1920s should be 
interpreted in the same way. 
 
Bridging Sectarian Divides 
 Whereas diversity appears to be the exigency behind the development of 
critical pedagogy in the eighteenth century, a desire to choke that diversity led to 
the eventual demise of the dissenting academies.  One of the reasons that the 
academies had become popular sites of learning was that their commitment to 
education and social change surpassed their commitment to the sectarian 
interests of their respective religious denominations.  Even though academies 
were affiliated with various nonconforming churches, their tutors provided an 
open-minded education.  However, toward the end of the eighteenth century, 
sectarian competition grew more intense and dissenting academies began to 
impose religious tests.  These limitations placed dogma before diversity and 
redefined the social and educational mission of the academies, which soon 
disappeared. 
 The decline of dissenting academies offers a lesson and warning to 
contemporary composition pedagogues: embrace difference and reject sectarian 
rivalry.  Just as competition between the diverse factions of religious dissent in 
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England eventually undermined the nonconformity movement, competition 
between the diverse theories of writing instruction can undermine the field of 
contemporary composition studies.  Many new teachers, following the lead of 
most introductory texts on composition pedagogy, conceptualize the diverse 
theories of teaching writing as non-overlapping and self-contained projects.  
They see each pedagogical theory as distinct from the others.  This manner of 
distinguishing between various pedagogical approaches is useful, but it also has 
the tendency to make writing teachers feel as though they must choose and 
practice a single pedagogy.  I witnessed such tendency in two graduate courses 
in pedagogical theory, where students often proclaimed, for example, that they 
liked the idea of freewriting but could not employ the strategy because they were 
self-identified rhetorical pedagogues.  In one course, the professor agreed with 
students, saying it was important for teachers to remain consistent in their 
pedagogical choices; in the other, the professor offered a more inclusive 
response, saying that teachers should experiment with a variety of ideas and 
strategies from across theoretical boundaries.  I think both responses are 
correct: instructors should think carefully about their pedagogical choices and 
how they fit into the framework of a course; but they should also not shy away 
from effective teaching methods just because those methods originate from 
within the established theoretical boundaries of rival pedagogies. 
 Despite the limitations of teaching within narrow methodological 
boundaries, such is encouraged by the abundance of pedagogical scholarship 
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that emphasizes pedagogical dissonance over harmony.  Consider, for example, 
Berlin’s Rhetoric and Reality, a staple in most graduate courses in composition 
theory: its primary objective is to create an epistemological taxonomy by which 
to understand and rank the dominant approaches to writing instruction.  While I 
think Berlin’s taxonomy is useful, I also think that he tries too hard to squeeze 
pedagogies into his epistemological categories.  Case in point: his treatment of 
expressivism unfairly portrays the pedagogy as individualistic, as unconcerned 
with the social and material world.  These efforts unequivocally designate 
expressivism as a subjective rhetoric, a category that it actually defies.  
Nevertheless, Berlin’s characterization resonated within the field and divided 
teachers of composition.  As a result, supporters of expressivism devoted great 
effort defending the pedagogy, while detractors devoted equal effort defending 
their critiques thereof (e.g. the Bartholomae/Elbow debate) 
 The rivalry that Berlin initiated between expressivism and social-epistemic 
rhetoric strikes me as unproductive.  It encouraged sectarian division more than 
it did collaborative unity.  This consequence is observed and epitomized in the 
legendary Bartholomae/Elbow debate, where Bartholomae is so attuned to the 
established differences between his social constructivist pedagogy and Elbow’s 
so-called subjective pedagogy that he cannot see their similarity.  Bartholomae 
says that college writing courses should be “academic” to the extent that they 
promote critical inquiry, perceive the classroom as real space, and challenge 
dominant forms of knowledge (483).  Elbow agrees: these points do not run 
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counter to his pedagogy but actually find support in his work.  Nevertheless, 
Bartholomae continues to charge that Elbow’s classroom is a utopian creation 
that ignores the social and historical foundations of knowledge.  Given 
Bartholomae’s proclivity to foreground difference, as well as his inability to 
reconsider assumptions about rival pedagogies, no new pedagogical insights 
are gleaned from the debate.  There is no guarantee that the establishment of 
common ground would have yielded more productive results; however, it would 
have provided a stronger foundation for authentic dialogue, the process through 
which, according to Freire, new possibilities emerge.  Herein lies the danger of 
sectarian competition: when rival pedagogues do not dialogue with each other 
but about each other, they jeopardize their potential to make pedagogical 
progress and to achieve professional success. 
 Pedagogical sectarianism is not limited to competition between 
contemporary pedagogical theories; it also spans history and pits today’s 
pedagogies against their predecessors.  After the rhetorical renaissance of the 
late 1960s and early ‘70s, scholars largely portrayed writing instruction since the 
nineteenth century as current-traditional (e.g. Berlin, Writing Instruction 85).  
Because the new writing pedagogies had developed in response to the 
ineffectual methods of current-traditionalism, few compositionists were eager to 
celebrate the achievements of their generational forebears.  As a consequence, 
important and progressive scholars were often ignored.  I. A. Richards, for 
example, was pushed to the margins of legitimate scholarship because his 
   174
   
 
 
association with literary formalism, unwarranted though it was, represented the 
image of outdated literary and pedagogical theories.  Since then, a few scholars 
have tried to revive an interest in Richards but have been unsuccessful.  I 
believe that the characterization of Richards’s ideas, as incompatible with 
contemporary theories of literature and pedagogy, is the reason that scholars 
refuse to re-engage his work.  By emphasizing difference, contemporary 
composition studies will never know the extent to which Richards and other 
historical pedagogues can contribute to success of student writing.  We must not 
simply read and study about our past; we must engage in dialogue with it. 
 I have attempted to apply the lessons eighteenth-century dissenting 
academies to my scholarly investigation of critical pedagogy.  I have not allowed 
the established boundaries of history or theory to limit the scope of my research.  
As a result, I have argued for a revised narrative of the history of critical 
pedagogy in the writing classroom.  I have also argued for a more inclusive view 
of pedagogical diversity.  Just as the desire to bridge student differences in the 
classroom led to predecessors of critical pedagogy in the eighteenth and 
twentieth centuries, our willingness to bridge pedagogical differences today can 
lead to greater pedagogical advancements tomorrow.  Moreover, just as the 
social and political commitments of the dissenting academies strengthened the 
cause of dissent, our shared commitment to student writing will strengthen our 
discipline.  However, if we become too rigid in our commitments to pedagogy, 
then contemporary composition studies may travel the same fateful arc as the 
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English dissenting academies. We must always remember that transformative 
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